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Summary
Biofuels are being extensively developed around the world thanks to the support
of states, which is a necessary condition for their production. Thus, the focus of
this dissertation is to study the regulation of biofuel policies. More precisely, this
work intends to enlighten the strong links between biofuel and agricultural policies.
Policies directed to biofuel production have changed dramatically over the past three
years, evolving from the status of a secondary policy within agricultural policies to
the position of a central policy at the crossroads of agricultural, environmental and
energy policies. The work exposed in this dissertation is divided in three parts. First,
the reasons that have led to the sudden development of biofuels are presented. Then,
in a second part, the interactions of biofuel policies with the present agricultural
policies are dealt with. The aim of this second part is to assess the extent to which
these policies ought to be amended in order to account for the growing importance of
energy crops in the total agricultural production. Finally, the third part focuses on the
new regulatory framework imposed by the dual production of the agricultural sector
(an environmental good and an agricultural commodity): a Common Agency setting
is chosen to address this issue. Moreover, this last part strives to anticipate the future
reforms of the CAP, in which the dual regulation (at the EU and Member State
levels) calls for a new framework for policy analysis. Hence, the common thread
of all the ideas developed in this dissertation is the mutual interactions that exist
between biofuel and agricultural policies. Biofuel policies have emerged thanks to the
8
reform of the CAP in 1992, are now an important player of the present CAP and will
undoubtedly be a central issue in the future reforms of agricultural policies.
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Introduction
Biofuel policies have by now gained a signicant importance worldwide. While
huge biofuel plans have been unveiled, the setting of ambitious production objectives
does not close the discussion over biofuels. On the contrary, an intense scientic de-
bate on the links between biofuel policies and agricultural, environmental and energy
policies has been building up.
Biofuels are produced from a wide variety of feedstocks, in a growing number
of countries. Indeed, the generic term "biofuels" spans a large array of situations.
A quick overview will help visualizing the products that will be referred to all along
this dissertation. There are two leading biofuels in the world: ethanol and biodiesel,
respectively blended with gasoline and diesel. Ethanol is produced from sugar crops
(sugarcane or sugarbeet) or crops containing starch (corn, wheat and cassava princi-
pally). Biodiesel is made by esterifying a simple alcohol (generally methanol) with
a vegetable oil (rapeseed, soybean, palm, sunower, coconut, coton, etc.). The co-
products of biodiesel production are cakes (stemming from the crushing of oilseeds),
and glycerine (produced during the esterication process). While cakes can be used
to feed cattle, glycerine is directed to the cosmetic and pharmaceutical industries.
Contrary to ethanol, biodiesel is not a simple molecule: its properties hinge upon the
feedstock used to produce it.1 Ethanol from sugarcane (produced mainly in Brazil)
1 The most important physical property is the formation of wax at cold temperatures. For instance, palm
oil becomes solid below 15C, which prevents its exclusive use as a feedstock for biodiesel in temperate
climates: it must be blended with soy oil or rapeseed oil.
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is characterized by the lowest production costs and the highest energy yields, since a
co-product obtained from sugarcane crushing (bagasse) is burnt for power generation
in distilleries.
Biofuels depend on two markets for their protability: the agricultural com-
modities market, which determines the price of the input, and the oil market, which
is the main determinant of the price at which biofuels are traded. However, we should
not conclude that the inuence of biofuels on both market are of the same magni-
tude: if the signs of an inuence of the biofuel boom on agricultural markets have
materialized (see, e.g. Babcock, 2007 and Schmidhuber, 2007), the inuence of bio-
fuel production on the oil market is nill, biofuels being still very small players in the
energy market. Hence, our studies have been conducted on the premise that the rela-
tionships between biofuels and agriculture were a richer eld to invest than the links
between biofuels and the energy market.
There are many quantitative studies being now conducted on biofuels, be it on a
very small scale (a county in the USA where a corn plant has been built) or on a global
scale (general equilibrium models predicting the evolutions of prices in response to a
demand shock generated by the emergence of biofuels). However, the ever changing
scopes of biofuel programs2 and the uncertainty over the durability of the commitment
from the states (as regards economic instruments set up to develop the biofuel sector)
call for a very frequent update of the studies, whose results become obsolete within a
2 The US and the EU have repeatedly increased the objectives of their biofuels plans over the past 5 years.
In the US for instance, a plan forescasting 7.5 billion gallons in 2012 was announced in 2005. In 2007, a new
biofuel program raised these gures to 35 billion gallons in 2017.
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few months. Moreover, these studies often brush under the carpet the fact that the
biofuel industry is massively supported by the states. Hence, any study that puts
forwards the positive e¤ects of biofuels (as regards agricultural prices for instance)
should not forget that huge amounts of money are being spent (by the taxpayer or the
consumer) for this industry to break even. These subsidies (and mandatory blending
schemes) come in addition to the "traditional" payments directed to agriculture. In
the US and in the EU, the support adds up to $4 billion per year (subsidies only).
Even in Brazil (the most e¢ cient producer in the world), the support is evaluated
at $1 billion (OECD and ITF, 2007). The aim of this thesis is not to assess the
protability of biofuels in 10 years time for instance. This undertaking would be
meaningless: biofuels are positioned in the midst of swiftly changing frameworks.
A plumetting oil market and/or strong agricultural prices are the greatest risks that
could a¤ect their protability in the upcoming years. Should such a scenario concretize
for biofuels, the support of the states would then be put into question, as the needed
tax-cuts for the biofuels to break even could quickly become unsustainable for their
budgets (likewise, a biofuel mandate in such a market conguration would be harshly
criticized by consumers associations). Moreover, environmental concerns (linked to
the sustainability of palm oil production for instance) could be a reason leading to a
phasing out of the support awarded to biofuels.
The point of view chosen in this study is a public economics approach, in which
we strive to consider the widest range of consequences caused by the decision to
produce biofuels. This means that we ought to encompass a large array of economic
17
Introduction
agents (farmers, consumers, taxpayers, biofuel industries, food industries, national
government, federal government, etc.) in our study and to take into consideration
the many related policies with which biofuel programs interact (environmental, energy
and agricultural policies mainly). The cornerstone of biofuel economics lies in the
strong implication of the regulators in the setup and the running of biofuel programs.
Indeed, no biofuel program can emerge without the strong will of a regulator to
support such a policy, since the production of biofuels is almost never protable.3
Hence, a large consensus has simultaneously been building up in many countries under
the pressure of well-organized agricultural lobbies. Biofuel programs have obtained
huge levels of public support (be it under the form of tax cuts or mandatory blending)
which have triggered o¤ high levels of production.4
Until the beginning of years 2000, biofuels were largely considered as a mere
accompanying measure of agricultural policies in the United States (US) and in the
European Union (EU). The case of Brazil was not really di¤erent, as the Proalcool
program launched in 1974 was mainly a plan established to stem overproduction con-
cerns a¤ecting sugarcane distilleries. More recently, the new plans launched in years
2000 have somehow widened the scope of biofuel policies. Biofuels have thus been pre-
sented as policies aiming at alleviating CO2 emissions concerns in the transportation
3 Ethanol has been protable in Brazil in 2005 (ESMAP, 2007), but this should be considered as an
exception.
4 However, as the French situation highlights, the decisions of the regulators to embark on strong biofuel
supports have been only remotely inuenced by economic reasoning. The French agricultural lobbies have
relied extensively on reports made by counsulting rms in order to promote the use of biofuels. These reports
ignored the economic concepts such as opportunity cost and thus led to overly positive conclusions.
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sector (as in the EU) or improving energy independence (as in the USA).5 However,
the aim of this dissertation is to show that all these alleged objectives for biofuels
have been overstated: the main objective of biofuel policies has been the support of
agricultural incomes. Indeed, biofuel policies have always had a very tight link with
agricultural policies. The backbone of this dissertation is therefore the links between
biofuel policies and the reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy: past, present
and future. Of course, the objective of this dissertation is not to proceed to an ex-
haustive presentation of the successive CAP reforms. It is rather to enlighten the
CAP features which have a relationship with biofuel production.
The three parts of this thesis aim at underlining the close relationships that
have been building up between biofuel and agricultural policies.
Part I focuses on the emergence of biofuel policies. In the EU, biofuels have
emerged thanks to a reform of the Common Agricultural Policy in 1992, namely the
introduction of the mandatory set-aside to stem overproduction concerns. Hence,
biofuels appeared since a feature decided in the 1992-CAP left a set-aside land that
could be cultivated with energy crops.6 The motivations of the states to develop bio-
fuels as well as the economic instruments they resort to are presented in Chapter 1.
This chapter also provides a comparison of biofuel policies with the agricultural poli-
cies of the 1980s. As the development of biofuel programs gained strength over the
5 However, it should be noted that two recent articles published in Science ( Searchinger et al. and
Fargione et al., 2008) show that the carbon balance of biofuels would indeed be negative, owing to a "carbon
debt" incurred by biofuels when their production implies land-use changes leading to a carbon release (e.g.
primary forest or peatland transformed into crop elds to produce biofuels).
6 Of course, the implementation of the set-aside was only a small part of the 1992 CAP reform. This reform
marked the beginning of a shift from price support to direct support, which culminated with the 2002 Mid
Term Reform, further completed by the 2007 "Health Check". For further details, see Bureau, 2007.
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past few years, the economic questions surrounding biofuel development have sharply
evolved. Biofuels have long been a secondary matter in agricultural economics. In
the European Union (EU), their emergence is linked to a reform of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), which set aside part of the arable land (around 10%, de-
pending on the year) and thus enabled the production of energy crops on this land
where the production of food crops was forbidden (in order to address the problem
of overproduction). The economic questions linked to the production of biofuels on
set-aside land were well-circumscribed and rather straightforward to answer. The rel-
ative easiness in treating the question stemmed from the marginal situation of biofuel
production (and by extension, of energy crops production) which set a framework
in which biofuels did not have any inuence on the economic variables which deter-
mined their protability. Indeed, the energy demand constituted by biofuels was so
small relatively to the food demand that it had no e¤ect on the equilibria of world
agricultural markets. Of course, biofuels had all the more no inuence on the energy
markets, as the share of biofuels in the total energy used in the transportation sector
are extremely marginal even today (cf. appendix to Chapter 2 ). Hence, the welfare
economic studies compared two situations: producing or not producing energy crops
on set-aside land. We shall shortly address these questions for France in Chapter 2.
Everything changed with the unveiling of massive biofuel programs in the OECD
countries, but also in developing countries. The huge increases that have been ob-
served in the agricultural markets since 20057 give compelling evidence of a strong
7 For instance, wheat price in Europe has been multiplied threefold since 2005.
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link between biofuel production and the price increase.8 Part II therefore concen-
trates on the implications of the large biofuel programs on the actual decoupled CAP
policy. Contrary to part I which demonstrated a formal link between a CAP reform
and the emergence of biofuels, the present CAP policies seem formally unrelated to
biofuel policies. However, the large price impacts of biofuel production on agricul-
tural markets call for a complete re-thinking of the present CAP policy with respect
to the payments awarded to farmers (Chapter 3 ) and the environmental provisions
(Chapter 4 ). Indeed, with the higher price levels triggered by the additional demand
for biofuels, farmers enjoy a double economic support (CAP decoupled payments in
addition to the subsidies for biofuel production). This situation looks bound for a
profound reform as such a big support awarded to farmers seems di¢ cult to justify
in a period of high commodity prices: one solution could be a decrease of decoupled
payments, as will be explained in Chapter 3. Hence, the emergence of biofuel policies
marks a profound change in the path of agricultural policy reform, which has mainly
consisted in decoupling the support awarded to farmers from production decisions.
This evolution has begun with the 1992 reform and was further reinforced during the
Agenda 2000, Mid-term Reform in 2002 and the "Health-Check" which ought to be
adopted prior to the end of 2008.
We present a model of competition between food and energy uses of agricultural
products to evaluate the e¤ects of a biofuel support policy (mandatory blending
or tax-cut). The model brings together the main stakeholders of the policy under
8 Of course, biofuel production is not the sole factor that explains this price increase. Historically low
stocks, harsh weather conditions and a sustained Asian demand contribute to the recent price increase.
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scrutiny: taxpayers, farmers, taxpayers, as well as biofuel and agro-food industries.
The increase in farm incomes made possible by the price hike in agricultural markets
enables the regulator to diminish the decoupled payments, while ensuring a parity
income to farmers. These central questions are addressed in Chapter 3.
Projected real food crop prices, 100 in 2004.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2015
Real Prices
Maize 141 179 186 176 155
Wheat 157 219 211 204 157
Rice 132 201 207 213 192
Soybeans 121 156 150 144 127
Soybean oil 138 170 162 153 119
Sugar 135 169 180 190 185
World Bank (2008)
March 2008 % January 2005
Wheat 440$/ton 186%
Corn 233$/ton 142%
Soybeans 576$/ton 120%
Sugar 291$/ton 51%
Palm oil 1248$/ton 210%
IFAP-WABCG (2008)
As the biofuel programs began to interact with other sectors, the consequences
of biofuel production began to appear far-reaching in scope. The changes might
be positive or negative, each linkage between biofuels and the policy under scrutiny
needing a thorough examination.
Moreover, the framework of higher prices and decreased decoupled payments
puts the cross-compliance schemes at risk: a new regulation of environmental pro-
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visions of the CAP ought to be designed. The close links that have been building
up between biofuels and agriculture were quite easily predictable, once the major
biofuels plans in the OECD countries had been announced. Indeed, all the quanti-
tative models pointed to higher agriculture prices in response to the demand shock
constituted by biofuels. However, the extent of the downside risks a¤ecting the en-
vironment has been gaining momentum as the rst e¤ects of the biofuel plans were
gauged: the increased use of fertilisers and pesticides in the USA and in the EU, as
well as very serious concerns about the sustainability of palm oil plantations in In-
donesia and Malaysia. Hence, environmental policies are in the meantime the reason
that pressed governments to develop biofuels (touted as the solution to GHG con-
cerns in the transportation sector) and one of the most embarrassing negative aspects
that jeopardize the continuation of biofuel policies. The links between biofuel policies
and the environmental provisions in agricultural policies will be dealt with in Chap-
ter 4, with an emphasis on the enforcement issue. Hence, biofuel policy calls for a
profound modication of the present Common Agricultural Policy, which has been
enacted recently (decided in 2003 and enforced in 2005).
Finally, part III aims at formalizing agricultures dilemma between high produc-
tion levels and the respect of stringent environmental provisions linked to the CAP.
Of course, such a tension between environmental and production objectives has al-
ways existed. However, the introduction of environmental provisions in the CAP used
to take place in a situation of low agricultural prices. With the emergence of bio-
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fuels (and the price hikes that they trigger o¤), the opposition between these two
objectives is reinforced.
The last two chapters are built around the framework of Common Agency, a
new branch of Contract Theory. This theory extends the Principal-Agent model
to the presence of n principals (most often, n=2). It9 appears to be a well-suited
theoretical framework to study agricultures dilemma for producing two types of goods
like environmental (e¤ort for reducing the use of polluting inputs) and "classical"
agricultural goods. The question of interest is thus to assess the consequences of the
competition between the two principals on the allocations levels. Common Agency
will be presented in Chapter 5.
Chapter 6 strives to model the regulation of the two types of goods produced by
agriculture: an environmental good and a "classical" agricultural commodity. More
generally, there is a tension between the stringent environmental objectives that the
EU entities (most often the Commission) wish to promote and the opposition of the
MS willing to unleash the production capacities of their agricultural sector. Hence,
Chapter 6 addresses the issue of regulation in the EU context, i.e. with a competition
between the supranational regulator (the EU Commission) and the national regulator
(a Member State). More precisely, the regulation which is considered gives the leader-
ship for imposing its environmental regulation to the EU. This regulation framework
ts well into the setting up of the Common Agricultural Policys successive reforms,
9 The Common Agency adds a very important feature with respect to the traditional principal-agent
relationship: the competition between the two principals in their contractual o¤er. Therefore, when o¤ering
her contract to the agent, the principal cannot only consider the agents strategic behavior in revealing his
information to her, she must also take into consideration the way the other principals contract will a¤ect
the agents information revelation to her.
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in which environment has been gaining pre-eminence over time. Moreover this two-
regulators, sequential setting paves the way for future reforms of the CAP, in which
a possible re-nationalization would still call for a powerful environmental regulation
at the EU level.
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Part I Biofuels: the origins of their
development
Biofuels have been developed widely for only a few years now and could appear
at rst sight as an ad-hoc solution found by many developed and developing countries
to curb their carbon emissions in transports. However, this possible explanation for
the outbreak of biofuels is incorrect. This sudden growth has indeed very deep roots
in agricultural policies, as will be demonstrated in the case of France in Chapter 2.
But rst, Chapter 1 will present the policies set up by the states to develop biofuels
and the alleged objectives behind these policies. This chapter will show that the
expansion of biofuel production rests on the decision by the State to support the
biofuel industry, which is not protable without this support. Moreover, Chapter 1
draws some parallels between biofuel policies and the former agricultural policies, as
far as commodities price support is concerned.
Chapter 1
A strong involvement of the states
An illustrative example: China
We shall begin this chapter dedicated to the involvement of the states in biofuel
policy by describing the Chinese biofuel situation. It might seem uncommon to begin
a presentation dedicated to biofuels with China, since it is by no means the leading
producer in the world (China is the third ethanol producer, far behind Brazil and
the US). However, an overlook at the support programs that have been set up in this
country may help understand the programs in other countries, and above all, the key
role played by the states.
The main feedstock used to produce ethanol in China is corn (other feedstocks
such as cassava and sugarcane are used, but only marginally), which represents over
80% of the total ethanol produced in the country, which adds up to 1.2 billion liters
in 2005 (Foreign Agricultural Service, 2007). Recent concerns about food security
have led China to use imported tapioca (from Thailand) to produce ethanol. Besides,
the government has restricted the production of ethanol from corn at the end of
2006. In 2007, a 5-year plan of biofuel production was introduced by the National
Development Reform Commission (NDRC) which set very ambitious goals for the
sector. However, the State Council decided not to approve the plan because of the
recent surge in commodity prices and concerns that ethanol could compete with
crops planned for human consumption (Foreign Agricultural Service, 2007). Hence,
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the original target of 5.22 million tons forecasted for 2010 has been revised downwards
to 3-4 million tons, with an increased part of feedstocks from non-arable lands (e.g.
tuber crops and sweet sorghum). Moreover, the government eliminated the rebate
on the 13% value added tax granted to ethanol, by fear of grain shortages. Besides,
additional incentives for biofuels will be provided when world oil prices fall below a
threshold level. Considering all these elements, it clearly appears that the Chinese
biofuel program will mainly hinge upon discretionary and changing rules edicted by
the government rather than the market. This observation looks hardly surprising for
a country ruled by a Communist Party, with a pervasive public sector. However,
as far as biofuels are concerned, the Chinese situation is by no means an exception:
all biofuel policies (even in the low-production-cost-Brazil) are highly dependent on
governmental decisions. These decisions are not limited to the mere design of biofuel
programs: a permanent involvement of the state is needed throughout the duration of
the program to adjust the supports awarded to biofuels in an ever changing economic
framework.
1.1 The objectives behind biofuel policies
A very wide array of objectives are put forward by the countries that have decided
to develop biofuels. The objective which is most often invoked is greenhouse gases
(GHG) mitigation. Other countries also put forward concerns about energy security
or independence, as well as the mitigation of local air pollutants. However, few coun-
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tries explicitely underline the role played by biofuel programs to support agricultural
prices (such as China). The last section of this chapter demonstrates the analogies
between biofuel production and target price policies, thus conrming the agricultural
motivations behind biofuel policies. It would be too long to detail all the objectives
behind the biofuel plans set up by a long list of countries. We will therefore focus on
the objectives put forward by the EU Commission.
1.1.1 Environment
The EU10 has been much more active than any other developed country in imple-
menting the constraining provisions of the Kyoto protocol. Even though the overall
balance is unevenly distributed across MS, signicant reductions in GHG emissions
have already been obtained in some European countries, for example in the United
Kingdom, thanks to political willingness. In that context, biofuels are presented as
a signicant instrument of the EU strategy to reduce GHG emissions. Nevertheless,
the biofuels contribution to the ght against GHG emissions will undoubtedly remain
modest (at least as far as rst generation biofuels are concerned). According to the
more recent proposals of the European Commission, biofuels could replace 10% of
fossil fuels used in the transport sector by 2020. Knowing that the transport sector
accounts for only25 to 30% of GHG emissions and that the assessment in terms of
GHG emissions of rst generation biofuels relative to fossil fuels is limited, the e¤ect
of biofuels on the EU GHG emissions will be small, less than 1% of the total EU GHG
10 This section is an excerpt from an article prepared for a Biofuel Conference in St-Louis, Missouri (April
2007) by Bamière L., Bureau J-C, Guindé L., Guyomard H., Jacquet F. and Tréguer D.
30
1.1 The objectives behind biofuel policies
emissions (our estimates). Of course, any contribution, even marginal, to the Kyoto
Protocol objectives is welcome. But the costs of the GHG emission reduction induced
by an increased use of biofuels should be counted against alternatives o¤ered by the
Kyoto Protocol, including the Clean Development Mechanism. In that perspective,
until recently, the price of traded carbon emission rights provided a useful benchmark
for stakeholders involved in the biofuels industry (as well as for public authorities).
The recent collapse of this price, due to a very generous allocation of emission rights,
makes the assessment more di¢ cult. This episode is unlikely to increase incentives
to boost investment in biofuels.
1.1.2 Energy
The development of biofuels is also motivated by the concern of reducing dependence
on EU energy suppliers given the threats of supply cut by Russia and the ongoing
uncertainties in the Middle East. Today, the EU depends on imports for half of
its energy needs. According to current trends, the dependence should increase in
the next years to reach 65 % in 2030 (Fischer Boel, 2007). However, according to
the EC analysis, the EU biofuels policy if fully implemented and respected might
help saving only 3 % of imported fossil oil (COM(2006) 34). Even if this marginal
contribution will be welcome, it cannot alone justify the EU biofuels strategy, notably
tax exemptions or reductions. Importing (very) large amounts of biofuels would allow
the EU to diversify energy sources and reduce dependence on a handful of suppliers,
but not to gain more self-su¢ ciency in terms of energy needs.
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1.1.3 The CAP
Behind the Commissions policy promoting biofuels, and perhaps behind that of some
MS, is the objective of providing larger outlets and employment to the farm in a con-
text where exports subsidies have been signicantly cut, foreign market access has
been substantially reduced, and considerable adjustments have been asked to Euro-
pean farmers during 15 years of almost permanent reform. The farm sector represents
only a few points of the EU-27 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), roughly 3 %. How-
ever, it remains a major economic sector in some countries, not only in the new MS
(the percentage of population employed in the farm sector is 30 % in Romania and
16 % in Poland) but also in some MS from the South of the EU-15 (more than 10 %
of the population is employed in the farm sector in Greece and Portugal). Even in
Northern Europe where the share of population in farming is only a few percentage
points, the sector still occupies a large part of land. In several regions, the rst trans-
formation food industry which is closely linked to agricultural activity represents a
large share of the whole industrial activity (Schmitt et al., 2002). Analyses at a re-
gional level of domestic reform and trade liberalization scenarios suggest that these
regions are the areas where the negative impacts would be the highest and the eco-
nomic prospects the less favorable (Jean and Laborde, 2007). In addition, the future
leaves little hope for an ambitious CAP. Income support in the form of decoupled
payments will very likely be reduced.11 At best, they will be reoriented towards envi-
ronmental and territorial objectives within a constant budget. More probably, there
11 We shall discuss the likely implications of this policy shift, in conjunction with biofuel production in
Chapter 3.
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will be a signicant reduction in the total agricultural envelope for reassignment on
other EU priorities after 2013, if not before. Lastly, the multilateral agricultural ne-
gotiations of the Doha Round should result in an increased access to the EU market
for foreign competitors. This larger openness of the EU agricultural market should
more particularly a¤ect the cattle-rearing areas and the livestock products, but also
some cereals (barley and corn) as well as sugar beets. All these evolutions should re-
sult in reductions in the European agricultural production. In that context, biofuels
are seen as o¤ering more favorable economic prospects to EU farmers. Incidentally,
biofuels would also make future adjustments of the CAP, agricultural budget cuts
and/or an agricultural agreement within the World Trade Organization (WTO) more
acceptable by EU farmers. However, such a reorientation of the CAP would jeopar-
dize the environmental provisions set up during the successive reforms of the CAP.
This problem will be addressed in Chapter 4.
1.2 The economic instruments used by the states
The economic assessments of the European biofuel programs are largely uncertain,
depending on the world markets of energy and agricultural commodities. Uncertainty
regarding price elasticities and cross e¤ects with other markets, including the energy
market and the demand for similar agricultural products for food use add to the
uncertainties on the technical aspects. Economic assessment requires to take into
account many interactions, some of them complex, like the role of oil price which
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a¤ects the competitiveness of biofuels with fossil fuels in both ways, and the feedback
between biofuel production, food prices and therefore competition between food and
non food use of agricultural products, which a¤ects the production costs of biofuels.
No model has yet managed to provide a global analysis that takes into account these
interactions in a detailed way, at least as far as EU biofuels are concerned.
Up to now, the production of biofuels only covers a very small amount of the
demand for transportation fuel. However, one cannot rely on analyses at the margin
or on the extrapolation of past trends. If the production grows signicantly, the
outlet of some of the co-products will become more limited. This means that the
break-even point of biofuels, compared to fossil fuel, will increase. The farm prices
will go up, which would drive biofuels further away from being competitive with fossil
fuels. It thus creates the risk of articially supporting investments which will not nd
competitive raw material any longer (Schmidhuber, 2007).
It should be stressed that in the EU, compared to the North American biofu-
els, a greater part of the cost is represented by the raw material. Indeed, the oilseeds
account for nearly 80% of the manufacturing costs for biodiesel, whereas corn only
represents half of the US ethanol costs. Changes in the CAP could thus modify the
overall current economic assessment. Lastly, technical change in the biofuel produc-
tion process itself should not be underestimated. However, at the present time, EU
biofuels fall short of being protable without government intervention. The present
growth in production largely results from the combination of the mandatory targets,
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tax exemptions and CAP subsidies (the combination of instruments used being very
variable depending on the MS).
There are 3 main economic instruments used by the states to develop biofuels:
tax-reduction on fuels, mandatory blending and import tari¤s.
1.2.1 Reduction of the excise tax on fuels
Fuel tax reduction has been the main economic instrument used to promote biofuels
(even Brazil still resorts to this instrument). Of course, this instrument can only
be used to the extent that excise tax are levied on fossil fuels. This is the case for
developed countries, but in some developing countries, fuels face only low taxes or are
even subsidized. Biofuels have historically required high levels of tax reduction.12 In
most cases, fuel tax reductions are granted to domestic and imported biofuels alike,
so as to respect WTO rules. However, high tari¤s are generally applied to imported
ethanol, in order to direct the benets of fuel tax reductions to domestic producers
only. The case of the USA is enlightening: a tax reduction of $0.51 per gallon ($0.13
per liter) is awarded for blending ethanol, however, a tari¤ of $0.54 per gallon ($0.14
per liter) is levied on imported ethanol, thus o¤setting the tax reduction benet.13
12 In the EU, tax reductions for ethanol have been as high as e0.84/l, while in the US, the federal tax credit
of $0.135 is often supplemented by the additional tax reductions given out by the states. As for biodiesel,
the gures are also quite high: up to e0.60/l in the EU and $0.26 in the US.
13 Here is a brief chronology of the support directed to ethanol in the US. The rst governmental program
to support ethanol in the US was initiated by the Energy Tax Act of 1978. A federal tax exemption of $0.40
per gallon ($0.11 per liter) was granted to ethanol. This tax exemption then rose to $0.60 per gallon ($0.159
per liter) in the Tax Reform Act of 1984 before gradually falling to $0.51 per gallon ($0.135 per liter) in
2005. The support granted to ethanol has been extended until the end of 2010. The quantities forecasted by
the government plans have been increased signicantly over the past few years: in 2005, the Energy Policy
Act required a minimum production of 7.5 billion gallons (28 billion liters) by 2012, but as soon as 2007,
the quantities were revised upwards to 35 billion gallons (132 billion liters) of ethanol equivalent by 2017
(ESMAP, 2007).
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Tax-cuts for biofuels can equivalently be considered as a subsidy. The regulator
gives out subsidies to make up for the gap between the production cost of biofuels
and the price of the fossil fuel they replace, as the latter is smaller than the former.14
The cost for society of a tax-cut program in favor of biofuels is greater than the mere
budgetary amount spent. We must add up the opportunity cost of public funds,
arising from the distortions caused in the economy by levying tax in order to nance
public expenses (this issue will be dealt with in Chapter 3 ). The risk exposure in case
of a sudden variation in the price of commodities that determine these subsidies (i.e.
the price of agricultural commodities and the oil price) is taken on by the State. As
the nancing of biofuel programs is guaranteed by the State, the variations of prices
are dampened by a risk-neutral agent. Moreover, the blending of biofuels does not
cause a price increase for the consumer at the gas pump, since the supplementary
cost is already accounted for in the tax-cut.
The problems linked to subsidies are inherent to any policy which supports a
sector: changes in the support levels cannot be operated as quickly as the sometimes
very brutal changes in the markets which determine them. Thus, if the price of
oil increases rapidly, it seems hardly possible that the subsidies could be quickly
downsized. Conversely, if the price of oil slumps suddenly, the risk of a disruption of
biofuel production cannot be completely discarded. A well-known example of such a
disruption is given by the rst Brazilian ethanol program. At the end of the eighties,
the conjunction of the counter oil shock and a very high sugar market sparked o¤
14 Biofuels have a smaller energy content than the fossil fuels they substitute for. Hence, the economic
value of biofuels corresponds to the price of fossil fuels adjusted for the di¤erence in energy content.
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supply problems for cars running solely on ethanol (Elobeid et al., 2006). The agro-
industries preferred to sell their sugar cane production to the sugar market rather than
to the domestic ethanol production. This example illustrates the intrinsic weakness
of biofuel markets, squeezed between energy and agricultural commodity markets.
1.2.2 Mandates
One of the most commonly used instruments to promote biofuels nowadays is manda-
tory blending. This solution has the advantage of not creating distortions linked to
taxation. Besides, it might provide an incentive for consumers to decrease their gaso-
line consumption, since the blending of a more expensive product (biofuels) with
respect to fossil fuels would trigger a price increase at the gas pump. However, this
price hike should not be confused with an environmental tax, since the price increase
would have no direct relationship with the social cost of an environmental external-
ity. In case of a brutal price hike in agricultural commodity markets, the additional
cost that will ensue would be borne by individuals on their own, each characterized
by risk aversion.
1.2.3 Tari¤s
As noted earlier, states tend to couple tax reductions on biofuels with import tari¤s in
order to grant the benets of their policy to domestic producers only. The situation
is quite contrasted between the two types of biofuels: ethanol is characterized by
higher tari¤s than biodiesel. The EU applies for instance a specic import duty of
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e0.192/l for undenatured ethanol ande0.102/l for denatured ethanol (i.e. mixed with
gasoline). However, it seems worth stressing that 101 developing countries enjoy duty-
free access to the EU ethanol market (under the ACP agreements, GSP+, Everything
But Arms...). Brazilian ethanol enters the EU with the Most Favored Nation duty
(i.e. e0.192/l or e0.102/l). For its part, the US levies a specic tari¤ on ethanol of
$0.143/l (plus a small ad valorem duty) and also grants a duty-free access to ethanol
coming from the Caribbean countries. More surprisingly, even Brazil resorts to import
tari¤s to protect its domestic producers (it levies a 20% ad valorem duty, ESMAP,
2007).
As regards biodiesel, the tari¤ rates are generally low in industrial countries
(6.5% ad valorem duty in the EU and 1.9% in the US). Global trade for biodiesel will
most likely be prevented by technical barriers such as fuel certication, in response to
environmental concerns raised by the clearing of rain forests to produce the feedstocks
(soybeans in Latin America and palm oil in Southeast Asia).
1.2.4 Other types of supports
There is a wide range of other supports that have been set up to develop biofuels, e.g.
accelerated depreciation, loans, loan guarantees, subsidies for buying ex-fuel cars,
etc.15 In the US, a wide range of statesinitiatives supplement the federal schemes
to support biofuel production. Thus, some states have passed into law mandates for
biofuels: Minnesota is the leading state in that respect since it has mandated a 10%
15 For more details, see Koplow (2006).
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percent blend of ethanol in gasoline since 1997 and further increased the target to
20% by 2013. Other states such as Iowa, Hawaii or Louisiana similarly impose ethanol
mandates.
1.3 The EU biofuel program and its
implementations by the Member States.
In 2003,16 the European Union (EU) launched an ambitious policy aiming at increas-
ing the use of biofuels in land transport with a view to contributing to objectives such
as meeting climate change commitments, environmentally friendly security of supply
and promoting renewable energy sources(Commission of the European Communi-
ties, 2003). The target for 2010 is that biofuels represent 5.75% of the market for
gasoline and diesel in transport.
The development of biofuels in the EU has largely been driven by incentives set
up by public authorities in both the agricultural and energy sectors. Without the
present set of subsidies, tax reductions and exemptions as well as mandatory incor-
poration rates, the EU production would certainly be much more limited. The CAP
provides incentives for producing biofuels (more precisely for producing energy crops).
On the demand side, measures essentially aim at increasing the use of biofuels in land
transport. However, because of high tari¤s on imports of some biofuels and/or some
16 This section is an excerpt from an article prepared for a Biofuel Conference in St-Louis, Missouri (April
2007) by Bamière L., Bureau J-C, Guindé L., Guyomard H., Jacquet F. and Tréguer D.
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raw agricultural materials used for producing biofuels, these consumption-oriented
measures also encourage production.
Measures developed at the farm sector level are part of the CAP. They are thus
common to all Member States (MS). This is also the case for external tari¤s. By
contrast, most of the incentives for using biofuels are the responsibility of MS. The
EU sets the objectives, mainly an incorporation rate target, but it leaves national
governments free to take appropriate measures to meet these objectives. These
measures are funded on national budgets. It explains why incentives to production
and utilization of biofuels di¤er a lot across the EU-27 MS. This is particularly the
case as far as tax exemptions / reductions are concerned. This is also the case for the
relative incentives for producing ethanol or biodiesel: the EU legislation only sets the
aggregate objectives, the balance between ethanol and biodiesel is chosen by the MS.
The various European countries will not be subject to penalties if they do not
meet the 5.75% incorporation target in 2010. They however will have to provide jus-
tications in case of non-compliance. More precisely, they will have to report the
measures undertaken to achieve compliance. Today, the EC explicitly recognizes that
the 2003 biofuels use Directive target for 2010 will very likely not be achieved. Rather,
the EC expects an incorporation rate of 4% only (Commission of the European Com-
munities, 2007).
The large increase in biofuel production in the EU can largely be explained by
the political will, which has resulted in either a large degree of subsidization (through
tax exemptions). While the development of both the consumption and the production
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of biofuels has been impressive in relative growth, the overall use hardly exceeded 1%
of transportation fuels in 2005, while it already had a signicant impact on markets,
driving up the price of rapeseed oil, for example. Even with such limited use of
biofuels, the costs for MS budgets have become signicant, so that several countries
are moving towards less tax exemptions and more constraining targets for mandatory
incorporation of biofuels. However, such a policy ends up passing signicant costs to
nal consumers, who have already expressed their discontent (UFC, 2007).
If the use of biofuel grows and reaches the EU target of 5.75% in 2010, and the
possible new target of 10% in 2020, clearly the cost of the public support will become
more apparent. One may consider that, for much larger quantities of biofuels used in
the EU, there is a need to keep public support consistent with major market forces, or
at least with the valuation of the actual positive externalities. More practically, either
biofuels will have to compete with fossil fuels in terms of cost (either by reducing the
production costs of biofuels or because oil prices will be higher). Or the subsidies
should be in line with what can be considered as a reasonable price of the GHG
emission avoided. This raises several questions: the rst one is the extent of the
actual positive externalities as far as GHG emissions are concerned. The second one
is the actual degree of competitiveness of the EU biofuels, compared to fossil fuels
and biofuels produced in other countries. All these elements play a crucial role in the
cost-benet analysis of the EU program.
To sum up, European public authorities and private investors are now at a
di¢ cult crossroad for making choices regarding the production of biofuels in the EU.
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All the uncertainties raised above make it problematic to assess what the future of
the EU biofuels industry could be. In that respect, it is symptomatic to observe that
the European public opinion is increasingly critical as regards the development of
biofuels in the EU and that a growing number of organizations are expressing their
opposition to the incorporation targets presently discussed for 2020 (a 10% market
share).
France has set a biofuels incorporation target of 7% in 2010. In order to achieve this ambitious
target (more ambitious than the EU recommendation), the French government has combined scal
incentives with penalties for not complying. The rst instrument is a tax reduction of the domestic
tax applied on fossil fuels used in land transport (in French, Taxe Intérieure sur les Produits Pétroliers
or TIPP). Tax cuts are granted for specic quantities, auctioned to companies at the EU wide level.
They can be revised annually according to price levels of petroleum products on the one hand,
agricultural raw materials on the other hand. In addition, wholesalers selling petroleum products
are subject to another tax: the General Tax on Polluting Activities (In French, Taxe Générale sur
les Activités Polluantes or TGAP). They can avoid paying this second tax by incorporating a certain
percentage of biofuels. Tax rates increase over time in line with the increase in the incorporation
target up to 7% in 2010. These measures result in a high penalty for a seller of transportation
fuel that would not include any biofuel, therefore providing a strong incentive to do so and pass
through the extra cost to the nal consumer. This has recently turned the main French consumers
organization against the whole biofuels policy (UFC, 2007).
Box 1: The economic instruments to develop biofuels in France
Sweden is one of the MS which promotes the most the use of biofuels (essentially under the form
of ethanol). This emphasis on biofuels use rather than production suggests that motivations of the
Swedish government are more connected to environmental concerns than to farm support. This con-
trasts with France which strongly opposes importing larger quantities of biofuels or raw agricultural
materials that could be used for producing biofuels. In other words, e¤orts on the biofuels dossier
are in France for a large part, if not essentially, motivated by the farm support objective. Sweden
has imported ethanol tax free from Brazil using some loopholes in EU tari¤s linked to ambiguities
in alcohol denomination and classication. This was ended in the beginning of 2006 following pres-
sures from EU agricultural producers. The incorporation target for 2010 is 5.75% but the interim
indicative target for 2005 (3%) was higher than the EC recommendation (2%). Since April 2006, the
largest gas pump must supply either ethanol of biogas. The obligation will be extended to medium
gas stations in 2009. In addition, some imported biofuels, that is the ones subject to high tari¤s,
are exempted from domestic taxes on fuels. Flex-fuel cars are also exempted from specic fees, for
example urban taxes in Stockholm.
Box 2: The Swedish biofuel program
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Germany is the sole country which met the 2005 target (2%) with a biofuels market share of 3.8%.
This is the result of an ambitious tax exemption plan initially implemented without quantitative
limits. However, from August 2006, the German government went back to a limited exemption tax
(tax of C=0.15 per liter of biodiesel if mixed with diesel and C=0.1 if used pure). Ethanol is so far
exempted from excise duty (63C=/hl). Germany has decided to implement a mandatory incorporation
of 6.75% in transport fuel by 2010.
Box 3: The German biofuel program
Since January 2007, the Netherlands have established a mandatory incorporation target for biofuels
of 2%. This target is bound to reach 5.75% in 2010. 2007 is the rst year where tax exemptions
kick in. However, the Dutch government wishes to implement an environmental certication before
promoting further the use of biofuels because of concerns raised by various organizations as regards
the negative consequences of biofuels expansion in developing countries (deforestation).
Box 4: The biofuel situation in the Netherlands
The United Kingdom (UK) is now giving the priority to mandatory blending under the Renewable
Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO). If retailers of petroleum products do not include a given rate of
biofuels in transport fuels, they will have to pay a penalty (buy-out price) of 0.15£ /l (i.e., roughly
0.23C=/l). Tax exemptions will be maintained until 2010/11: together with the buy-out price mech-
anism, they will provide a level of support of 0.35£ /l (0.52C=/l). From 2010/11, tax exemptions will
be removed and replaced by mandatory incorporation for a slightly lower level of support (0.30£ /l,
i.e., 0.45C=/l). The UK points out that the EU incorporation target of 5.75% in 2010 will be ex-
cessively costly if achieved through subsidies and tax exemptions / reductions. Unsurprisingly and
unlike many other European countries, the UK is vigilant to comply with the spirit of the 2003
Directives on biofuels stating that there should not be overcompensation for the costs of using bio-
fuels. The UK has o¢ cially announced that it will very likely not achieve the 2010 incorporation
target of 5.75%. Simultaneously, it has also announced supplementary measures to increase incor-
poration of biofuels (accelerated depreciation rules for biofuels plants and support to distribution
infrastructures of ethanol mixed gasoline).
Box 5: The biofuel program in the United Kingdom
1.4 Welfare implications of biofuel production
This section17 intends to show that biofuel policies are primarily designed for agri-
cultural income objectives. After describing the features of the agricultural policies
17 This section is based on an ongoing work with J.-C. Bureau and A. Gohin. All errors or omissions are
mine.
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from the 1980s, we detail the welfare impacts from a domestic production of ethanol
(respectively from corn in the US and from wheat in the EU). We thereafter compare
the welfare implications of this new biofuel policy with the instruments used in the
former agricultural policies (target price and deciency payments for the USA and
export subsidies for the EU). Moreover, we show that the countries which engage in
biofuel policies may gain with respect to the former agricultural policies, while the
rest of the world unambiguously lose. Note that we only focus on the consequences of
biofuel production on agricultural markets (i.e. the supplementary demand to agri-
culture). Hence, the environmental externalities linked to the production and the use
of biofuels in cars are not addressed in this section.
1.4.1 The agricultural policies of the 1980s
In the EU, a major characteristic of agricultural policy support in the 1980s was the
organization of transfers from consumers to producers, through (high) guaranteed
prices. Most major agricultural sectors were subject to intervention prices, together
with a system of import duties, public intervention purchases to support prices above
a pre-dened target price, and export subsidies to dispose the excess production that
was not purchased by consumers. Markets were also largely administered in the US,
where market management dated back to the 1930s. A system of "loan rates" acted as
a oor price for producers. Unlike the EU, the taxpayer was asked to contribute to a
larger share of the support, since the deciency payments that covered the di¤erence
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between this loan rate and target prices (see Gardner, 1992, Helmberger 1995 for
clear explanations of these policies and welfare e¤ects).
The shortcomings of the system became apparent in the 1970s and unbearable
in the 1980s. EU consumer support peaked with the growing discrepancies between
EU institutional prices and world market prices, depressed by EU export refunds and
the successive export enhancement programs that the US implemented in order to
retaliate. Intervention stocks and export refunds generated considerable budget costs.
This has led the EU to solve the problems of imbalance between supply and demand
by a series of reforms that have ranged between 1992 and 2006. A common feature
of these reforms that have a¤ected most common market organization is a reduction
of the role of market price support. In particular, the intervention (i.e. guaranteed)
prices for wheat have been halved in current prices between 1992 and 2005. There
is no longer any intervention prices for commodities such as corn, rye, rice, beef and
sugar (even though a safety net still exists in the last two cases). Farmers have
been compensated for these cuts in administrative prices through a system of direct
payments. Progressively, these payments have had less linked with the quantities
produced. Since the 2003 reform (i.e. in practice since 2006 in most Member states),
most of these payments have been decoupled from production, i.e. granted on an
historical basis, and would be provided even in the absence of production. Direct
payments are now the main component of the EU agricultural support provided to
farmers, even though this total support is notoriously di¢ cult to measure.18
18 Both the measures used by the World Trade Organization (the Aggregate Measure of Support) and
the ones used by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the Producer Subsidy
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In the US, the shift of support from consumers to taxpayers is less obvious,
given that for a long time the gap between the price guaranteed to producer and the
world prices were largely paid by taxpayers, but also because policy reforms have
been less dramatic than in the EU. While the EU has followed a consistent path of
reforms towards supporting farmers with lump sum payments, the US has followed a
more erratic path. However, the share of support that is no longer tied to production
or actual prices has also increased between 1987 and 2000.
1.4.2 Welfare variations triggered by biofuel policies
This paragraph intends to detail the welfare consequences of the massive corn ethanol
production in the USA19 (or wheat for ethanol in the EU). In a rst approximation,
we do not consider the actual consumption of ethanol in the transport sector. In order
to understand the dynamics at stake, a thorough analysis from the consequences of
biofuel policy on US corn exports20 (and EU wheat exports) seems necessary. For this
purpose, consider the supply (S) and demand (D) of corn in the US, as depicted in
gure (1.1). Let (ES1) be the excess supply from the USA, obtained by horizontally
substracting the quantity demanded from the quantity supplied: ES1(p) = S(p)  
D(p): Let also (ED) be the excess demand from the rest of the world. The equilibrium
quantity on the world market is Q2  Q1, at price Pw1, i.e. the quantity supplied by
Estimates and the Total Transfer Estimates) are subject to technical and methodological di¢ culties.
19 As the USA is the worlds rst corn exporter, the impacts of this new corn framework are bound to be
sizeable.
20 The welfare analysis is conducted making reference to the US framework. However, the analysis is exactly
the same for the EU wheat ethanol framework.
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the American corn producers (Q2) exceeds the quantity demanded by the American
corn consumers (Q1): Assume now that a quantity QB of corn is diverted from the
traditional food/feed outlet in order to be transformed into ethanol. We have D0(p) =
D(p) + QB and the new excess supply on the world market is (ES2); dened by
ES2(p) = S(p)   D0(p) = S(p)   D(p)   QB: The new equilibrium quantity on the
world market is given by the intersection of (ED) with (ES2); i.e. Q4  Q3; which is
traded at price Pw2; with Pw2 > Pw1: On the domestic market, an aggregate quantity
of Q3 is demanded for corn, of which Qf = Q3   QB for food/feed uses, while a
quantity Q4 is supplied by the American corn producers.
Studying the welfare variations from the policy shift in favor of ethanol produc-
tion, we observe that:21
 On the domestic market:
 corn producers gain area a+ b+ c+ d:
 corn consumers lose area a+ b:
 taxpayers lose QB(Pw2   PE); which is the amount corresponding to the
subsidy given out to ethanol in order to make it competitive with respect
to fossil gasoline (PE is the break-even price for corn directed to ethanol
production).
 On the world market, rest of the worlds consumers and producers lose area
e+ f + g.
21 cf gure 1.1
47
1.4 Welfare implications of biofuel production
The conclusion of this preliminary analysis is that the rest of the world unam-
biguously lose from this policy shift, while the US (resp. the EU) may gain from this
policy shift if c+ d > QB(Pw2   PE):
1.4.3 Comparison between the corn ethanol policy and the
target price policy
The target price policy is depicted in gure (1:2), which represents the agriculture
supply (S) of corn, the domestic demand (D) and the total demand (TD); made up
of the domestic demand (D) in addition to rest of the worlds excess demand. The
government introduces a target price pd for farmers which is coupled with a subsidy
to enable farmers to sell quantity q3 at price pw1: For farmers to receive pd at quantity
q3; the taxpayer has to pay a subsidy pd   pw1 on each unit of output. The target
price policy at price pd has the following welfare consequences with respect to the free
trade situation:
  producers gain area a+ b+ c
 consumers gain area e
 taxpayers lose area a+ b+ c+ d+ e+ f + g + h
Overall, for the US, the welfare variation adds up to a loss of area d+ f + g+h;
while the rest of the world gains area f + g + h:
Comparing the welfare consequences of the corn ethanol policy with respect to
the former target price policy, it appears that:
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Fig. 1.1. The welfare consequences of biofuel production in the USA or in the EU.
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 US producers are indi¤erent (if the production of ethanol leads to the same
price as the target price, i.e. if Pw2 = pd).
 US consumers unambiguously lose from this policy shift.
 US taxpayers might gain if the amount of subsidy for producing a quantity QB
of corn ethanol is smaller than the amount paid with the target price policy,
i.e. if (Pw2   PE)QB < (pd   pw1)q3:
 Rest of the worlds producers and consumers lose on aggregate.
1.4.4 Comparison between the wheat ethanol policy and
export subsidies policy
As exposed in Just, Hueth and Schmitz (2004), the EU spent millions of dollars during
the late 1980s and the early 1990s to expand international markets under the Export
Restitution Program. As the EU had decided to o¤er a guaranteed price to its farmers
well above the world price, it was therefore necessary to get rid of the excess supply on
the world market, which was only possible with export subsidies. Figure (1:3) below
exposes the welfare consequences from these export subsidies in the case of wheat for
instance. EUs supply (S) and demand (D) are represented on the right side, while
rest of the worlds excess demand (ED) is represented backwards on the left side. In
the situation of free trade, epw2 is the domestic and world price, domestic consumption
is eq1; while domestic production is eq2:With the introduction of an export subsidy E,
the domestic price is increased to epd, however, the increase in exports triggers a fall
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Fig. 1.2. Welfare analysis with a target price and deciency payments.
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in the world price to epw1: Consequently, domestic consumers lose area a+ b, domestic
producers gain area a+b+c and taxpayers lose area b+c+d+e+f+g+h in nancing
the export subsidy. Hence, the net cost for the exporting country is a loss of area
b+d+e+f+g+h: export subsidies appear as a very costly way of nancing domestic
producers. However, note that the rest of the worlds producers and consumers gain
area i+ j + k from the setting of an export subsidies policy.
From the comparison of the export subsidies scheme with respect to the new
wheat ethanol policy, we can observe that:22
 Consumers and producers are indi¤erent (if the production of wheat for ethanol
leads to the same domestic price, i.e. if Pw2 = epd).
 EU taxpayers might gain if the amount of subsidy for producing a quantity QB
of wheat ethanol is smaller than the amount to nance export subsidies, i.e. if
(Pw2   PE)QB < (epd   epw1)(eq4   eq3):
 Rest of the worlds producers and consumers lose on aggregate.
Hence, we may note that biofuel policies are rst and foremost policies designed
in order to support incomes in the agricultural sector. Moreover, it might be possible
that these biofuel policies prove more e¢ cient in pursuing this agricultural income ob-
jective than the previous agricultural policies. This issue will be thoroughly addressed
in Chapter 3.
22 Note that gure (1:1) depicts the corn ethanol situation in the US as well as the wheat ethanol situation
in the EU.
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Conclusion
To conclude this chapter, it seems worth stressing that biofuel policies are rst and
foremost policies set up in order to increase the agricultural income and therefore,
very close links have been built between biofuel and agricultural policies. It should
also be noted that the intervention of the State is a necessary condition for biofuel
production to take place. Even if the occurrence of a period of protability without
subsidies for biofuels is not impossible, such events are very uncommon and biofuels
do need subsidies from the State (or mandatory blending schemes) in order to be
produced (ESMAP 2007).
Moreover, this chapter has striven to underline the close similarities between
the previous agricultural policies which consisted in setting a price above the world
market price in order to support the agricultural sector. With biofuel production, the
economic instrument is no longer a price but a quantity of energy crops that is being
produced by the agricultural sector and subsequently removed from the food market
in order to be processed into biofuels. The results in terms of welfare might bear
some similarities with the previous agricultural policies.
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Chapter 2
The beginning of biofuel
production: the land set-aside
policy
Preamble
Biofuel production has soared over the past 3 years. The economic analysis that was
conducted just after the launch of the main biofuel programs was centered on the
production of energy crops on set-aside land, with a look at the competition that was
bound to occur between food and energy crops, in response to a biofuel production
that would require more land than what the set-aside land could o¤er. Today, such
an analysis may look outdated at rst sight. However, the economic study that
was conducted back then seems to be a necessary preliminary approach in order to
understand the many new economic questions that crop up with the competition
between food and energy uses, developed in Chapter 3. The present Chapter is an
article written by Sourie, Tréguer and Rozakis in mid-2005. Its original title in French
was "Lambivalence des lières de biocarburants en France".
The aim of this chapter is to stress the fact that biofuel production has deep
roots in agricultural policies, namely biofuel production has been possible in the
EU since a part of the arable land had been set aside for overproduction concerns.
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Introduction
Indeed, biofuel production has only recently been touted as the solution for GHG
emissions in the transport sector. During the rst years of their production in the
EU, biofuels were only presented as a means to increase farmers incomes by giving
them the opportunity to produce on set-aside land. Therefore, the scope of biofuel
policies was restricted to the eld of agriculture production.
Introduction
From a situation of little importance in French crops (324,000 hectares in 2004 in-
cluding 300,000 hectares of rapeseed), the surface area of energy crops should quickly
expand in order to increase the level of incorporation of biofuels in fossil fuels to
5.75% by 2010 (recommended value of Directive 2003/30/EC, promotion of biofu-
els). The French government recently increased the authorized quantities of biofuel
production. In the present context where oil prices are close to $70 a barrel and where
the ght against global warming has become a priority, biofuels are shown in quite a
favorable light. However, considering their very poor energy yield per hectare of land
and their high costs, we are led to temper the very optimistic analyses carried out
on them. Essentially presented as energy chains, it should not be forgotten that bio-
fuels are also an indirect way of supporting agribusiness and agriculture, under the
responsibility of each country.
The main results summarized here concern France. They are obtained by using a
sequential partial equilibrium model, OSCAR (Optimisation of the Economic Surplus
of Renewable Agricultural Biofuels), developed by INRA (see Box 6 below for more
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details on the assumptions used in the model). The strong points of this model consist
in a detailed formalization of food and non-food agricultural supplies, considering
CAP evolutions and the impacts of biofuels on farm incomes as well as on farm jobs.
2.1 Biofuels, a brief summary
An overview of biofuels shows the prevalence of a continent (America) and of a type
of biofuel (ethanol). The latter is made from sugar cane (Brazil) or from corn (USA).
Palm oil could very rapidly make its mark on the biofuel market.
The European landscape di¤ers in the choice of its biofuels and energy crops.
For the choice of appropriate energy crops, these distinctions are due to economic
and agronomic considerations as well as to the composition of their car industry and
renery structures for the choice of its biofuels.
In France, the original target of biofuel was to overcome the drawbacks of set-
aside lands (CAP mandatory set-aside lands) decided in 1993 in order to control food
supply. Rapeseed methyl ester was favored because it permitted the cultivation of the
greatest area of set-aside lands for a given amount of public nancial support owing
to its low yield per hectare (see table 1). More recently, policies to control greenhouse
gases have shed a new light on biofuels: they represent a centerpiece in the measures
taken to reduce CO2 emissions in transport.
62
2.1 Biofuels, a brief summary
Crop Sugarbeet Wheat Rapeseed
Yield in tons (2005) 79.4 8.1 3.3
Evolution of yield in
tons/year
0.98 0.12 0.02
Primary biofuel Ethanol Ethanol Vegetable
oil
Yield hl/hectare (2005) 79 28 15
Density 0.79 0.79 0.91
Secondary biofuel ETBE ETBE RME
Yield hl/hectare (2005) 180 64 15
Density 0.75 0.75 0.88
Replaced fossil fuel gasoline gasoline diesel
Liter of fossil energy replaced
per liter of biofuel
0.83 0.83 0.92
Table 1: Some technical data
Two main types of biofuels are industrially produced: ETBE23 (ethanol from
wheat or sugar beet) and RME24 from rapeseed oil (or ester) (table 1). Primary biofu-
els (ethanol and oil) are processed to obtain secondary biofuels which are compatible
with the requirements of motors o¤ering increasingly high performances. ETBE is
mixed with gasoline, and RME is mixed with diesel. The substitution of a part of
the fossil oil by RME eases the constraint on diesel supply, which is subject to the
biggest increase in demand. Moreover, incorporating RME improves the lubricating
quality of diesel, which has become poorer and poorer in sulphur for environmen-
tal reasons. Ethanol could also be directly mixed with gasoline, but this scenario
is largely marginal: in France at present, it is excluded for technical reasons (insta-
bility of the gasoline-ethanol combination in the presence of water, which results in
an increased volatility of the blend). However, these obstacles could be overcome
23 Ethyl-Tertiary-Butyl-Ether
24 Rapeseed Methyl Ester
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quickly considering the technical knowledge of the French car manufacturers present
in the big ethanol producing countries and if a specic distribution system for the
gasoline-ethanol mixture was envisaged. Biofuels are a little less energy-giving than
oil products, especially ethanol, hence the slight over-consumption of the blends lead-
ing to a slight economic depreciation of biofuels compared with fossil fuels. For 2005,
table 1 shows the yields per hectare of primary and secondary biofuels for the three
crops concerned. Rapeseed is the least productive one of them. If the upward trend
in observed yields lasts (2nd line), production per hectare will go on rising, but more
for ethanol than for rapeseed ester. This is why the large production of ester planned
in the biofuel program will take up a lot of arable lands. By way of information, palm
oil production is four times higher.
2.2 Positive energy balance, but small contribution
to energy independence.
The production of biofuels requires consumption of fossil energy throughout the pro-
duction chain. Therefore, it is necessary to check whether biofuels will induce savings
in fossil energy when they replace fossil fuels. Energy balances allow us to check this.
If balances are over 1, gains in fossil energy will be higher than expenses. However, it
is di¢ cult to assess these balances because co-products are produced at the same time
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as these biofuels, and are used either in animal feed (DDGS25 and rapeseed cakes) or
in chemical industries (glycerol). As the productions of biofuels and co-products are
closely linked in industrial processes, it is impossible to nd out the real quantity of
fossil energy consumed in order to obtain co-products.
In the balances presented by the Department of Energy and Mineral Resources
(DIREM) and by the French Agency for the Environment and Control of Energy
(ADEME), the di¢ culty outlined above is bypassed by adopting an accounting method
(table 2, 1st column). It consists in assigning the co-products, on an inclusive basis,
with a certain quantity of fossil energy consumed by the chain, according to an ap-
plied rate. This rate is the relationship between the quantities of co-products and
fuels. This energy assigned to co-products is deducted from the energy assigned to
biofuels, which improves, proportionally speaking, the energy balance of the latter.
Other applied rates could be used resulting in other energy balances.
Energy Yields function of the methodology used for co-products
Accounting Method Systemic Method
Wheat ethanold 2.04 1.19
Sugarbeet ethanol 2.04 1.28
RME 2.99 2.5
Table 2: Energy balances
Faced with this di¢ culty, the only satisfactory method is a systemic approach
consisting in assigning co-products with the fossil energy needed to produce the goods
that these co-products will replace (for instance, the rapeseed-cake from the ester
25 Distillers Dried Grains with Solubles, obtained during the fermentation of cereals (wheat, corn) into
ethanol.
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chain will replace the soy-cake imported to feed animals). Unlike the previous one,
this method will measure the real e¤ect of the insertion of a biofuel chain on the
consumption of fossil energy. This method was recommended by Shapouri as early as
1995, and has been accepted for the recent study conducted by EUCAR (European
Council for Automotive R&D), CONCAWE (Conservation of Clean Air and Water
in Europe) and JRC (European Joint Research Centre)(table 2, 2nd column). With
this hypothesis, energy yields are nowhere near as good, especially with ethanol.
Considering the biofuel needs planned for 2010 by the EU,26 (that is to say 9.3
million hl of ethanol and 27.5 million hl of ester) and on the basis of the energy outputs
in table 2, the net contribution of biofuels to oil savings is between 1.5 Mtoe (million
tons of oil equivalent - substitute value for co-products) and 2.0 Mtoe (mass prorata
for co-products). The ester chain has quite a good energy output per volume of
biofuels but these results become very modest in terms of hectares of land. The total
contribution of biofuels to oil savings is low, given that in 2004, agriculture consumed
2.9 Mtoe of nal energy (all forms of energy taken into account) and France 92.8
Mtoe of oil.
2.3 The likely competition with food crops
Now that the targets of biofuel production are clearer, it is interesting to measure
their consequences on the agricultural areas utilized. Table 3 shows the estimated
26 France has since then decided to go beyond the Commissions recommendations.
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needs in farming surface area to produce the quantities of energy crops correspond-
ing to the incorporation target (suggested by the European Union) of 5.75% biofuels
by 2010. Traditionally reserved for set-aside lands (main reason for their implemen-
tation), it is clear that energy crops will spread beyond this area (at present set-aside
lands represent about 1.5 million hectares but the surface area may vary according to
political decisions) to meet this target. In this perspective, competition might appear
between food and non-food crops.
2004 2007 2010
Needs in
ethanol
Million hec-
toliters
2.68 5.95 9.27
Needs in RME Million hec-
toliters
4.93 13.15 27.57
Needs in wheat
and sugarbeet
1000 hectares 60 145 225
Needs in Rape-
seed
1000 hectares 330 880 1,800
Table 3: needs in feedstock for biofuels
Studied using the INRAs sequential model OSCAR, this competition mainly
arises between rapeseeds (for food and non-food use), owing to the constraints inher-
ent to farming production, and to a lesser degree between rapeseed and cereals. This
competition emerges as soon as ester production reaches 8 million hectoliters (graph
1) (which is quite soon in the increase in importance of the biofuel development pro-
gram which forecasts an ester need of 27.57 million hectoliters) and before the total
set-aside area of 1.5 million ha is reached (table 3: the production of 13.15 million
hl of ester requires a surface area of 880,000 ha). This situation is linked to the fact
that in the model, a large part of the set-aside areas is not used for non-food rapeseed
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crops for the following reasons: constraint of a maximum of 30% rapeseed in rotations
(practices observed), 30% of the set-aside land is considered as unexploited (sloping
ground, land too far away from the main body of farm, and so on) and 34% of the
producers, with no experience in rapeseed, are excluded from production. Moreover,
the additional aid of 45e per hectare granted to areas switching from food crops to
energy crops (up to 1.5 million ha on the European level) contributes to the substi-
tution of food rapeseed by energy rapeseed: the rotations of crops are the same; only
the use is di¤erent. The aid is justied by the fact that these productions contribute
to ghting GHG emissions or even to the regulation of cereal markets (the export of
cereals costs the European Union an average of 5e per ton). The framework of this
analysis is probably a little rigid. In particular, we may think that the number of
rapeseed producers is likely to rise thanks to farming development programs. Even
though they are slightly more protable than food crops, energy crops cannot totally
replace the latter because they are set by quotas according to the quantities of biofuel
production authorized by the State.
We assume di¤erent strong hypotheses: 1) Agricultural prices are supposed to be constant; 2) The
tax exemption is limited to its minimum (see table 4); this is why, in table 6, the cost for the taxpayer
is only 0.09C=/l instead of the present tax exemption at 0.33C=/l; 3) No signicant negative e¤ect is
mentioned, either on the side of the food industries which compensate for the decit of the national
food crop production through imports at steady prices, or on the oil side insofar as the biodiesel
program reduces the imports of diesel; 4) Last, the opportunity cost of public funds equals zero,
which renders the strong political desire to develop biofuels.
Box 6: Hypotheses for the OSCAR model
68
2.3 The likely competition with food crops
Graph 1: Area in rapeseed forecasted by the OSCAR model.
This competition could lead to a rise in food and energy rapeseed prices. In the
United States, in the case of corn, Gallagher (2000 and 2003) showed that there is a
possible rise in corn prices if ethanol takes the place of a large part of an additive to
gasoline of fossil origin, methanol, which is suspected of environmental damage. This
price rise increases corn producersincome; on the other hand, it penalizes, albeit to
a lesser extent, the income of stockbreeders who are corn consumers. However, in
Europe, stockbreeders and cattle feed industries could gain from the development of
RME and wheat ethanol because of a fall in the price of rapeseed cakes and DDGS.
This fall in the prices of co-products would make RME and wheat ethanol more ex-
pensive since the valorization of co-products is deducted from the biofuel costs. For
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Europe, it would be advisable to study the e¤ects of an ambitious worldwide produc-
tion of biofuels on European agricultural prices and on the trade of farm products.
The biofuel costs plotted on graph 2 are calculated from the farm-gate to the
nished product, in depots, before distribution to retailers. These costs, assessed per
liter, are formed by the purchase prices of rawmaterials (wheat, rapeseed, sugar beets)
and the logistics and industrial costs minus co-product revenues. They are drawn
up in the context of competition between food and energy crops: ester rapeseed
is cultivated both on set-aside lands and food plots. This competition necessarily
brings the purchase costs of wheat and rapeseed energy crops at least to the level of
food crops at farm-gate prices, respectively 88 and 198e/t. Because of the special
quota regulations, the price of sugar beet, that is to say 20e/t, is a calculated price
allowing every sugarbeet grower to protably produce ethanol on arable lands (study
carried at INRA for the reform of the sugar market in the EU). From what we
know, this theoretical price is close to the actual price. This pattern of energy crop
prices is plausible since, in the long run, industrial companies will wish to avoid any
compartmentalization between food and non-food markets.
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Graph 2: Cost and valorization for di¤erent types of biofuels produced in France
In graph 2, the economic valorizations of biofuels are given by the black curve.
They are estimated when they come out of the renery depot by applying a reduction
in fuel prices in order to take into account the overconsumption by motors using
additive blends of biofuels. Therefore, biofuel valorization is lower than fossil fuel
price, in particular ethanol against gasoline (see substitution rates in table 1).
The comparison between costs and valorization clearly shows that biofuels are
not competitive without specic support. The main biofuel, ester, would become
competitive against diesel if the oil price reached 75 to $80 per barrel (1e = $1.2).
An increase in oil prices does not favor so much the competitiveness of ethanol and
still less that of ETBE because of their poor energy balances.
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2.4 An economic overcompensation through the
partial exemption of "TIPP"
In addition to the agricultural subsidies granted by the CAP, biofuels enjoy a partial
exemption of "TIPP" (Interior Tax on Oil Products) which applies to fossil fuels.
This exemption is 0.33e/l for ester and 0.37-0.38 e/l for ethanol in 2005. This tax
exemption allows biofuels to be protable when oil prices uctuate between 15 and $20
per barrel. Today, such a level of exemption is no longer necessary. Considering the
present oil context and the previous hypotheses on the prices of energy crops (that is to
say prices equivalent to the corresponding food crops), the minimum exemptions that
should be implemented may be assessed by the gap between biofuel costs and their
increase in value such as they are on graph 2. For an oil price of $65, these exemptions
are more or less equivalent between ETBE, ethanol in direct use, and ester. Given
that the tax exemption concerns ethanol, and that from a liter of ethanol you obtain
2.27 litres of ETBE, the tax exemption per liter of ethanol more than doubles for that
chain. This estimation can be seen in table 4, for an oil price of $65 a barrel. The
minimum exemptions are much lower than the current ones, especially for the chains
of ester and ethanol in direct use. They are higher for ethanol via ETBE because of
the additional cost of ETBE production.
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Minimum
tax-cut, e/hl,
$65/barrel oil
tax-cut e/l
(2005)
Excess tax-cut
e/l
Wheat ethanol
used in ETBE
0.22 0.38 0.16
Sugarbeet
ethanol used
in ETBE
0.20 0.38 0.18
Wheat ethanol,
direct use
0.09 0.37 0.28
Sugarbeet
ethanol, di-
rect use
0.08 0.37 0.29
Rapeseed methyl
ester
0.09 0.33 0.24
Table 4: Excess in tax-cuts
The tax exemption surpluses presented in table 4 give an estimate of the prof-
its for the agents involved downstream, from collection through to incorporation of
biofuels into fossil fuels. It is logical to compare these gains with those of agriculture.
We should remember that, in 1993, agricultural objectives were clearly displayed to
justify the development of biofuels.
The sharing of prots in favor of agriculture essentially depends on two factors:
the agricultural prices of energy crops and the nature of the areas used for these crops
(CAP set-aside lands or areas given over for food production). The prices which will
be used to estimate this sharing are the ones which were used for the estimation of
biofuel costs (graph 2), that is to say 198e/t for rapeseed, 88e/t for wheat and 20e/t
for sugar beet, as explained above. These prices apply whatever the location of the
energy crops, on CAP set-aside or on arable lands. To meet the demand for energy
crops, farm producers will rst put a part of the CAP set-aside land into cultivation
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again (graph 1) before replacing food crops, because this choice is economically more
interesting. This substitution for set-aside land will last as long as the impact on
farm incomes are greater than the bonus of 45e per hectare granted when energy
crops replace food crops. This is why, at present, the 300,000 hectares of rapeseed
ester almost totally fall within the set-aside lands. The prot sharing results (given
in table 5) are based on this mechanism.
As long as energy crops replace CAP set-aside lands (table 5), farm producers
get additional farm income per hectare of wheat or rapeseed ranging from 200 to 300e;
these incomes are more or less equivalent to the average income per hectare of cereal
farm-holdings. In this way, farmers retrieve the part of income lost due to the CAP
provisions on set-aside lands enforced in 1993. The increase in farming income per
hectare of energy sugar beet exceeds the increase in income of other crops because of
the methods used to estimate prices; it is the opposite per liter of biofuel because of the
high production of ethanol per hectare of sugar beet (100 liters/ton). A comparison
of these agricultural gains with the downstream ones requires an expression of the
supplementary farm income per liter of biofuel. We can see that the additional farm
income per liter of biofuel is quite clearly lower than downstream gains produced by
the tax exemption surpluses.
74
2.4 An economic overcompensation through the partial exemption of "TIPP"
Price Average
yield
Increase in
agricultural
income (en-
ergy crops
produced on
set-aside land)
Increase in
agricultural
income (en-
ergy crops
competing
with food
crops
Excess
tax-
cuts
Units e/ton t/ha e/ha e/l e/ha e/l e/l
Wheat 90 8.22 302 0.10 45 0.02 0.16
Sugarbeet 20 79.5 606 0.08 149 0.02 0.18
Rapeseed 200 3.28 199 0.08 45 0.03 0.24
Table 5 ; Increased agricultural income on and outside the set-aside land
As soon as these crops replace food crops, the economic benets for agriculture
diminish sharply. The increase in farming incomes per hectare of wheat and rapeseed
falls to 45e (aid to energy crops) and that of sugar beet to 149e. The gain per liter
of biofuel becomes very low (0.02-0.03e/l). Prot sharing between agriculture and
the downstream sector is unequitable in this scenario.
To summarize, as long as biofuels allow farmers to cultivate their CAP set-aside
lands, the situation is interesting for them; on the other hand, when energy production
starts to whittle away food areas, the economic stakes become quite marginal. It
must be added that the economic spin-o¤s of biofuel chains chiey concern the cereal
regions, which are generally well-equipped in agro-industrial structures, and much
less the mixed farming regions.
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2.5 Costs and benets of the biofuel program
An estimate of the impacts of the biofuel program on general economic activity and
among other things, on job creation, is a very controversial issue. PriceWaterhouseC-
oopers announces the creation of 3,800 jobs and added value of 207 million e induced
by the present biodiesel program (about 4 million hectoliters). For the American
Midwest and for a production of 14 million hectolitres of ethanol, Gallagher indicates
5,500 jobs created in industry and services but few in agriculture and a positive
balance of $200 million.
In the case of industries, the analysis only considers the jobs and the added value created at the
level of the industries grinding rapeseed and esterifying oils. The tax exemption being set at a
minimum compatible with the microeconomic balance of the chains, the industrial added value is
equal to the remuneration of xed factors of the biofuel industry, that is to say the salaried costs
of the created jobs and the other xed costs. In the case of the farming sector, the analysis only
considers the farming incomes and jobs provided by the proportion of crops cultivated on set-aside
lands. We assume that only the energy crops on set-aside lands are likely to create jobs and generate
additional incomes. As a matter of fact, in the case of energy crops replacing food crops, there is
no reason to foresee any economic boost e¤ect through increased consumption of farm inputs, the
inputs for non-food crops being the same, in nature and quantity, as the ones used by substituted
food crops.
Box 7: Hypotheses for the Cost-Benet analysis
On the other hand, a study by the Department of Budget of the French Ministry
of Finance (Lévy-Couveinhes report, July 2000) leads to negative macroeconomic
conclusions unless the oil price reaches at least $60 a barrel, and contests the job
creations resulting from sector-based measures. These large di¤erences in results
stem on the one hand from divergent methods, and on the other hand from whether
or not the opportunity cost of public funds (consideration of alternative uses of public
money intended to support biofuel chains) is taken into account. The macroeconomic
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models which would allow a more in-depth analysis of the production of energy from
biomass because they are free of these simplifying hypotheses are not yet up to scratch.
Using the OSCAR model, we therefore carried out a very simplied analysis of the
macroeconomic e¤ects originating from the biodiesel chain for a program of 27.5
millions hectolitre (needs of 2010) (see the appendix). The results come to 1,800
jobs created, including 300 maintained in agriculture, and added value of 0.09e per
liter of biodiesel. Taken as a whole, these impacts are quite weak because of the
competition between food and non-food crops. Finally, all these elements put end to
end give the balance in table 6 which concludes that the situation is balanced. To the
strictly economic results above, we must add the positive environmental externalities
coming from the reduction of GHG. At present, the monetarization of this advantage
is made easier by the existence of a market for the rights of CO2 emission, the price of
which is around 20e/t CO2. However, this evaluation remains virtual since it relies
upon a uctuating market of emission permits and not on the real damage caused by
greenhouse gases. The results below are obtained from life cycles analyses made by
ADEME and DIREM (see table 7).
Cost-benet in e/l, RME chain, 2010 situation, $65/barrel
Minimum tax cut (loss in tax-
payers surplus)
-0.09
Variation of GDP, biofuel in-
dustries
0.05
Variation of agricultural sur-
plus
0.04
Sum 0
Table 6: Cost-benet analysis
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The valorization of CO2 helps to justify only a part of the public funds granted to
the biofuel chain. By placing itself at this second level of analysis, the biodiesel chain,
an essential link in the biofuel program, is in the general economic interest thanks to
its positive contribution to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. However, this
result is closely linked to the given oil price of 65$ a barrel. A drop of only 10% in the
barrel price would lead to the cost-advantage balance in table 6 becoming negative
and cancelling out the positive e¤ect resulting from the reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions shown in table 7.
Teq CO2 saved
per hl
Amount e/hl in % of the
minimal tax-
cut
Wheat ethanol in
ETBE
0.22 0.02 9
Sugarbeet ethanol
in ETBE
0.22 0.02 10
Wheat in ethanol,
direct use
0.10 0.04 46
Sugarbeet in
ethanol, direct use
0.10 0.04 57
Rapeseed methyl
ester
0.21 0.04 49
Table 7: the CO2 externality
Conclusion
First-generation biofuels constitute a fairly ine¤ective energy production. This was
acknowledged in 2004 by the American National Commission on Energy Policies which
recommended abandoning corn ethanol for ligno-cellulose ethanol. It is too early to
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say whether this result can be extrapolated to France. The results of the national
research program on the valorization of biomass which has just been launched should
bring new developments on this matter. If the non-foodsector encroaches on the
food sector as is more than likely in the future  the microeconomic accounts
of biofuels are in decit, even if the price of oil reaches $65 a barrel (1e=$1.22). In
other words, public aid is necessary for the economic balance of the chains. However,
the present support granted in the form of a "TIPP" exemption could be notably
reduced, given the high prices of the oil barrel, especially in 2005.
The microeconomic competitiveness of biofuels requires high oil prices of be-
tween 75 and $80 per barrel. The maximum price of oil (Brent), which was reached
in 2005, is lower than this. The high 2005 prices resulting from an increase in the
demand for oil may favor capacity investments; a decrease in oil prices could result
from this, which would automatically increase the microeconomic decit of the bio-
fuel chains. The International Agency for Energy, in the World Energy Outlook of
2004, suggests a scenario of the oil price at $35 a barrel in 2030 (in constant dollars
2000). According to the Agency, this average price level remaining steady over a long
period would lead to investments allowing a structural change in energy demand, in-
cluding a reduction in world energy demand for oil of up to 15% (that is to say the
equivalent of the present demand from the United States). This hypothesis of the
long-term lowering of prices results from the level of reserves, the progress in oil ex-
traction technologies, the promotion of new sources of non-conventional oil (asphalt
sands, heavy oils) and from the large reserves of energy savings.
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The microeconomic repercussions for farm producers are above all tangible as
long as the set-aside lands are valorized; beyond, these repercussions decrease sharply.
These repercussions chiey concern the large cereal regions of the North Paris basin
and much less the mixed farming regions. This is why the production of oil in rural
plants for direct use in fuel could develop after the recent withdrawal of a certain
number of statutory obstacles. In the mixed farming regions, it could become a way of
creating added value at the local level and reinforcing the links between cereal growers
and stockbreeders in the same region within the framework of the implementation of
traceableanimal chains.
In fact, an ambitious biofuel program such as the one proposed for 2010 is
much more of an economic challenge for biofuel-oil industriesthan it is for farmers,
unless a driving e¤ect on agricultural prices occurs. Considering the importance of
the biofuel programs which are implemented not only on the European level but also
on a worldwide level (Brazil, USA for ethanol, Malaysia-Indonesia for palm oil), this
positive e¤ect may be possible.
Macroeconomic assessments shed a more favorable light on biofuels. Very posi-
tive for certain authors (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Gallagher), they merely seem sat-
isfactory according to our estimations. These broad economic results are positive
provided that the oil price reaches $65 a barrel and that the monetary value of the
reductions of CO2 emissions is taken into account. However, at present this sole val-
orization is not enough to justify public support. The production of biofuel restricted
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to the set-aside lands would have beneted from much more attering economic as-
sessments (but it cannot achieve the objectives of the European Union).
In the nal analysis, the economic and energy balances of rst-generation biofu-
els are not decisive enough to make these renewable energies an alternative anything
more than limited to the exhaustion of oil resources. Under these conditions, like
in the United States, the second-generation biofuels using ligno-cellulose resources,
by-products and crops bring much more hope. In fact, they could need less land, im-
prove energy outputs and benet from lower costs. In the rst place, a stock of 5
million tons of wheat straw (that is to say a quarter of the annual French production
of cereal straw) is available, while preserving the fertility of the soil and the demand
of stockbreeders. This resource of 1.5Mtoe primary energy would supply enough
ethanol to meet the needs of 2010 such as they are stated by the European Union.
The wood-chain by-products could also increase the stock of biomass, while extending
the areas of biofuel production. Later, dedicated crops (specic cereals, miscanthus,
quick-rotation coppice) are envisaged. In addition to the European programs, a re-
search e¤ort on the national level has recently been launched on the matter. Within
10 to 15 years, the rst technologies for the conversion of biomass into biofuels should
see the light of day.
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Update on the production costs of biofuels
The prices of oil and agricultural commodities have drastically changed since this
study was conducted. However, biofuels are still not protable, as our lastest calcu-
lations show (as of January 2008):27
Private produc-
tion cost
Public produc-
tion cost, CO2
priced at 20e=t
Public produc-
tion cost, CO2
priced at 50e=t
Wheat ethanol 0.67e/l 0.63e/l 0.57e/l
Rapeseed biodiesel 0.80e/l 0.75e/l 0.69e/l
Table 8 ; Private and public production costs for biofuels
Threshold oil
price
Wheat ethanol 183$/b
Rapeseed biodiesel 147$/b
Table 9 ; Oil price for biofuel protability
This situation is straightforward to explain. Take the example of vegetable oils,
which are used to make biodiesel. Upon the last three years, their price evolution has
been following the (fossil) oil price. In such a context, biofuel industries will never be
protable: the increase in their output price is o¤set by the increase in their input
price. As agricultural and energy prices have been linked by the production of biofuels
worldwide, biofuel industries will almost always require support schemes (tax-cuts or
mandates) in order to break even.
27 The prices of commodities were the following: wheat at 230e/ton and rapeseed at 400e/ton. The e/$
parity was 1e=$1.47
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The global energy situation has profoundly changed since the beginning of years 2000, characterized
notably by the all-time record (in nominal terms at least) set by the oil barrel in the rst days of 2008.
This recent evolution hinges upon three main factors: the unexpected rise in demand, insu¢ cient
production capacities and the deregulation of the energy sector. However, the end of the nineties
had been characterized by a cheap and aboundant energy: the oil barrel was oscillating between
$15 and $25 by then. Energy and economic development are two intertwined notions. Besides, the
global energy consumption is a¤ected by the great politicals events, as the two oil shocks that took
place in the seventies demonstrate. During this period, the oil barrel has surged from $3 in 1973 to
$30 by the beginning of the eighties. However, the counter oil shock in 1986 pulled this price back to
$10. More recently, the collapse of the USSR or the monetary crisis in the emerging Asian countries
(1997-1998) has heavily weighted on the global energy market. In spite of these sporadic variations,
the long term trend remains upward-oriented. Oil accounts for 35% of the global energy production,
while coal and natural gas respectively make up 23 and 21% of the total production. The various
scenarios of the evolution of the global energy demand hinges on two main factors: economic growth
and the degree of environmental protection laid down by the states. All the scenarios converge to
a decrease in the energy intensity and a landscape in which fossil energy will still be dominating.
Oils share will rise to 40%, with an increase from 3.8 to 5 Gtoe (Giga ton of oil equivalent) in
absolute terms. The rst three producers of oil are Saudi Arabia (which takes up a central position
within the OPEC cartel), the former Soviet Union (which used to be the biggest producer during
the eighties) and the United States. The di¢ cult question of the worlds oil reserves should not
be taken up without a few denitions. First of all, a distinction should be drawn between the
notion of resource (the volume of oil underground) and reserve (the quantity which can e¤ectively
be recovered, depending on the available techniques and the production costs). These reserves can
be proved, probable or possible, the di¤erence lying in the degree of certainty concerning their
e¤ective exploitation. Experts at the French Petroleum Institute estimate that the proved reserves
of conventional oil add up to 40 years of consumption. These reserves could be revised upwards
following discoveries, a better knowledge of the existing oilelds and thanks to a better retrieval of
oil. We should also add on the non-conventional oil reserves (extra-heavy oil, asphaltic sands and
bituminous schists). Oil prices have evolved in a rather sudden trend, surging from $10 in 1998 to
$100 in 2008. The explanations classically put forward to explain such a huge increase are the high
demand for oil (stemming from a vigorous global growth), the vanishing of the production excess,
concerns on the reserves and some degree of speculation. However, we should note that the prices
are largely greater than the production costs: $3 in Saudi Arabia and a maximum of $15 for the
most expensive oils to extract. Moreover, producer countries make their budgetary forecasts based
on a barrel which seldom exceed $30 ; oil companies make their investment decisions based on a
threshold price for oil ranging between $20 and $30. The importance of oil in the economy has
been drastically reduced since the seventies, when the tenfold multiplication of the barrel price had
triggered a 15% decrease in demand. The high prices observed during the present decade have had
far less consequences. In the medium term, the barrel ought to pull back around $30 to $40 per
barrel. The challenges that crop up with global warming calls for a major cut in the consumption of
fossil energy, an increased use of carbon-free energy and a control of the global energy consumption.
Finally, the contribution of biofuels to the e¤orts to tame climate change remains very modest (in
2007, biofuels amount to only 1% of the global demand for fuels).
Box 8: Oil and energy markets. This is the summary from an article by Favennec, J.-P. entitled
"Energie : demande, réserves, capacités de production et prix", published in the Biofuel Survey
under the supervision of Tréguer, D., Déméter 2008, 352 pp.
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Crops for biofuels in the EU have historically been produced on set-aside land. Hence
biofuels made from crops produced on this unused arable land permits to save GHG
emissions with respect to the fossil fuel alternative. The results of life-cycle analysis
studies showed a great heterogeneity, but the commercial processes in the EU en-
able to reach GHG savings between 18 and 50%. The agricultural production, the
industrial transformation of crops into biofuels and the nal use in cars lead to GHG
emissions of the same magnitude or even greater than their fossil counterparts. How-
ever, biofuels are granted with a carbon credit since their use prevents the release of
carbon dioxide from fossil fuels, which are kept underground. Thanks to that carbon
credit, biofuels have lower life-cycle emissions than petroleum fuels. This framework
for assessing biofuels GHG emissions was acceptable as long as biofuels were incor-
porated in small quantities. With the new 10% target set for 2020 in the EU, a more
complex analysis ought to be conducted, taking account of the land-use changes trig-
gered by this high incorporation rate. As pointed out by Fargione et al., the sizeable
production of biofuels on a global scale will lead to the conversion of land (mainly
in the Americas and Southeast Asia) for biofuel production (or food/feed produc-
tion when the existing agricultural land has switched to biofuel production). The
conversion of land within previously undisturbed ecosystems will lead to large CO2
emissions stemming from the burning and microbial decomposition of the organic car-
bon sequestered in the soil and plants. Hence, it seems necessary to consider these
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indirect GHG emissions linked to biofuel programs in the EU. This CO2 emission
takes place in two steps:
 First, a rapid release occurs with the re used to clear land and the
decomposition of leaves and ne roots
 Then, a long period of GHG release ensues, stemming from the decay of coarse
roots and wood products.
The total quantity of CO2 released over the rst 50 years is denominated carbon
debtby Fargione et al.
Thereafter, as time goes by, biofuels may possibly repay this initial carbon debt
incurred at the initial land conversion stage: this is of course only possible if the
production and combustion of biofuels lead to lower life-cycle emissions than the
fossil fuels they replace. However, it seems worth stressing that until this debt is
eventually repaid, biofuels produced on converted land lead to higher GHG emissions
than fossil fuels. When these indirect e¤ects are properly accounted for in the GHG
analysis, the positive externality of biofuels turns out to be a negative environmental
externality.
The emissions linked to land use changes (grassland, tropical forest or savannas
to cropland) must therefore be properly taken into account. Table A below shows
di¤erent cases of land conversion and the associated carbon debts. The worst type
of biofuel in that respect is biodiesel made from palm oil grown on land previously
planted with tropical rainforest on peatland (in Malaysia or Indonesia), which incurs
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a carbon debt that would take 423 years to repay. The quantity of carbon released
when palm trees replace peatland is increased by the need for drainage, which leads
to additional sustained emissions of 55 Mg of CO2.ha 1.yr 1. With the importance
of the EU biodiesel program, there will be a need for vegetable oil imports. These
imports will either come from South America (Brazil and Argentina) and South-
east Asia (Indonesia and Malaysia). Judging by the gures in table 10, the indirect
carbon emissions linked to the EU biofuel program could have extremely negative
consequences: the production of palm oil in Indonesia/Malaysia would require be-
tween 86 to 423 years to repay the carbon debt, while the production of soybean in
Brazil for biodiesel necessitates between 37 and 319 years to balance the initial car-
bon loss. These new analyses tend to jeopardize the EU 10% target by 2020. Besides,
it seems that biofuel certication cannot solve the problem, as the enforcement issue
on a global scale seems hardly feasible.
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Biofuel Palm
biodiesel
Palm
biodiesel
Soybean
biodiesel
Sugarcane
ethanol
Soybean
biodiesel
Former Ecosys-
tem
Tropical
rainforest
Peatland
rainforest
Tropical
rainforest
Cerrado
wooded
Cerrado
grassland
Location Indonesia
and
Malaysia
Indonesia
and
Malaysia
Brazil Brazil Brazil
Carbon
debt (Mg
CO2e:ha
 1)
702 3452 737 165 85
Debt allocated
to biofuel (%)
87 87 39 100 39
Annual re-
payment (Mg
CO2e:ha
 1:yr 1)
7:1 7:1 0:9 9:8 0:9
Time to repay
biofuel carbon
debt (yr)
86 423 319 17 37
Table 10 ; Carbon debts from di¤erent land conversions for biofuels (Fargione et al :)
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Part II A necessary evolution of
agricultural and environmental poli-
cies in the new biofuel context
The recent impulse given to biofuel energy policies is likely to produce ma-
jor side-e¤ects on highly regulated agricultural sectors, particularly in the European
Union (EU) and in the United States (USA), where public regulation of the agri-
cultural sector is prominent.28 Since the new biofuel policies might trigger feedstock
price increases, biofuel policies will have interactions with agriculture policies aiming
at supporting farmersincome. Additionally, as most of the energy crop production
might lead to more intensive agricultural practices, they will interact with environ-
mental policies directed at agriculture as well. In countries where agricultural policies
aim at supporting the farmersincome, the question of a dual support for the agricul-
tural sector (biofuel support in addition to the "traditional" income support schemes)
might lead governments to take advantage of the possible substitution between these
28 We curtail our analysis to the rst generation of biofuels, which uses the same feedstock as the
agro-food industry. Moreover, the interactions with energy markets, although very interesting, will
be left aside in this analysis.
two kinds of supports (Babcock, 2007). For the EU, sorting out the environmen-
tal consequences of the development of biofuels is further complicated by the links
between income support and environmental objectives of agricultural policies (the
so-called cross-complianceprovisions). In the USA, the question of environmental
impacts of energy crop production, although not directly linked to income support as
in the EU, is also an important issue. The increased production of corn might well
lead to local pollution problems, as well as soil erosion concerns.
Hence, the emergence of biofuel policies marks a profound change in the path
of agricultural policy reform, which has mainly consisted in decoupling the support
awarded to farmers from production decisions. This evolution has begun with the
1992 reform and was further reinforced during the Agenda 2000, Mid-Term Reform
in 2002 and the "Health-Check" which ought to be adopted prior to the end of 2008.
Clearly, the decision to design large-scale biofuel programs has led to sharp increases
in agricultural commodity markets, and this new biofuel policy, although formally
taking place outside the CAP, has deep consequences on the logic of the evolution
of the CAP. It could be argued that biofuel policy has implications that look like
re-coupling. Moreover, the evolution that had been observed with respect to the
enforcement of environmental policies within agricultural production is jeopardized
by the high price levels triggered by biofuel programs. The reforms of the Common
Agricultural Policy had led to the implementation of cross-compliance provisions,
with the possibility for the regulator to ne the farmers in case of infringement, the
penalty paid by the farmer being proportional to the decoupled payment. With a new
framework of high commodity prices and decreased decoupled payments, the cross-
compliance scheme is put at risk. A new scheme ought to be implemented in order to
guarantee that the progress achieved during the successive CAP reforms environment-
wise will not be cancelled out by the new conditions of agricultural production, i.e.
high prices which are an incentive for farmers to increase the use of polluting inputs,
e.g. fertilisers and pesticides.
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the analysis of the interactions between biofuel and
agricultural policies, more precisely on the likely evolution of the latter in the new
context of high agricultural prices triggered o¤ by sizeable biofuel plans. We will
show how a partial substitution of support to the biofuel industry (in the form of
subsidies or mandates) for agricultural decoupled payments could lead to a higher
aggregate welfare situation. Chapter 4 addresses the question of the enforcement of
environmental provisions in agriculture, in the context of an increased production
of energy crops. The main question raised in this chapter consists in selecting the
best penalty scheme in the new biofuel context, i.e. either a fraction of the decoupled
payment (the scheme used under the current CAP framework), or xed penalties.
Chapter 3
Biofuels production and the
economic support to agriculture
Introduction
In the EU as in the USA, a major part of the programs aimed to develop biofuels
have been set up under the pressure of agricultural lobbies who conceive biofuels as
an opportunity to stem the tide of decreasing incomes. By subsidizing the biofuel in-
dustry, the regulator raises the (internal) price of the agricultural feedstock. In the
EU, a development of biofuel production allows the agricultural sector to benet from
a dual support (taken in a broad sense): on the one hand, the State hands out de-
coupled payments to farmers (Single Farm Payments), and on the other, the State
gives an important support to the biofuel industries, whose production costs exceed
the price at which they can sell their output. The price increase of the agricultural
commodities raises the farmer revenues, and the need for direct income support is re-
duced. Hence, for a given objective of agricultural income, the regulator is able to
operate a partial substitution between direct agricultural income support and subsi-
dies to the biofuel industry. Owing to the importance of the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) in the EU budget (e50 billion per year, i.e. 46% of the EU budget),
and since the support to agriculture is twofold (CAP payments and biofuel subsidies),
the question of a partial substitution of biofuel subsidies for CAP payments could be
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on the EU political agenda very soon.29 In the USA, the ethanol program might lead
to a long-lasting price increase for corn, wheat and soybeans, which could temporar-
ily stop the counter-cyclical and loan deciency payments (Babcock, 2006. See also
the last line of table 3).30
The agro-food industry will face new competition from the biofuel rms for
agricultural raw material. The ercest competition will take place on the European
rapeseed market. This crop is interesting for agro-food rms (among its many physical
and chemical properties is the presence of omega-3) and biofuel rms alike (the iodin
number of rapeseed oil is low enough to meet the specications of fuels). Thus,
both industries will nd only imperfect substitutes for rapeseed.31 Of course, this
competition with biofuel rms for the same input is harmful for the European agro-
food industry, which stands up against the policy in favor of the rst generation of
biofuels (cf. Unilever, 2006, Forbes, 2006 and Confederation of the Food and Drink
Industries of the EU, 2006). Goldman Sachs (Financial Times, 2006) also points to
a possible decrease in agro-food rm prots owing to biofuel production. With rising
revenues for farmers, decreasing prots for the agro-food industry and a reduced
consumer surplus, the net e¤ect on European welfare is unclear.
29 This policy could also transfer the burden of the nancial backing of agriculture from the EU to the
Member States, extending the subsidiarity of the CAP" introduced by the modulation" features of Agenda
2000.
30 A counter-cyclical payment is a form of agricultural subsidy used to compensate farmers if the price of
an agricultural commodity drops below a level deemed to be desirable. A loan deciency payment is paid to
the producers of certain commodities. It is based on the di¤erence between a target price and the domestic
market price.
31 Rapeseed is produced elsewhere in the world (e.g. Canada produces canola, which is very close to rape-
seed). However, it seems impossible to guarantee the absence of Genetically Modied Organisms (GMOs).
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The rst part of this chapter gives some quantitative e¤ects on agricultural
markets triggered by the development of biofuels, while the second part will address
explicitely the interactions between agricultural and biofuel policies, through the pre-
sentation of a stylized model.
3.1 The e¤ects of biofuel development on
agricultural markets
Biofuel policies are likely to have large impacts on agricultural policies. First, the new
demand for feedstock might lead to price increases on the agricultural markets. When
reecting on the consequences of biofuel development on agricultural policies, the
rst questions that come to mind deal with the evolution of agricultural markets: the
prices of the main agricultural commodities. The answers to these questions are given
by agricultural prospective models. In spite of the great interest that these questions
take on for the actors in the agricultural sector, the study of the relationships between
biofuel and agricultural policies ought to go further than the mere confrontation of
supplies and demands. Indeed, the demand for energy crops is supported by the
State (either directly through subsidies or indirectly through mandatory blending
that weigh on the consumers). Through the enforcement of a biofuel development
policy, the State triggers welfare variations (positive or negative) for the di¤erent
agents involved: here lies the interesting economic aspect to be studied.
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3.1.1 Model simulations for the EU biofuel sector
Several authors have attempted to gauge the future developments of biofuels in the
EU, even though there is still a lack of models that fully include the linkage with the
energy markets. For instance, Dronne and Gohin (2006) estimate the variation of
several crop prices resulting from a demand shock of 3 million tons (Mt) of rapeseed
oil provoked by the EU biofuel policy. Compared with the baseline (2002), this would
lead to an increase of the EU-15 production of biodiesel from 1.1 Mt to 4.1 Mt.
Although inferior to the quantity corresponding to the EU 5.75% objective (11.4 Mt
of biodiesel), this quantity represents the installed capacity by the beginning of 2007.
It is su¢ cient to assess the main impacts on the international markets. The results
are presented in the following table.
Commodity Price variation
Rapeseed oil 19%
Other oils 9.6/11%
Rapeseed Cakes -5.2%
Other Cakes -0.6/-3.5%
Rapeseed grain 12%
Other vegetable grains 3.3%
Cereals (EU) 0
Cereals (World) 3%
Table 1; Dronne and Gohin (2006)
The demand shock leads to more expensive vegetable oils, grains and cereals,
while the price of cakes32 would decrease. More recently, Gohin conducted a general
32 Cakes are co-products of the biodiesel production process, used to feed animals owing to their high
protein content.
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equilibrium analysis of the European biofuel sector. The results are shown in the table
below:33
Soft
wheat
Rapeseed Sugar
beet/
sugar
Rape oil Rape
meal
Palm oil
Production
(Million
tons)
93,545
(5.4%)
7,207
(76.6%)
13,877
(13%)
3,357
(68.9%)
3,955
(68.8%)
0
Total de-
mand (Mil-
lion tons)
76,833
(19.5%)
8,400
(68.9%)
13,095
(14%)
2,485
(310%)
4,478
(23.4%)
3,631
(-6.2%)
Net exports
(Million
tons)
17,413 (-
58.2%)
-469
(0%)
430
(-7.4%)
905
(-584%)
-62 (-
3,062%)
-3,631 (-
6.2%)
World prices
($/T)
128
(11.3%)
245
(42.6%)
281
(0.1%)
570
(47.9%)
129
(-12.4%)
548
(38.9%)
Table 2; Gohin (2007)
The two most important results are the increase in the world price of oilseeds
and the change in the EU situation, which becomes a net importer of rapeseed (from
a situation of net exporter).
3.1.2 Model simulations for the US biofuel sector
For various levels of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), Marshall and Greenhalgh
(2006) estimate the economic impacts on feedstock prices, as well as on the incomes
of various types of farmers: corn or soybean producers and animal breeders. The rst
subgroup might benet from the ethanol policy, while the two other subgroups might
lose money.
33 The scenario is a production of biodiesel and ethanol at the EU-15 level in order to reach 5.75% of
biofuels in 2010.
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Annual produc-
tion, ethanol
Billion
gallons
5 7.5
(cur-
rent
RFS)
10 12.5 15
Economic im-
pacts
Baseline
Price of corn $ per ton 94.5 3.3 7.9 12.1 17.5
Price of soy-
beans
$ per ton 206 -0.4 -1.6 -2.7 -3.6
Farm income $billion per
year
75 0.7 0.7 1.9 3.3
Cash receipts $billion per
year
208 0.7 1.1 1.9 3.0
Variable costs $billion per
year
133 0.6 1.3 1.9 2.9
Farm income
(corn)
$billion per
year
16 3.7 8.5 18.0 30.6
Farm income
(Soybeans)
$billion per
year
5 -2.2 -7.4 -12.2 -16.3
Farm income
(Livestock)
$billion per
year
47 0.5 -0.4 -0.9 -2.3
Government
payments
$billion per
year
10 -7.5 -15.9 -17.5 -18.4
Table 3; Marshall and Greenhalgh (2006)
This study shows that a signicant development of biofuels could lead to a
decrease in the federal payments directed to the farmers (Contracyclic Payments and
Loan Deciency Payments). It seems therefore straightforward that the payments
given out to support biofuel production partially substitute for agricultural payments.
The decrease in the price of soybeans seems quite puzzling. This decline is maybe
exaggerated and stems from the fact that biodiesel development in the USA and in
the EU is not accounted for in their model.
97
3.1 The e¤ects of biofuel development on agricultural markets
Still for the USA, Elobeid et al. (2006) calculates the corn price at which the
incentive to expand ethanol production disappears (i.e. the maximal expansion of
ethanol production). With the current ethanol tax policy and with the prices of
crude oil, natural gas and co-products set at their 2006 levels (notably, a $60 oil
barrel), they conclude that the break-even corn price would be $159 per ton. With
this price of corn, ethanol production would reach 1.19 billion hectoliters per year,
requiring 38.2 million hectares of corn. This situation is compared with the baseline
for 2015 (see Elobeid and Tokgoz, 2006). Their results are described in the following
tables.
CARD Baseline
(2015)
Long term Variation
(%)
Corn price $/ton 100.8 159 58%
Corn area Million hectares 31.8 38.2 21%
Corn production Million tons 331 398 20%
Corn for ethanol Million tons 82.6 282 242%
Ethanol con-
sumption
Million liters 35,800 119,000 232%
Table 4; Elobeid et al. (2006)
As regards soybean, the prices ought to decrease (the increase in the soy oil
price is not enough to make up for the fall in the soycakes price, challenged by
DDGS34). However, the analysis does not take into account the biodiesel production
build-up in the USA. The negative impact on the soybean complex might therefore
be over-estimated.
34 Distillers Dried Grains with Solubles, which is a co-product from ethanol production.
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CARD Baseline
(2015)
Long term Variation
(%)
Soybean price $/ton 203 192 -5%
Soybean area Million hectares 27.4 23.7 -14%
Soybean produc-
tion
Million tons 82 70.7 -14%
Domestic use of
soybean
Million tons 57.6 50.3 -13%
Cake price $/ton 160.2 92.7 -42%
Use of soya cake Million tons 37.6 15.2 -60%
Price of soy oil $/ton 535 650 20%
Table 5; Elobeid et al. (2006)
Besides, we should note that Elobeid et al. nds in its sensitivity analysis that
a +/- $10 variation of the oil barrel would change its results in a rather drastic way.
Thus, the following table shows the impacts of oil price scenarios on the US ethanol
production and corn feed use.
Variation w.r.t. long term
scenario
Scenario Ethanol pro-
duction
Corn feed use Ethanol pro-
duction
Corn feed use
Million liters Million tons
$70 barrel,
$187/ton
Corn
165,106 76,3 40% -26%
$50 barrel,
$132/ton
Corn
72,164 127 -39% 24%
Table 6; Elobeid et al. (2006)
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Variation w.r.t. long term
scenario
Scenario Ethanol pro-
duction
Corn feed use Ethanol pro-
duction
Corn feed use
Million liters Million tons
No tari¤, no
subsidy
27,019 155.6 -77% 52%
No tari¤ 115,690 102.8 -2% 0%
Table 7; Elobeid et al. (2006)
Finally, the last table shows in a blatant manner the strong inuence exerted by
the economic instruments (subsidies and tari¤s) on the systems durability. Without
support, the biofuel development framework would be altered in quite a radical way:
 The tari¤s removal hardly changes the production of ethanol (the production
subsidy being maintained).
 However, when the production subsidy is also withdrawn, ethanol production
falls sharply (-77%), releasing important quantities of corn for feed use (+52%).
3.1.3 Global models of biofuel production
Schmidhuber (2006) also gives a global outlook of the price evolutions for some agri-
cultural commodities associated to an increase of 10 million tons of di¤erent biofuel
feedstocks, as reported in the table below.
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10 additional million tons of...
Commodity Sugar Corn Sugar and
Corn
Soybean
and Corn
Sugar,
Corn and
Soybean
used to produce biofuels,
would change world price in the long term (%)
Sugar 9.8 1.1 11.3 2.3 13.8
Corn 0.4 2.8 3.4 4 4.2
Vegetable Oil 0.3 0.2 0.2 7.6 7.8
Proteins 0.4 -1.2 -1.2 -8.1 -7.6
Wheat 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.8 2
Rice 0.5 1 1.2 1.1 1.4
Wheat 0 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4
Poultry 0 -0.4 -0.4 -2.1 -2
Table 8; Schmidhuber (2006)
It can be noted that the decrease in the price of proteins is more important in
the case of a biofuel production made from protein-rich agricultural raw materials
(soybean and corn mainly). In this case, Schmidhubers simulations show that the
price of poultry (which requires important quantities of protein for its feeding) would
decrease (-2%).
The biofuel production scenario IFRI-IMPACT gives the following price in-
creases for the main biofuel raw materials. The authors have built an "agressive
growth" scenario for biofuels, i.e. they would replace (at a global scale) 10% of fossil
fuels in 2010 and 20% by 2020.
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Variation in the world prices
Raw material 2010 2020
Cassava 33% 135%
Corn 20% 41%
Oilseeds 26% 76%
Sugarbeet 7% 25%
Sugarcane 26% 66%
Wheat 11% 30%
Table 9; IFPRI (2006)
These gures show that signicant price increases may occur on the world mar-
kets in response to biofuel production.
3.1.4 Impact on cattle breeding in the USA
The ambitious biofuels programs are likely to trigger noteworthy increases in the
prices of agricultural commodities. However, it should not be concluded too quickly to
unanimously positive consequences for the whole agricultural sector: a sharp contrast
could well emerge between grain producers and cattle breeders.
The new demand for corn energy uses competes with the traditional feed and
food outlets. This new demand, which would trigger a price increase for corn, would
lower the demand for corn coming from the breeding sector. However, ethanol pro-
duction generates a co-product (30% of the dry matter): DDGS (Distillers Dried
Grain with Solubles) which is a protein-rich compound (25 to 27%) that can substi-
tute for soycakes or corn in the ruminantsintake. DDGS are less suitable for hogs
and poultry but they can partially substitute for soycake and corn by adding some
amino-acids. 3/4 of DDGS produced by the ethanol industry will be used for cattle
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breeding, 10% will be exported and the remaining 15% will be directed to other uses.
within the part used by breeding, 80% of DDGS will be used by beef (meat), 10% for
dairy beef and only 5% for hogs and poultry.
3.1.5 Biofuel imports
The question of importing biofuels from countries whose production costs are cheaper
will be very acute in the upcoming years in the EU and the US alike.
These imports would mainly come from Brazil35 (which produces ethanol from
sugar cane) and from Malaysia and Indonesia (for palm oil, which is esteried to
give biodiesel). Note that the international trade of biofuels has always been very
limited and that a necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for its taking o¤ would be
a clarication of the legal statute of biofuels with respect to the WTO.36 What is
at stake in this problem is the extent to which domestic production of energy crops
should be favored compared to imported biofuels.
35 According to the report by the EU Commission (2006a), ethanol imports to the EU have added up
to 2.5 millions hl in average during the period 2002-2004. Only 30% of the total volume has been traded
under the MFN conditions, most imports benet from tari¤ reductions under preferential agreements (ACP
agreements, GSP, GSP+ and EBA).
36 It is unclear whether biofuels are agricultural, environmental or energy products. For the time being,
this question still needs to be addressed, as stated in a recent report by the International Policy Council
(2006).
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The expansion of sugar in Brazil is closely linked to the history of this country. Sugar was rst
produced in the Nordeste region, then the production was developed in the São Paulo region (where
modern sugar reneries and distilleries have been built) and in the Center-West region. The increase
in areas and yields have allowed a steady rise in production: from 24hl per hectare in the sixties
to 66hl in 2004. Signicant progress has also been accomplished on an energy basis, with an ever
more e¢ cent use of bagasse. Brazil is the rst producer and exporter of sugar in the world, but the
increased production and consumption of sugar lowers its export balance: half the sugar factories are
now used to produce domestic ethanol. Sugar cane makes up 3/4 of the global sugar production, the
remaining quarter being produced from sugar beet in temperate zones. The gures about ethanol
in Brazil are impressive: production amounts to 154 millions hl (one third of global production,
with an increase of 55% forecasted for 2010), 60% coming from the South-West and Center-West
region, the remaining 40% being produced in the Nordeste region ; three millions cars are ex-fuel
vehicles or work with 100% hydrous ethanol (and 16 millions run on fuel or a fuel-anhydrous ethanol
blending) ; 320 factories process almost 400 millions tons of sugarcane annually. However, in spite
of an annual 6%-increase in cane production, some authors remain skeptic as regards the Brazils
capacity to satisfy the additional demand in sugar and ethanol. The Proalcool plan decided in 1975
following the rst oil shock had been initiated by the State which gave sizeable incentives (like, for
example: subsidies for buying cars running solely on ethanol, obligation for the state-owned company
Petrobras to buy a given quantity of ethanol, setting of the ethanol price below the gasoline price,
etc.) to develop ethanol. However, this plan did not outlive the counter oil shock of 1986, which
was followed by a surge in the sugar market at the beginning of the nineties: the sugar was a
better outlet than ethanol. Moreover, the state did not want to bear the overcost of ethanol with
respect to gasoline. Quite logically, the production of cars running solely on ethanol periclited until
a complete halt in 1996. A new era in the development of ethanol was triggered in 2004 as ex-fuel
vehicles were launched. These vehicles are partly subsidised by the state and make up 75% of the
sales of new cars. The emergence of ex-fuel cars is a means to enable a long term development
of biofuels in Brazil. Brazil is often touted as the future global supplier of ethanol. However, the
perspective of a 5% use of ethanol in the total fuel consumption worldwide raises important issues
in Brazil and appears as a threat to some authors. Sugar cane accounts today for 10% of the
cultivated land (a little less than 6 millions hectares), but could well be extended on 90 millions
additional hectares (in the Center-West region mainly). The most frequently heard objections to this
possibility are: the intrusive character of this crop, its fragility in the face of large-scale cryptogamic
and viral diseases and the fact that production is protable only for big landowners. Moreover,
a control of the agricultural production seems necessary (The ring of cane leaves before harvest
leads to smoke clouds which are responsible for the formation of ozone). A solution would be an
increased mechanization (where technically possible). The social e¤ects of ethanol production have
been positive (800 000 direct jobs have been created in the industry). However, the fate of the "boias
frias", agricultural workers paid proportionally to the quantity of cane harvested and the downside
consequences of monoculture on human nutrition are parameters to consider when reecting on the
public policy of ethanol production in Brazil.
Box 9: The situation in Brazil: ethanol production. This is a summary from an article by Bertrand,
J.-P. et al., entitled "La politique brésilienne en matière de biocarburants : le pari sur léthanol",
published in the Biofuel Survey under the supervision of Tréguer, D., Déméter 2008, 352 pp.
Biodiesel imports into the EU are subject to an ad-valorem duty of 6.5 %.
Despite this low tari¤, there is nearly no imports of biodiesel, mainly because biodiesel
104
3.1 The e¤ects of biofuel development on agricultural markets
Fig. 3.4. Main feedstock for biofuels in Brazil: soybeans and sugar cane. Map created
by Hervé Théry, published in Déméter 2008.
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production outside the EU is very limited. Tari¤s on vegetable oils are either nil or
very low. There are some technical di¢ culties for using large quantities of soybean
oil in biodiesel. However, low percentages of soy and palm oil can be combined with
rapeseed oil without particular problems. As a result, one observes an increase in EU
imports of palm oil, mainly from Malaysia. The ambitious incorporation targets set
by the EU might require importing signicant quantities of palm oil, not only for their
use for biodiesel production but also because of substitution possibilities between the
various vegetable oils in food uses.
As noted by the European Commission, there is currently no specic customs
classication for bioethanol for biofuel productionand it is not possible to estab-
lish from trade data whether or not imported alcohol is used in the fuel ethanol sector
in the EU(Commission of the European Communities, 2006a). Despite this uncer-
tainty, one can reasonably assume that the increase in EU imports of alcohol (from
1.45 million hectoliters in 1999-2001 to 2.56 million hectoliters in 2002-2004) is largely
due to the ethanol demand. Thanks to the various preferential agreements in force in
the EU, in particular the EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for the Least
Developing Countries (the "Everything But Armsinitiative), the GSP+ granted to
14 countries including all Latin American countries except Argentina, Brazil, Chili,
Paraguay and Uruguay, and the Cotonou Agreement with 77 African, Caribbean and
Pacic (ACP) States, large quantities of alcohol can enter into the EU at a zero or
reduced tari¤: EU imports of alcohol at a reduced or zero duty increased from 1.2
million hectoliters in 2002 to 2.0 million hectoliters in 2004. With the growing num-
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ber of developing countries interested in accessing the EU market under the GSP+,
it is expected that these favored imports will keep growing. Alcohol imports from
major producers, in particular Brazil and the United States, face high Most Favored
Nation (MFN) tari¤s, that is 19.2e per hectoliter on undenatured alcohol and 10.2e
per hectoliter on denatured alcohol. Despite this protection, EU imports from MFN
suppliers are increasing (from 0.66 million hectoliters in 2002 to 1.1 million hectoliters
in 2004).
The issue of allowing easier imports, in particular for ethanol, divides European
countries. Some countries (Portugal and Sweden for example) are highly favorable
to the idea arguing that the energy and greenhouse gas balances of Brazilian ethanol
are far better than the ones of EU bioethanol produced from wheat or sugar beets.
Other countries (in rst place France and Germany) strongly oppose the idea: clearly,
France and Germany play the biofuel card also with the view to supporting their own
farmers.
3.2 Formalizing the link between biofuel and
agricultural policies: a model.
As37 pointed out in the studies presented in the rst part of this chapter, subsidizing
the biofuel industry raises the price of the agricultural feedstock. The increase in the
37 This section is adapted from the rst part of an article by J.-M. Bourgeon and D. Tréguer, entitled:
"Killing Two Birds with One Stone: US and EU biofuel programs.
107
3.2 Formalizing the link between biofuel and agricultural policies: a model.
agricultural commodity prices raises the farmer revenue, and reduces the need for di-
rect income support. Hence, for a given objective of agricultural income, the regulator
is able to operate a partial substitution between direct agricultural income support
and subsidies to the biofuel industry. Owing to the importance of the Common Agri-
cultural Policy (CAP) in the EU budget,38 the question of a partial substitution of
biofuel subsidies for CAP payments could be on the EU political agenda very soon.
This section is related to the literature on the transfer e¢ ciency of agricultural
programs (Alston and Hurd, 1990 and Gardner, 1983), which notably considers the
incidence of the opportunity cost of public funds in the relative e¢ ciency of economic
instruments aimed at supporting farmers incomes. Indeed, biofuel subsidies (and
mandatory blending) could be considered a new element in the already wide range of
instruments at the regulators disposal.
We develop a model that disentangles the various e¤ects that the support
granted to biofuels may trigger. We show that without constraint on biofuel pro-
duction (e.g. coming from security of energy supply concerns), the government may
nd it worthwhile to implement a biofuel program to diminish the social cost of the
farm support program: indeed, it may be socially benecial to implement such poli-
cies if costs of public funds are high. This result might explain why biofuel programs
have been in place in the EU and the US for more than a decade. Considering the
possibility of importing agricultural feedstock, the government may still take advan-
tage of substitution between the farm support program and the biofuel subsidy policy.
38 In 2007, it represents more than e40 billion, i.e. 37% of the EU budget, (European Commission, 2007).
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This e¤ect leads to a higher domestic price of the agricultural commodity than the
world price, relatively low import levels, and the biofuels produced from imported
agricultural feedstock beneting from a lower subsidy than biofuels produced from
domestic input. When the biofuel production constraint is binding, the optimal do-
mestic production of feedstock exceeds the optimal (unconstrained) level of supply of
agricultural raw product that prevails in autarky.
The section is organized as follows. First, our model is presented and the optimal
production of energy crops is derived. Then, the import scenario is dealt with.39
3.2.1 The model
Consider an economy with an agricultural sector, a food sector and an energy sector.
All agents in this economy are price-takers. The production cost of the agricultural
product is a¤ected by the farmersenvironmental practices. Denote by C(X; e) the
cost function of the representative farm, where X is the production level and e 2
[0; eM ] is an environmental index (e.g. the polluting emission level), with CXe < 0.
Hence, the more the farmer pollutes, the lower the marginal cost of production.40
Both the food and energy industries use the agricultural feedstock in order to produce
their own outputs (food products and biofuels, respectively). The total quantity of
the agricultural product is thus split between the food (xF ) and energy (xE) sectors:
X = xF +xE. The production function of the representative rm in the food industry
is denoted by yF = fF (xF ) with f 0F > 0 and f
00
F < 0: The production function of
39 All proofs are placed in the appendix.
40 We also assume C(X; e) convex: we have CXX > 0; Cee > 0 and CXXCee   C2Xe > 0.
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the energy sector is fE(xE) = xE; where  < 1 is a positive parameter. Prot
maximization of the representative farmer determines the inverse agricultural supply
function, given by CX(X; e). Denote by pF (yF ) and pE the prices for the food and
the energy products. pE is supposed una¤ected by the production of biofuel and such
that:
CX(X; 0)  pE > 0
i.e. the energy rm production cost is greater than its revenue, whatever environ-
mental standard e. We shall rst consider in the following that the government has
decided to grant energy rms a per unit subsidy E which allows biofuel rms to break
even,41 and then discuss mandatory blending.42 As CXX > 0, the subsidy should rise
with the desired quantity of energy crops, as the price of the domestic crop becomes
higher. Hence, the demand coming from the energy rms for the agricultural prod-
uct is determined by the biofuel objective of the government. Total demand for the
agricultural product is determined by the demand coming from the food industry
and is deduced as follows. Solving the program of the representative rm of the food
industry, given by:
F  max
xF
pF (yF )fF (xF )  CX(X; e)xF ; (3.1)
41 We assume that the energy rm has no private information: the regulator knows the rms technology
and cost function.
42 We discuss the mandatory blending framework at the end of this section.Of course, other policies are
possible, like, rst of all, a Pigouvian tax on fossil fuels.
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where pF (yF ) and CX(X; e) are considered as constant, the equilibrium condition on
the input market leads to an optimal input demand xF satisfying:
g(xF ; xE; e)  pF (yF )f 0F (xF )  CX(xF + xE; e) = 0; (EC)
for all xE  0. For a given environmental index e, (EC) implicitly denes xF as a
function of xE.
3.2.2 Optimal biofuel policy in autarky
The objective of the regulator is to maximize the sum of the surpluses of the di¤erent
agents in the economy: farmer prots A, food and energy industry prots, F and
E, the consumer surplus CS,43 and the taxpayer surplus T . It also takes account
of a guaranteed income A for farmers. Hence, the taxpayer must nance the biofuel
program on the one hand and the direct payments to farmers on the other. The
total cost of subsidizing the energy crops is given by xEE, while the parity income
constraint leads to spending equal to A  A. The total public spending is a¤ected
by 1 +  in the Social Welfare Function (SWF), where  is a positive parameter
representing the social cost of public funds (see Fullerton, 1991 for a discussion on
the value of ). We thus have:
T = (1 + )[(CX   pE)xE +A   A]:
The environmental e¤ects of the agricultural production are summarized in an envi-
ronmental damage function D(e), with D0(e) > 0, i.e. the greater the farmsemis-
43 CS is the Marshallian consumer surplus deriving from the consumption of food: CS(xF ) =
Z yF (xF )
0
pF (yF (xF ))dyF
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sions, the larger the environmental damages. One of the regulators tasks is to de-
termine a socially desirable environmental standard e for agriculture. Of course the
regulator also has to make sure that farmers do comply with the environmental guide-
lines. We rst characterize the situation of costless enforcement implying e = e, and
discuss the enforcement problem in a specic section. Last, an environmental bene-
t stemming from the GHG mitigation e¤ect of biofuels is also accounted for in the
SWF: let B(xE) be this environmental benet and assume that B0(xE) = q > 0. As
explained above, the prot of the biofuel industry E is equal to zero. Absent any
constraint on the biofuel production level, the governments program is given by:
max
xE ;xF ;e
fA + CS +F   (1 + )[(CX   pE)xE +A  A] +B  D : (EC)g (3.2)
International agreements or energy supply security concerns may oblige the
agency to produce at least some given levelQ of biofuel. This would introduce another
constraint in program (3.2), given by: xE  Q=. To simplify the presentation, we
do not include this constraint in the government program, but we discuss the case of
a binding biofuel production constraint in the following. Neglecting constant A, the
Lagrangian of program (3.2) may be written as:
L = CS +F   (1 + )[(CX   pE)xE   A] +B  D   g(xF ; xE; e)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the market equilibrium condition
(EC). The optimal policy satises the following rst-order conditions:
@L
@xF
= xFCXX   (@g=@xF ) = 0 (3.3)
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@L
@xE
= xFCXX   (1 + )[CX   pE] + q    (@g=@xE)  0 (xE  0) (3.4)
and
@L
@e
= xFCXe   (1 + )Ce  D0    (@g=@e) = 0: (3.5)
Besides, we dene the derivative of xF with respect to xE for a given environmental
standard e : dxF
dxE
=  @g=@xE
@g=@xF
:
The reader can easily verify that solving equations (3.3)-(3.5) for e; xE and xF
leads to the following result:
Proposition 1 The optimal policy e; xE and x

F is implicitly dened by (EC),
xFCXX

1 +
dxF
dxE

  (1 + )[CX   pE] + q  0 (xE  0) (3.6)
and
xFCXX

1 +
dxF
dxE

=
CXX
CXe
f(1 + )Ce +D0g: (3.7)
Proof: See the appendix.
To interpret (3.6), consider the case  = 0. We would have
CX(X; e)  pE = q
i.e., the Pigouvian rule that the optimal subsidy should equalize the marginal ben-
et of GHG mitigation. With  > 0, a binding constraint (3.6) implies that the
optimal subsidy for biofuels (which entails the shadow cost of public funds) exceeds
the marginal benet of GHG mitigation. More precisely, without any constraint
on biofuel production, the regulator must choose a quantity of energy crops up to
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the point where the marginal social loss of subsidizing the biofuel sector equals the
sum of the GHG positive externality and the marginal social gain of the transfer
of revenue from the food sector to farmers. Indeed, the increase in the price of
the agricultural raw product makes it possible to diminish the direct payment to
farmers: a marginal increase dxE in biofuel demand transfers a revenue equal to
 (d=dxE) [CS +F ] = xFCXX(X; e)dX=dxE from the food sector (the food indus-
try and consumers) to farmers. This transfer allows the government to reduce the
extent of the farm support program, hence the corresponding tax distortions caused
in the rest of the economy. For high levels of xF , the total subsidy outlay may in fact
diminish: indeed, for a given environmental standard e, we have
d
dxE

(CX(X; e)  pE)xE +A   A

= CX(X; e)

CX(X; e)  pE
CX(X; e)
  dX
dxE
xF=X
(X; e)

where (X; e) is the price elasticity of the agricultural crop supply, given by (X; e) =
CX(X; e)=[XCXX(X; e)]. Hence, the variation in total public spending may be neg-
ative provided that the elasticity of agricultural supply is low and xF=X, the share
of food sector demand in the total demand for feedstock, is large. A su¢ cient con-
dition to have a strictly positive level of biofuel at the optimum of the governments
program is that (3.6) being strictly positive when no biofuel program is in place and
all the agricultural crops are used as an input for the food industry (i.e., xE = 0 and
xF = X0, the feedstock production level bought by the food sector when no biofuel
is produced):
X0CXX(X0; e)(dX=dxE)jxE=0   (1 + )[CX(X0; e)  pE] + q > 0
114
3.2 Formalizing the link between biofuel and agricultural policies: a model.
Leaving aside GHG mitigation concerns (i.e. even with q = 0), we have xE > 0 if
  s(e) dened by:
s(e) =
CX(X0; e)  pE
X0CXX(X0; e)(dX=dxE)jxE=0   (CX(X0; e)  pE)
Consequently, when the shadow cost of public funds is large, the regulator should
implement a biofuel program for the reason that transferring income from the food
sector to farmers allows it to reduce the social cost of the farmer income support
policy. In order to give a hint of the value of s, consider rapeseed production in
the EU-15. With a price elasticity of the agricultural crop supply equal to 0:28
(see the FAPRI elasticity database), pE=C(X0; e) = 0:5 and a 10% decrease in the
consumption of rapeseed by the food industry, i.e. (dxF=dxE)jxE=0 =  0:1, we have
s = 0:18. This value is below the lower boundary of the range of  given in the
literature (0.2 to 0.6). Therefore, a strictly positive quantity of biodiesel ought to be
produced in the EU-15, on purely redistributive grounds.
Equation (3.7) allows us to characterize the optimal standard policy. The last
term of (3.7) corresponds to the marginal social surplus of agricultural production
under standard e: D0(e) is the marginal damage and  Ce(X; e) the marginal
reduction in production cost which corresponds to a social benet  (1+)Ce(X; e)
in public funds.44 The Pigouvian rule calls for an environmental standard that nullies
this surplus. The rst term of (3.7) corresponds to the marginal social surplus of
biofuel production, with the marginal social loss of subsidizing the biofuel sector given
44 The term CXX=CXe corresponds to the (opposite of the) marginal rate of substitution between the
agricultural feedstock and the environmental standard at a given price of the agricultural product: we have
(de=dX)jCX=cst =  CXX=CXe.
115
3.2 Formalizing the link between biofuel and agricultural policies: a model.
by (1 + )[CX(X; e)   pE] and the value of the social benet of GHG mitigation
given by q. The Pigovian level also requires that this marginal surplus is nill. However,
we know from (3.6) that this marginal surplus is equal to the marginal social gain of
the transfer of revenue from the food sector to farmers, which is positive whenever
 > 0. With a positive social cost of public funds, as CXX=CXe is negative, the
marginal damage of agricultural production is lower than its marginal social benet,
implying that the optimal standard e is lower than the Pigouvian level. This can
be easily understood: by setting a stringent environmental standard, the regulator
increases the marginal cost of production (we have CXe < 0), hence the price of
the agricultural feedstock which reinforces the substitution e¤ect between the biofuel
subsidy policy and the farm support program.
Let us now consider the case of a policy constrained to reach a given level of
biofuel production Q. We then have xE = Q= and the rst-order conditions with
respect to xF and e lead to the optimal policy (xcF ; e
c) that satises:
xcFCXe(X
c; ec)
dX
dxE

X=Xc
= (1 + )Ce(X
c; ec) +D0(ec) (3.8)
where Xc = Q= + xcF . Again (3.8) implies that e
c is lower than the Pigouvian level
eP corresponding to the production level Xc implied by Q.
3.2.3 Mandatory blending
The main economic instruments to promote biofuels are subsidies. However, govern-
ments tend to rely more and more upon a second type of instrument which does
not harm public nances: mandatory blending. In this situation, the consumer is
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compelled to use a given amount of biofuels ExE. We still assume that the bio-
fuel rm satises the demand and that the government reimburses its production
cost. As a result, the consumer faces a higher price for gasoline: indeed, the price
of the "aggregate gasoline" (i.e. fossil fuel mixed with a given proportion of biofuel)
is pG = pE + (xE=yE)(CX   pEE): Denoting by CS(yF ; yG) the consumers surplus
corresponding to a consumption bundle (yF ; yG) of food products and gasoline, the
regulators program is written as follows:
max
xE ;xF ;e
fA + CS(yF ; yG) + F   (1 + )[A   A] +B  D : (EC)g (3.9)
Neglecting the constant A, the Lagrangian of program (3.9) may be written
as:
LMB = CS(yF ; yG) + F + (1 + )A +B  D   g(xF ; xE; e)
where  is the multiplier corresponding to the market equilibrium condition (EC).
The optimal policy satises the following rst-order conditions:
@LMB
@xF
= XCXX   (@g=@xF ) = 0 (3.10)
@LMB
@xE
= XCXX   [CX   pE] + q    (@g=@xE)  0 (exE  0) (3.11)
and
@LMB
@e
= XCXe   (1 + )Ce  D0(e)   (@g=@e) = 0: (3.12)
Using (EC), (3.10) and (3.11) lead to the following condition:
XCXX(X; e)
dX
dxE
  [CX(X; e)  pE] + q  0 (xE  0): (3.13)
Rearranging terms, we obtain the following result:
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Proposition 2 If  is large, the optimal policy with mandatory blending is implicitly
dened by (EC) and
[CX   pE]  q = XCXX dX
dxE
=
CXX
CXe
f(1 + )Ce +D0g (3.14)
Compared to the optimal subsidy policy xE; x

F and e
, we have xMBE > x

E and e
MB <
e.
Proof: See the appendix.
The level of biofuels produced in the case of a mandatory blending framework is
greater than with a subsidy. This result is hardly surprising, as the consumer surplus
is a¤ected by a weight equal to 1 in the Social Welfare Function, while the taxpayer
surplus is weighted 1 + :
As concerns environmental standard e, the mandatory blending framework im-
poses a more stringent level: as the taxpayer only pays for the decoupled payment
directed at the farmers, the price increase of the agricultural raw material can be
pushed a step further.
3.2.4 Importation of energy crops
The results of the previous section are limited to a quantity produced domestically.
However, buying energy crops on the world market could prove less expensive for
society. We now consider that the energy rm may also buy its raw material on the
world market. Let XE be the total quantity of energy crops, XE = xE+xI , where xE
is the domestic energy crop and xI the imported one, bought on the world market at
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price w from a perfectly elastic supply. The subsidies awarded by the regulator to the
biofuel sector are E = CX(X; e)= pE for domestic energy crops, and I = w= pE
for imported energy crops. The biofuel subsidy is thus given by S = (ExE +IxI):
With no biofuel production constraint, the regulators program can be written as:
max
xE ;xI ;xF ;e
fA + CS +F   (1 + )(S +A   A) +B  D : (EC)g (3.15)
Denoting by x^E; x^I ; x^F and e^ the optimal regulator choices, the biofuel feedstocks
levels must satisfy the following conditions:
xFCXX(X^; e^)
dX^
dxE
  (1 + )fCX(X^; e^)  pEg+ q  0 (x^E  0) (3.16)
and
 (1 + )(w   pE) + q  0 (x^I  0): (3.17)
where X^ = x^E + x^F . The latter condition states that (absent any constraint on the
biofuel production), the optimal imported crop level equates the marginal social cost
of subsidizing the biofuel industry with the marginal environmental benet of biofuel.
If q is large, it is optimal to import as much agricultural commodity as possible
because of the positive GHG mitigation e¤ects. We assumed that it is not the case
and consequently that we have x^I = 0 when the government has no minimal biofuel
production objective. Compared to (3.17), condition (3.16) entails the marginal social
gain of the transfer of revenue from the food sector to the farmers, which eases the
condition for a positive level of domestic biofuel crops. As (3.16) is similar to (3.6),
the resulting demand levels are the same as those obtained in the case of a closed
economy: we have x^E = xE, x^F = x

F (and x^I = 0).
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If the country faces a minimal biofuel production level Q > xE, energy crops
produced domestically exceed level xE. Indeed, substituting Q=   x^E for x^I in
program (3.15) and maximizing in x^E and x^F , we arrive at the following condition:
xFCXX(X^; e^)dX=dxE   (1 + )[CX(X^; e^)  w] = 0 (3.18)
which implicitly denes x^E. Plugging xE = x^E into (3.16) and using (3.18) to substi-
tute for the rst term, we get:
(1 + )[CX(X^; e^)  w]  (1 + )[CX(X^; e^)  pE] + q =  (1 + )(w   pE) + q < 0
which implies that x^E > xE. Hence, taking imports into account, we have the follow-
ing results:
Proposition 3 When the government can import the agricultural feedstock at price
w > pE   q=(1 + ):
 With no constraint on the biofuel production level, it is optimal to produce
energy crops if  is large. All the agricultural feedstock is produced domestically
and we have x^E = xE, x^F = x

F and x^I = 0:
 If the government has a biofuel production objective Q > xE, it is optimal to
produce energy crops domestically at level x^E > xE implicitly dened by (3.18).
Importations of raw materials are given by x^I = Q=   x^E. The internal price
of the agricultural feedstock veries CX(X^; e^) > w leading to subsidies E > I .
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Conclusion
The rst part of this chapter has shown that biofuel production will have deep and
long lasting consequences on agricultural markets, albeit all the complexities and the
uncertainties of biofuel programs. These high levels of agricultural prices drastically
change the context in which a reform of the agricultural policy may take place. The
model presented here strives to anticipate the likely reform of the Common Agri-
cultural Policy in the context of an important biofuel production. First, we have
shown that biofuel programs may allow the regulator to operate a partial substitu-
tion between decoupled payments and the support for biofuels. This substitution is
detrimental to the food industries (and to the consumers). However, when the social
cost of public funds is high, the regulator should nance a biofuel program because
of its redistributive property. Of course, this result rests on the existence of su¢ -
ciently high distortions in the tax system. The positive environmental externalities
attributed to the substitution of biofuels for fossil fuels tend to push the optimal
biofuel quantity a step further. We also developed a simple framework which took
account of the possibility of imports: thanks to the economy of public funds permit-
ted by biofuels, the optimal level of energy crops produced domestically is set at a
level where the interior price exceeds the world price for energy crops. The conclu-
sions drawn in the case of a biofuel program nanced through subsidies can also be
made when biofuels are promoted thanks to a mandatory blending scheme. The op-
timal level of biofuels that ought to be produced is even higher in that case. We
have tried to keep our model as simple as possible. However, many renements could
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be implemented. First, we have considered that the subsidies were ne-tuned. This
assumption could be criticized, as there are informational asymmetries between the
regulator and the biofuel rms. In the mandatory blending framework, such infor-
mational asymmetries are not relevant but informational rents could well be replaced
by monopolistic rents for biofuel producers. For instance, the major biodiesel rm
in France covers more than 75% of the market. We have also assumed a perfectly
competitive agro-food sector. Relaxing this assumption may well lead to very strin-
gent conditions for a socially valuable subsidy substitution e¤ect between the farm
support and the biofuel program.
Even if such a drastic reform (which can be considered to a certain extent as a
re-coupling of the support to agriculture) seems at odds with the recent evolution of
the CAP (which was characterized by ever more decoupled payments to agriculture),
the importance of biofuel production within European agriculture and its impact on
agricultural prices calls for a thorough re-thinking of the way agriculture is supported
in the EU. Indeed, it seems quite unlikely that farmers will continue to enjoy a double
support from taxpayers. A certain form of substitution between support to agriculture
and to biofuels seems unavoidable.
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Proof of proposition 1
From (EC), we have @g=@xE =  CXX and @g=@e =  CXe: Rearranging terms of
(3.3) yields:
 = xFCXX=(@g=@xF ) =  xF (@g=@xE)=(@g=@xF ) = xFdxF=dxE
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Plugging into (3.4) and (3.5) gives:
@L
@xE
= xFCXX
dX
dxE
  (1 + )[CX   pE] + q  0 (xE  0)
and
@L
@e
= xF
dX
dxE
CXe   (1 + )Ce  D0 = 0 (3.19)
Rearranging terms gives (3.7).
Proof of proposition 2
Denoting by S  (xE; xF ; e) the optimal subsidy policy, we have, using (3.10),
(3.11) and (3.6):
@LMB
@xE

S
= [XCXXdX=dxE   (CX   pE) + q]jS
= [xECXXdX=dxE + CX   pE]jS > 0
hence x+E > x

E.
Similarly, using using (3.10), (3.12), (3.3)and (3.5):
@LMB
@e

S
= [XCXedX=dxE   (1 + )Ce  D0(e)]jS
= [XCXedX=dxE   xFCXedX=dxE]jS
= [xECXedX=dxE]jS < 0
hence e+ < e:
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Proof of proposition 3
Substituting Q=   xE for xI in the government program leads to the following La-
grangian (neglecting the constants):
L = CS +F   (1 + )[(CX   w)xE   A] D(e)  g(xF ; xE; e)
The rst-order conditions are:
@L
@xF
= xFCXX   (@g=@xF ) = 0
@L
@xE
= xFCXX   (1 + )[CX   w]   (@g=@xE) = 0
and
@L
@e
= xFCXe   (1 + )Ce  D0(e^)   (@g=@e) = 0
and give:
@L
@xE
= xFCXX
dX
dxE
  (1 + )[CX   w] = 0
and
@L
@e
= xFCXe
dX
dxE
  (1 + )Ce  D0(e^) = 0
deriving the following condition:
xFCXX
dX
dxE
= (1 + )[CX   w] = CXX
CXe
f(1 + )Ce +D0(e^)g
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Chapter 4
Enforcing environmental policies in
agriculture: what do biofuels
change?
Introduction
The deep changes triggered by the emergence of biofuels raise important questions
about their impact on the environment. The e¤ects of biofuels on environmental
policies are double-edged. On the one hand, biofuels are one of the main features of
the greenhouse gases (GHG) mitigation policies in the transportation sector. On the
other hand, the sizeable production of energy crops will have major implications on
environmental policies for the agricultural sector. Hence, the environmental external-
ities are positive for the GHG emissions, but negative for the agricultural production.
We choose to leave aside the positive externalities linked to the use of biofuels as a
substitute for fossil fuels45 to concentrate on the issue of energy crops and the envi-
ronment. There is an essential contradiction between setting a prominent objective
for biofuel production that will lead (through higher prices) to higher yields and thus
to an intensication of the agricultural production, and the adoption of sound agri-
cultural practices.
45 A growing number of articles suggest that these externalities may indeed turn out to be negative. See,
e.g., Fargione et al., 2008.
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In the EU, the large-scale production of biofuels raises very important questions
with respect to the evolution of the CAP concerning the enforcement of environmental
provisions. The latest reforms of the CAP (2002s Mid-Term Reform notably) had
introduced the concept of cross-compliance, which linked decoupled payments to the
respect of 19 Directives. Biofuel production (although not formally part of the CAP)
puts the whole cross-compliance scheme at risk. Indeed, with the high levels of price
(partially caused by the decision to produce large quantities of biofuels), the incentive
to exceed environmental standards increases. Hence, the regulator needs to update
its enforcement policy. This chapter intends to deal with two questions of interest
with respect to the setting of environmental standards in agriculture:
First, environmental provisions ought to be correctly enforced in order to be
respected. This means that the regulator ought to set environmental standards and
implement an inspection scheme (ne + probability of detection) in order to control
emission levels.
Secondly, the new situation of high agricultural prices (partly due to biofuel
production) requires a complete re-shaping of environmental policies directed to agri-
culture. Environmental provisions had been designed in the context of low agricultural
prices. With high commodity prices, the regulator ought to enforce a stringent envi-
ronmental policy in a context in which market parameters stimulate an increased use
of polluting agricultural inputs.
In the United States, the large-scale production of corn used to make ethanol
sparks o¤environmental concerns. Considering various scenarios of mandatory blend-
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ing levels, Marshall and Greenhalgh (2006) establish the environmental damages
stemming from corn production. The study points to the risks of local pollution
by phosphates and nitrates, as well as soil erosion problems. In addition, the authors
note that the high levels of prices on the soybean and corn markets might push some
farmers to opt out of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).46
Annual produc-
tion, ethanol
Billion
gallons
5 7.5
(cur-
rent
RFS)
10 12.5 15
Baseline Percent change from baseline
Fertilizers Million
tons
9 2.1 4.2 6.1 8.4
N leaking to wa-
ter
Million
tons
5.2 1.5 2.9 4.2 5.6
P leaking to wa-
ter
Million
tons
0.6 1.8 3.2 4.4 6
Erosion Million
tons
1,776 1.5 2.8 4 5.3
GHG emitted
by agriculture
Million
tons
87 1.9 3.8 5.6 7.7
Table 1 ; Marshall and Greenhalgh (2006)
The study by Marshall and Greenhalgh stresses the fact that the increased rate
of nutrient and soil loss is by far larger than the rate at which supplementary land is
brought into production. Farmers respond to the new market conditions (stimulated
by the ethanol market) by giving up environmental-friendly rotations and tillage in
favor of agricultural practices that are more nitrogen-intensive. The authors also point
to a slight decline in acreage managed using low-till or no-till techniques (which are
46 This program has been set up mainly for soil conservation purposes. Project are ranked following an
Environmental Benet Index, and the farmers who are chosen agree to crop native grasses (no cash crop) in
exchange of payments from the State. The contracts usually run for 10 to 15 years.
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benecial for the environment). Some problems of eutrophication of rivers, streams
and lakes could be observed, as well as reduced sh habitat and oxygen-depleted zones
in coastal waters. Their report concludes by underscoring the necessity of diversifying
the agricultural raw material used to produce ethanol, mainly by speeding up the shift
to the second generation of biofuels, produced from a ligno-cellulosic raw material.
More recently, a report from the National Academy of Science underlined the
very negative consequences in the Mexico Gulf linked to the increased production of
corn (for ethanol) in the Midwest (National Academy of Sciences, 2008). Besides,
the consequences of the sizeable ethanol production for the CRP scheme is studied
by Secchi and Babcock (2008). They come up to the conclusion that environmentally
sensitive land will be cropped again owing to the high prices for corn, and that very
high spending levels would be necessary to maintain those lands within the CRP.
Although the environmental downside e¤ects of biofuel production are more
documented in the US than in the EU for the time being, the focus of this chapter
will be set on the EU situation.47 The latest reforms of the CAP have evolved towards
ever closer links between agriculture and the environment. As the agricultural pay-
ments became more and more decoupled from production, the decoupled payments
became correlatively more and more coupled with the respect of environmental provi-
sions. The growing importance of biofuel production within the European agriculture
calls for a rebuilding of environmental policies directed to agriculture. One of the so-
47 The European Environmental Agency has begun to raise concerns about the environmental risks linked
to the production of rst-generation biofuel in the EU. They recently stood up against the objective of the
European Commission, imposing a 10% blending of biofuels by 2020.
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lutions put forward by some stakeholders (among which the EU Commission) is to
set up a certication framework, as it has been achieved in forest management. This
certication would especially apply for the production of palm oil in Malaysia and
Indonesia (IHT, 2006) and should be enforced in a non-discriminatory way for both
European and imported biofuels (EU Commission, 2006, and WWF, 2006). However,
it seems that certication, as presented by the European Commission, is a mere re-
denition of the environmental cross-compliance. Besides, certication is subject to
controversies since it could be used by protectionist countries as a non-tari¤barrier to
trade. The implementation of biofuel certication would also stir up some practical
problems.48
Hence, the problem of biofuel certication is closely linked to the agricultural
stage of biofuel production. Sound agricultural techniques seem to be a necessary
condition for the certication of the whole biofuel production chain. Therefore, the
problem faced by biofuel certication boils down in great part to the respect of the
already-existing environmental provisions embodied in the agricultural policies. Thus,
biofuel certication will require correctly enforced environmental policies. To be ef-
fective, environment policies cannot only be enacted by a given legislative body: they
are respected only to the extent that they are correctly enforced. Seemingly adequate
environmental regulations can completely fail if their enforcement is not properly
designed.
48 For instance, the control of the whole energy crops production, within and outside the borders of the
EU will prove di¢ cult. As these controls have a cost, it is necessary to nd the optimal trade-o¤ between
control and pollution.
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As stressed by Bontems and Rotillon (2003), an e¢ cient control policy is not a
mere denition of the right level of tax or norm to abide by. The conventional rule
which states that pollution should be reduced to the point where the marginal damage
and the marginal cost of pollution reduction are equal does not apply any more if
enforcing the rule is costly. Cost of pollution should be added up with the marginal
cost of control. This ultimately reduces the level of environmental standards that must
be imposed to farmers. Following Becker (1968), an enormous body of literature has
been developed around the "economics of crime", with a straightforward transposition
to the enforcement problem in environmental policies. Some major contributions of
this branch of literature will be presented.
In order to put into perspective the links between biofuels and agri-environmental
policies, the future of the CAP ought to be addressed: if the scenario of a decrease
in the level of decoupled payments materializes, the penalties in the framework of
cross-compliance (a fraction of the Single Farm Payment) will lose their role as a
credible deterrent. We do not intend to suggest that the next reform of the CAP
will necessarily consist in a strong substitution of biofuel support for CAP payments.
However, in the same way as we tried to predict what could unfold as regards the sur-
pluses of the various agents in the previous chapter, we reect on the likely impacts
that such an agricultural policy shift would have environment-wise. For this purpose,
the model developed in the previous chapter is extended to the question of the en-
forcement of environmental provisions. In the previous chapter, we have shown that
because of the social cost of public funds, the optimal standard is stricter than the
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Pigouvian level. Indeed, by setting a stringent environmental standard, the regulator
increases the marginal production cost, hence the price of the agricultural feedstock,
which reinforces the substitution e¤ect between the biofuel subsidy policy and the
farm support program. However, this standard is less stringent taking account of the
cost of enforcing the environmental policy. We analyze the e¤ects of a monitoring
cost on the biofuel production (assuming that production levels are not constrained)
and on the agricultural environmental standard assuming that the government may
inict two types of monetary sanctions: nes and cross-compliance provisions. We
compare these two policies and show that for a large level of biofuels, cross compliance
provisions are less e¤ective than nes.
Hence, the structure of this chapter is the following: rst, we detail the envi-
ronmental provisions contained in the CAP: cross-compliance and agri-environmental
schemes principally, and we point to the main aws concerning the enforcement of
these policies. Then, we make a brief review of the literature concerning the mon-
itoring and enforcement of environmental policies. Finally, the core of the chapter
will be presented. It deals with a model linking the issues of the CAP likely evolu-
tion stemming from the higher production of biofuels, and the related problems that
emerge about the enforcement of the environmental regulation.
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4.1 Environmental policies within the CAP: the
enforcement problem
Before addressing specic environmental issues linked to biofuel production, the gen-
eral framework of environmental provisions in the CAP is presented. Even if biofuel
production is not directly tied up to the CAP, the new environmental issues that
will crop up in the upcoming years might well be linked to the agricultural phase of
their production. The sustainability of biofuels hinges upon the fulllment of strong
environmental standards as regards the production of energy crops. Hence, the var-
ious environmental schemes embodied in the CAP are rst reviewed. We present 3
aspects of the links between the CAP and the environment: cross-compliance, agri-
environmental schemes and the nitrates Directive.
4.1.1 Cross-compliance
The agenda 2000 reform of the CAP established the separation between the two pil-
lars of the CAP: the market and income policy ("rst pillar") and the sustainable
development of rural areas ("second pillar"). Moreover, the Agenda 2000 reform ini-
tiated the principle following which farmers ought to abide by environmental protec-
tion requirements (i.e. the so-called "cross-compliance" provisions) in order to benet
from market support schemes. The 2003 CAP reform went a step further, making
cross-compliance mandatory.
137
4.1 Environmental policies within the CAP: the enforcement problem
With the enactment of the 2003 reform, all farmers receiving direct payments
must respect mandatory cross-compliance provisions. Farmers ought to fulll the
requirements of 19 European legislative acts applying directly at the farm level in
the domains of environment, public and animal health, pesticides and animal welfare.
Farmers will face partial or total withdrawal of their Single Farm Payment (SFP)
in case of non-compliance. Moreover, beneciaries of direct payments have to keep
land in good agricultural and environmental conditions. MS are given some leeway
to dene precisely these conditions. However, standards related to soil protection,
maintainance of soil organic matter and soil structure, and conservation of habitats
and landscape must be set by the MS. Finally, MS must also ascertain that there is
no major loss in their total permanent pasture area. If need there be, they should
prohibit its conversion to arable land (EU Commission, DG Agriculture website).
4.1.2 Monitoring and enforcement of Agri-environmental
measures
Alongside cross-compliance provisions stand the agri-environmental measures, which
go beyond the good farming practices (GFP). These agri-environmental schemes were
rst introduced at the end of the 1980s as an instrument to support specic farm-
ing practices to protect the environment and maintain the countryside. The 1992
CAP reform made the implementation of agri-environmental measures compulsory
for MS. Agri-environmental measures consist in the reimbursement of the additional
costs faced by farmers who commit (for a minimal 5-yearsperiod) to adopt strong
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environmental farming techniques. Such environmental measures are, e.g. the extensi-
cation of farming, conversion to organic farming, conservation of high-value habitats
and the associated biodiversity, etc. The rst period of implementation covered the
period 1993-1999. In 1998, the European Parliament and the Council made a joint
statement in which the integration of environmental concerns into the CAP was iden-
tied as a priority.49 In response to these orientations, the Commission decided that
the program for the period 2000-2006 would include "strengthened agri-environment
measures as compulsory elements" of rural development programs (RDP). Indeed,
agri-environmental measures are the only mandatory elements for the MS to include
in their RDPs. Agri-environment measures are co-nanced by the EU, with a 75%
contribution in Objective 1 (least developed) areas and up to 50% in other areas.
This co-nancing was revised upwards in 2004 with up to 85% for Objective 1 areas
and up to 60% in other areas. The average agri-environment subsidy in the EU in
2001 amounted to 89e per hectare. However, there is a great heterogeneity in the
payment rates (depending on the sub-measure and the MS). In aggregate terms, agri-
environmental support appears to be the largest rural development measure with 13.5
billions euros of EU co-nancing which have been handed out for the period 2000-
2006: this amounts to 27% of all rural development expenditure (Court of Auditors,
2005).
49 Decision No 2179/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 1998 on
the review of the European Community program of policy and action in relation to the environment and
sustainable development.
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Enforcement seems however to be Achillesheel of environmental policies related
to agriculture in the EU.50 The EUCourt of Auditors issued a report on the implemen-
tation of the rst program of agri-environmental measures (1993 to 1999).51 Its main
conclusion dealt with the non-veriability of some agri-environmental measures, such
as the reduction of fertiliser usage: "The problem is known to the Commissions own
checkers, but the Commission continues to adopt such measures". Likewise, the Com-
mission realized two detailed evaluations of the implementation of agri-environmental
programs for the period 1993-1999.52 These evaluations stressed the fact that the mea-
sures which requested a reduction in the use of inputs by a certain amount or which
demanded not to exceed a given quantity of fertilizer per hectare were tricky to check
since soil analyses could not reliably assess the respect of the limits. Moreover, the re-
ports noted that the inspection of the farms book are not su¢ cient to identify errors
or irregularities.
In the control of the agri-environmental measures, much emphasis is put on the
self-declarations of the beneciaries. However, if the enforcement procedure does not
incorporate a properly designed monitoring scheme with adapted penalties in case of
infringement, the environmental policy might well fail. The Court of auditors noted
that: "Checks on sub-measures inspected in France for example, rely to a large ex-
50 Although we focus on the EU framework, it should however be noted that the conservation programs in
the US face the same enforcement problems. Indeed, a recent report by the Government Accounting O¢ ce
(2003) states that the farm bills cross-compliance provisions have been inconsistent due to an inadequate
enforcement of the policy.
51 Court of auditors, Special Report No 14/2000 "Greening the CAP".
52 Commission Report to the Council and European Parliament on the application of Council Regulation
(EEC) No 2078/92, COM(97) and DG VI Working Document VI/7655/98: State of application of Regulation
(EEC) No 2078/92: Evaluation of agri-environment programmes.
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tent on the veracity of the declaration made by the beneciaries and, in particular,
on the reliability of the parcel and grazing logbooks. In these documents, the farmer
himself enters applications of fertilisers and phytosanitary products, planting, mow-
ing and harvesting activities, and grazing periods. The checkers are not obliged to go
beyond simply verifying that the data have been entered in these logbooks". A Com-
mission inspection report concluded that this type of check could not be considered
su¢ cient and had to be supplemented by other types of check. Indeed, the Commis-
sions guidelines recommend complementing the checks on the information recorded
by the beneciary by other checks focusing, for example, on yield, invoices or soil and
plant analyses. Taking account of the numerous aws which characterize the enforce-
ment of the agri-environmental schemes, and given the non-negligible amounts spent
in such environmental undertakings, the EU Commission stressed the fact that, "if
a measure cannot be adequatly checked, it should not be the subject of public pay-
ment". However, the Court of Auditors noted that this rule is respected to a limited
extent.
4.1.3 The nitrates Directive: an enforcement problem
Water pollution is one of the most prominent environmental problems addressed to the
EU. Since 1973, more than 20 Directives concerning water quality have been enacted.
Dating back from 1991, the nitrates Directive53 is one of the most important measures
in that respect. It principally deals with the monitoring of water quality in relation
53 Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12th December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pol-
lution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources.
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to agriculture and the designation of so-called "nitrate vulnerable zones" for which
specic measures ought to be taken. Most notably, the Directive sets an upper limit
for nitrogen coming from livestock manure in these zones: 170kg N/ha/year. This
Directive had a dual objective: to reduce water pollution by nitrates from agricultural
sources and to prevent further pollution. Before to be put into action, the Directive
rst needs to be transposed into the national laws of the MS. This rst legislative
undertaking proved quite di¢ cult: 5 years after the Directivesenactment, some MS
had still not transposed the Directive. Only a minority of MS have fully implemented
the Directive and the Commission began disciplinary procedures for the MS which
fail to properly apply the directive.
In spite of all the environmental provisions embodied in the nitrates Directive,
its implementation has failed in many MS. This is largely due to numerous prob-
lems in the Directives enforcement. First, the Directive is a European legislative
text that rst needs to be translated into the national laws. Thereafter, the imple-
mentation hinges upon the decision at a decentralised level, e.g. the départements
in France. Hence, the enforcement of the directive proves highly heterogenous.54 In-
deed, as noted by Greer (2005), this example illustrates the fact that the EU lacks a
properly developed administrative apparatus and relies on member states to imple-
ment policy decisions. Partly for this reason the EU is often said to su¤er from an
implementation decit in which it struggles to ensure compliance with its directives
54 The most laxist départements with respect to the provisions contained in the Action Plans were also those
where the nitrates problem was the most acute, i.e. in Brittany. (Tréguer, D. Report on the enforcement of
the nitrates Directive, 2002).
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and regulations: e¤ective policy enforcement is highly dependent on national level
institutions.
4.2 Enforcing environmental policies in agriculture:
a review of literature
As pointed out in the preceding section, the success of an environmental policy hinges
upon the e¤ectiveness of the associated control scheme. Indeed, to enforce a demand-
ing policy it is necessary for the State to control farms frequently and to be able
to inict sizeable penalties. Owing to the technical di¢ culties linked to a perma-
nent control of polluting emissions in many cases, fraud may concern a non-negligible
proportion of farmers if the inspection mechanisms and penalties are no su¢ cient
deterrents. However, these instruments have to be carefully determined. Monetary
penalties are transfers which do not imply costs for society, whereas a credible level
of control does imply such costs. In order to minimize the costs of these controls,
it therefore seems necessary that their frequency be as low as possible and that the
penalty be as high as possible. As intuitive as these prescriptions appear to be, the
penalties applied are hardly ever maximal, since all agents do not have the same pay-
ment capacities and since a certain progressiveness in the penalty scheme should be
applied so that penalties reect the importance of the fraud (the punishment must
t the crime.) Otherwise, any polluter having decided to pollute would pollute at the
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maximal level. An e¢ cient environmental policy should comprise an ex-post control
scheme of the agentsdecisions with adapted sanctions in cases of non-compliance.
Inicting sanctions can also imply expenses for the regulator and more generally,
for society: the trade-o¤ between the frequency of controls and the importance of
the sanction is determined by their respective costs. For instance, sti¤er sanctions
incur costs (prosecution, loss of revenue by farmers facing mandatory production
disruptions) that are not counterbalanced by gains for other parties, contrary to
monetary penalties.
4.2.1 Modelling the polluting farm
Assume that the polluting emissions are entirely controlled by the farm, i.e. the pres-
ence of pollution can only stem from a deliberate and rational intention to pollute.
The question which we will focus on deals with the incentives given by the di¤erent
economic instruments (standards, taxes or emission permits) to evade the regulation,
for a given auditing policy, i.e. a system of penalties and probabilities of being con-
trolled. The prot of the farm derived from emitting a quantity e of pollution: (e)
stems froms the following maximization program:55
(e) = max
q
pq   C(q; e) (4.20)
where p is the price of good q and C(q; e) is the cost function, characterized
by properties to ensure the concavity of the program, i.e. C convex in each of its
55 This model is adapted from Bontems and Rotillon (2000)
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arguments and globally convex ( Cqq > 0; Cee > 0 and CqqCee   C2qe > 0). Let ea be
the level of emissions announced to the regulator, e its true level of pollution and s
the ongoing standard. Assuming that the farmer is risk-neutral, his utility is given
by the following expression:
U(e; ea) = (e)  (ea   s)  p(e  ea)[	(e  ea) + (e  s)  (ea   s)] (4.21)
(:) is the penalty schedule to be paid by the farm when it announces that the
standard will not be met, while 	(:) is the penalty triggered when a fraud has been
discovered. p(:) is the probability of detection, which depends upon the intensity
of the violation of the announced level of pollution. The above formulation is very
general and may be adapted to any economic instrument used to regulate pollution:
a standard, a tax or an emission trading system.
The farm has to choose its optimal announcement ea to the regulator, and its
true level of pollution e. After optimizing with respect to each choice variable and
upon rearranging terms, the optimal trade-o¤ is given by:
0(e) = p(e  ea)0(e  s) + [1  p(e  ea)]0(ea   s) (4.22)
Hence, the optimal level of pollution is chosen such that the marginal prot
derived from pollution equals the sum of marginal expected penalties for a violation
of the standard, with respect to the real and to the declared level of pollution.
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4.2.2 The Becker single-act framework
Becker founded the economics of crime with his seminal article published in 1968. His
approach can be summed up in the following way: inspections being costly, while nes
are monetary transfers without deadweight losses, the regulator ought to substitute
increased ne payments for the intensity of control. Thus, the level of the ne must
be raised up to the initial wealth of the rm. Let us present the framework developed
by Becker more in depth. Assume that farms may commit a damaging act to the
environment, like for example an overuse of pesticides. The resulting e¤ect of this
damaging act is the same whatever the farm and has a monetary value D: The private
benet that the farms get from polluting varies across the farms. Let () be this
benet, distributed on [; ]; with cumulative distribution function F and density f:
For simplicity reasons, we assume that () = : However, we also suppose that the
regulator does not have the auditing rights to assess the benet that the farm extracts
from polluting. Moreover, let ; c; P and w0 respectively be the probability of control,
the cost of control, the penalty decided by the regulator and the maximal amount
the government can charge the farmer due to the limited liability constraint.
The program of the regulator is the following:
max
;P
Z 
P
[  D]f()d   c
s:t: P  P
(4.23)
The constraint of the program must be binding, i.e. the regulator inicts the
maximum possible penalty (the maximum the governement can charge), P = w0:
Assume it is not the case, i.e. the optimal expected ne is given by K = P ; with
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P  < P , which yields a welfare W (; P ) =
Z 
P
[   D]f()d   c: Observe that
for the same expected penalty, it could be possible to reduce the intensity of control:
indeed, we have 0 = K=P <  = K=P and the policy (0; P ) yields a welfare
W (0; P ) = W (; P ) + c[   0] > W (; P ), hence a contradiction. Thus, the
optimal policy is to inict a penalty up to the maximal amount that the government
can charge. Maximization with respect to  gives the optimal monitoring e¤ort, ;
which is such that:
P  D =  c=f(P ) (4.24)
Hence, the expected penalty is smaller than the damage, while e¢ ciency requires
to (implicitely) allow farmers with  > D to pollute. As monitoring farms is costly,
the regulator will allow farms whose private benet is lower than the environmental
damage to pollute. In Beckers framework, the penalties should always be set at their
maximal level. However, this might not always be optimal, as any farm which has
decided to pollute will therefore have an incentive to pollute at the maximal level.
4.2.3 Departure from the Becker Single-act model
As pointed out by Cohen (1999), many developments in the economics of crime lit-
erature have consisted in criticizing or rening Beckers seminal article (1968), like
Townsend (1979), Polinsky and Shavell (1984) and Border and Sobel (1987).
While Beckers approach allows to take the heterogeneity of the sector into ac-
count, it is too simple to give sensible policy requirements in most real-life contexts,
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particularly when the damage to society depends on the intensity of the individuals
deeds. This becomes particularly important when considering the provision of en-
vironmental goods. Mookherjee and Png (1994) shows that "punishment must t
the crime". Compared to Becker, their analysis allows to determine the social norm,
i.e. the polluting intensity thereshold that triggers punishment. Any intensity below
this level is thus allowed. Above this level, violators have to pay according to their
self-indulgences.
4.3 Biofuels and cross-compliance: a model
This section56 addresses the issue of the enforcement of environmental policies in
agriculture, in the context of an increased production of energy crops. We will deal
with the limits of the existing instrument (environmental cross-compliance) in the
new biofuel framework. The single farm payment (which decoupled support from
production) was introduced with the CAP mid-term reform of 2002-2003, together
with provisions for cross-compliance. As far as feedstock production is concerned, the
main environmental issues deal with nitrates and pesticides. The nitrates directive has
already been presented earlier in this chapter. As for pesticides, their use is regulated
by EU directives aiming at controlling the way pesticides get market access and the
level of residues in food. Moreover, the water framework Directive of 2000 imposes
56 This section is adapted from the second part of the article by J.-M. Bourgeon and D. Tréguer, entitled:
"Killing Two Birds with One Stone: US and EU biofuel programs.
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measures to reduce signicantly discharges and losses of dangerous substances, in
order to protect surface water.
The aim of decoupled payments is therefore twofold: on the one hand, it guar-
antees a parity income to farmers; on the other hand, it intends to guarantee that
agricultural production takes place in a framework which is compatible with sound
environmental practices. The decoupled payment might be partially or totally with-
drawn from the farmer, should some infringement be discovered when controls are
carried out. Two e¤ects are likely to occur with the development of biofuels. On the
one hand, the incentives to evade the environmental cross-compliance policy57 will
increase with the high level of feedstock prices. On the other hand, as mentioned
in the previous chapter, the regulator may be tempted to diminish the payment to
farmers (since farmersincome will rise), which corresponds to a decrease in the max-
imal penalty at his disposal. Hence, if the subsidies (and other supports) for biofuels
were to partially substitute for decoupled farm payments, cross-compliance would lose
some of its justication, credibility and e¢ ciency. It is central to nd what kind of
protection could be set up in order to temper the evolution of the production of energy
crops towards more intensive practices. We might question the incentive strength of
the possibility to reduce or withdraw the decoupled payment in case of infringement
as this payment is downsized.
57 Full granting of the single farm payment to farmers is linked to compliance with statutory environmental,
food safety, animal and plant health, and animal welfare standards. Land must also be kept in good
agricultural and environmental condition."In the case of non-respect of these measures, direct payments can
be reduced or withheld. In the case of negligence, the overall payment to be withheld is set at a maximum
of 5%, or 15% for repeated o¤ences. For intentional non-compliance, the ne is not less than 20%, and may
go as far as total exclusion from receipt of payment for one or more years.
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4.3.1 The model
In this section, we discuss the problem of dening the environmental standard con-
sidering the enforcement issue of such a policy. Indeed, to enforce a demanding policy
it is necessary for the State to inspect farms frequently and to be able to inict size-
able penalties. We shall analyze this problem in a framework similar to Malik (1992),
considering that inspecting farms is costly and that the government inicts penalties
that depend on the extent of the infringement. We analyze the two cases of an exoge-
nous maximal penalty, and of a maximal penalty which corresponds to the farmers
decoupled payment, as is the case in the EU. We do not consider importations in this
section.
Assume that whenever a farmer has chosen an emission level e that exceeds the
standard e, the agency is able to inict a penalty that depends on the extent of the
farmers infringement, e  e, and more precisely that the corresponding penalty is a
fraction f(e   e) 2 [0; 1] of a maximal penalty 	. The function f() is exogenously
given (by an independent legislative body) and is assumed increasing and convex
in e   e, with f(0) = 0. The maximum penalty can either be a given amount P
(also determined by an independent legislative body), or the decoupled payment that
the farmer should receive in case of compliance, i.e. A   A(X; e): The latter case
corresponds to the current framework chosen by the EU to enforce environmental
policies in agriculture. Let k be the probability of being inspected, and k the
corresponding cost.
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Denoting by w the price of the agricultural product, the representative farmer
solves the following maximization program:
max
X;e
wX   C(X; e)  kf(e  e)	
Maximization with respect to e gives an optimal level e which satises:
 Ce(X; e)  kf 0(e   e)	 6 0 (4.25)
i.e., the marginal cost reduction from pollution must be lower than (or equal) to the
marginal expected penalty. Since there is no social benet associated to the payment
of nes,58 we have e = e at the optimum of the governments program: no ne is
paid in equilibrium. Moreover, as inspecting farms is costly, this condition is binding
at the optimum of the agency program, i.e. we have:
 Ce(X; e)  kf 0(0)	 = 0 (IC)
Taking the same core model as in Chapter 3, the agency simultaneously chooses
the optimal level of control, the environmental standard and the scope of the biofuel
program by maximizing the following program:
max
xE ;xF ;k;e
fA+CS+F  (1+)[(CX pE)xE+A A+k]+B D : (IC); (EC)g
Assuming an interior solution for the biofuel level, we have the following result:59
Proposition 4 Taking account of the cost of inspection, the optimal (unconstrained)
policies verify:
58 Since we assume that public funds are costly, it could be interesting to raise money by inicting nes.
However, we rule out such a possibility since this would entail administrative as well as psychological costs.
59 The proofs have been placed in the appendix to this chapter.
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 A) In the case of a xed maximal penalty (	 = P ),
(1 + )[CX   pE]  q =

xFCXX   (1 + )kCXe
Ce

dX
dxE
=  CXX
CXe
 D0   (1 + )Ce   (1 + )k(Cee   C2eX=CXX)=Ce	
assuming that the optimal policy ef ; xfE and x
f
F is such that x
f
E > 0:
 B) In the case of cross-compliance provisions (	 =A   A);
(1 + )[CX   pE]  q =

xFCXX   (1 + )kCXe   kf
0(0)XCXX
Ce

dX
dxE
=  CXX
CXe
 D0   (1 + )Ce   (1 + )k(Cee   C2eX=CXX + kf 0(0)Ce)=Ce	
assuming that the optimal policy ecc; xccE and x
cc
F is such that x
cc
E > 0:
 We have ef > e and xccE < xfE < xE.
Compared to the costless enforcement policy (xE; e
), the cost of inspections
introduces distortions in the agencys trade-o¤s, resulting in lower biofuel production
levels and less stringent environmental standards. However, the distortion on the
production side is lower with a xed penalty than under cross-compliance provisions.
Not surprisingly, the emissions level taking the cost of inspection into account is higher
than when enforcement is costless. Indeed, allowing for more emissions reduces the
farmers gain from exceeding the environmental standard, which in turn allows the
frequency of inspection to be diminished.
Consider now that the government is constrained by a biofuel objective Q and
suppose it desires to enforce a given environmental standard e. Denote by X(Q; e)
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the agricultural production implied by the equilibrium condition (EC). The corre-
sponding monitoring e¤orts under xed penalty, kf , and cross-compliance, kcc, can
be deduced from (IC). We have:
kf > kcc () A(X(Q; e); e) < A   P ;
and the same condition holds for the welfare levels reached under the two alterna-
tive governemental policies. Hence, cross-compliance may prove the most e¢ cient
policy if P is low compared to the parity income and if agricultural production
X(Q; e) is low. However, for large biofuel objectives, the government is more likely
to choose a xed penalty policy. Indeed, ecc(Q), the optimal environmental stan-
dard under cross-compliance given the biofuel objective Q, increases implying that
A(X(Q; e
cc(Q)); ecc(Q)) also strictly increases with Q. Hence, for any objective
greater than Qs  inffQ  0 : A(X(Q; ecc(Q)); ecc(Q))  A   Pg, the government
is able to implement the optimal environmental standard of the cross-compliance pol-
icy with a xed maximal penalty policy and to reduce its monitoring e¤ort and thus
the cost of the enforcement policy.
Conclusion
This chapter has been dedicated to the environmental consequences of biofuel pro-
grams in the agricutural production process. Before addressing the specicities linked
to the outbreak of biofuels in the environmental policies, a review of the existing en-
vironmental policies directed to agriculture has been conducted, while underlying
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the enforcement problems which characterize these policies. Most notably, the agri-
environmental schemes have been found to lack the proper inspection schemes in order
to be correctly implemented. As noted by the Court of Auditors: "The Commission,
Council and Parliament should consider how the principle should be put into practice
in respect of proposals for agri-environmental expenditure in the 2007 to 2013 plan-
ning period, taking into account, on the one hand, the risk of non-compliance and,
on the other hand, the potential benets of this type of expenditure". This trade-
o¤ should be closely considered when setting up an environmental policy. A large
body of literature has been expanding to help regulators enforcing their environmen-
tal policies. The level of the nes as well as the probability of controls ought to be
correctly tailored in order to design an e¢ cient policy of control. Taking the envi-
ronmental policy enforcement problem into account, the monitoring cost on the one
hand and the incentive constraints on the other hand changes the optimal energy crop
quantity and the optimal environmental standard obtained in the previous chapter.
Besides, we may note that one way to avoid inating the cost of environmental con-
trols consists in taxing the polluting inputs. This taxation will induce farmers to
adopt sounder agricultural practices.
Finally, it seems that the present framework of environmental provisions di-
rected to agriculture needs a complete re-shaping. The new context of high commod-
ity prices gives incentives to produce using high levels of polluting inputs. Should
the level of decoupled payments decrease in the forthcoming reforms of the CAP, the
threat of losing part of this decoupled payment will not be enough to deter farmers
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from exceeding the environmental standard, as the incentive to breach the environ-
mental policy increases. Therefore, this chapter has shown that in such a context,
the regulator must resort to monetary penalties which are exogeneously determined
(they have no link with the decoupled payment levels).
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Proof of proposition 4 A)
Neglecting constant A, the Lagrangian of the governmentsprogram may be written
as:
Lf = CS +F   (1 + )[(CX   pE)xE   A + k] +B(xE) D(e)  g
 [Ce + kf 0(0)	]
where  and  are the multipliers corresponding to (EC) and (IC). In the case of a
xed maximum penalty, we have:
@Lf
@xF
= xFCXX   (@g=@xF )  CeX = 0 (4.26)
@Lf
@xE
= xFCXX (1+)[CX pE]+q  (@g=@xE) CeX  0 (xfE  0) (4.27)
@Lf
@e
= xFCXe   (1 + )Ce  D0(e)   (@g=@e)  Cee = 0: (4.28)
@Lf
@k
=  (1 + )  f 0(0) P = 0: (4.29)
Using (EC), (4.26) and (4.27) lead to:
@Lf
@xE
= [xFCXX   CeX ] dX
dxE
  (1 + )[CX   pE] + q  0 (xfE  0)
while (4.29) and (IC) give:
 =  (1 + )=[f 0(0) P ] = (1 + )k=Ce
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Consequently, we have:
@Lf
@xE
=

xFCXX   (1 + )kCeX
Ce

dX
dxE
  (1 + )[CX   pE] + q  0 (xfE  0)
Similar computations give
@Lf
@e
= xFCXe   (1 + )Ce  D0(e)  [xFCXX   CeX ] @g=@e
@g=@xF
  Cee
Using @g=@e =  CXe and @g=@xE =  CXX we get:
@Lf
@e
= xFCXe   (1 + )Ce  D0(e)  [xFCeX    C
2
eX
CXX
]
@g=@xE
@g=@xF
  Cee
=

xFCXe    C
2
eX
CXX

dX
dxE
  (1 + )Ce  D0(e) + 

C2eX
CXX
  Cee

=
CXe
CXX

xFCXX   (1 + )kCXe
Ce

dX
dxE
  (1 + )Ce  D0(e)
 (1 + )k
Ce

Cee   C
2
eX
CXX

Denoting by S  (xE; xF ; e) the solution of program (3.2), we have:
@Lf
@xE

S
=  (1 + )kCeX(X
; e)
Ce(X; e)
dX
dxE

S
< 0
and
@Lf
@e

S
=   (1 + )k
Ce(X; e)

C2Xe
CXX
dX
dxE
+ Cee   C
2
eX
CXX

S
=   (1 + )k
Ce(X; e)

C2Xe
CXX
dxF
dxE
+ Cee

S
where:
C2Xe
CXX
dxF
dxE
+ Cee > Cee   C
2
Xe
CXX
> 0
and Ce < 0, implying:
@Lf
@e

S
> 0
As Lf is concave, we thus have e < ef and xE > xfE.
161
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4 B)
In the case of a cross-compliance policy, we have  [Ce(X; e) + kf 0(0)(A   A)] as
the last term of the Lagrangian.
@Lcc
@xF
= xFCXX   (@g=@xF )  [CeX   kf 0(0)XCXX ] = 0 (4.30)
@Lcc
@xE
= xFCXX (1+)[CX pE]+q  (@g=@xE) [CeX kf 0(0)XCXX ]  0 (xfE  0)
(4.31)
@Lcc
@e
= xFCXe   (1 + )Ce  D0(e)   (@g=@e)  [Cee   kf 0(0)(XCeX   Ce)] = 0:
(4.32)
@Lcc
@k
=  (1 + )  f 0(0)(A   A) = 0: (4.33)
Condition (4.30) gives:
 =
xFCXX   [CeX   kf 0(0)XCXX ]
@g=@xF
while (4.33) and (IC) give:
 =  (1 + )=[f 0(0)(A   A)] = (1 + )k=Ce(X; e)
Consequently, we have:
@Lcc
@xE
=

xFCXX   (1 + )kCeX   kf
0(0)XCXX
Ce

dX
dxE
 (1+)[CX pE]+q  0 (xfE  0)
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Similar computations give:
@Lcc
@e
= xFCXe   (1 + )Ce  D0(e)  [xFCXX   (CeX   kf 0(0)XCXX)] @g=@e
@g=@xF
 [Cee   kf 0(0)(XCeX   Ce)]
Using @g=@e =  CXe and @g=@xE =  CXX we get:
@Lcc
@e
= xFCXe   (1 + )Ce  D0(e)  CeX

xF   

CeX
CXX
  kf 0(0)X

@g=@xE
@g=@xF
 [Cee   kf 0(0)(XCeX   Ce)]
= CXe

xF   

CeX
CXX
  kf 0(0)X

dX
dxE
  (1 + )Ce  D0(e)
+

C2eX
CXX
  kf 0(0)XCXe   Cee + kf 0(0)(XCeX   Ce)

=
CXe
CXX

xFCXX   (1 + )k
Ce
(CeX   kf 0(0)XCXX)

dX
dxE
 (1 + )Ce  D0(e) + (1 + )k
Ce

C2eX
CXX
  Cee   kf 0(0)Ce

which gives the result.
Denoting by Sf  (xfE; xfF ; ef ), we have
@Lcc
@xE

Sf
= (1 + )k2f 0(0)X
CXX(X
f ; ef )
Ce(Xf ; ef )
dX
dxE

Sf
< 0
hence xfE > x
cc
E . We also have:
@Lcc
@e

Sf
= (1 + )
k2f 0(0)
Ce(Xf ; ef )

XCXe
dX
dxE
  Ce

Sf
which is ambiguous.
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Part III Common Agency: a new
framework for agriculture regulation
The environmental provisions that had been implemented in the successive CAP
reforms took place in a context of low agricultural prices, which made the environ-
mental reforms more acceptable to farmers, who highly depended on CAP payments.
However, biofuel policies have dramatically changed the framework of agricultural
production by triggering price increases in agricultural markets. Abiding by environ-
mental regulation seems now far more costly, as high commodity prices push farmers
towards high production levels.
Of course, such a tension between environmental and production objectives has
always existed. However, with the emergence of biofuels (and the price hikes that
they trigger o¤), the opposition between these two objectives is reinforced. Hence,
this part aims at formalizing agricultures dilemma between high production levels
and the respect of stringent environmental provisions linked to the CAP.
The previous part has studied the welfare consequences of biofuel production
on the present CAP, with the agricultural sector modelled using a representative
producer. This type of analysis allows to derive the relative e¢ ciencies of di¤erent
economic instruments used to reach an agricultural policy objective (see, e.g. Wal-
lace, 1962, Gardner, 1983 or Alston and Hurd, 1990). However, the questions of the
agricultural sectors heterogeneity and the informational asymmetries that exist be-
tween farmers and the regulator cannot be tackled by such modelling frameworks.
The answer to such limitations in the traditional welfare analysis consists in apply-
ing Contract Theory to agricultural policies. Analyses by Lewis, Feenstra and Ware
(1989), Chambers (1992) or Bourgeon and Chambers (2000) have followed this trail.
The last two chapters of the dissertation are built around the framework of Com-
mon Agency, a new branch of Contract Theory. This theory extends the Principal-
Agent model to the presence of n principals (most often, n=2). It60 appears to be a
well-suited theoretical framework to study agricultures dilemma for producing two
types of goods like environmental (e¤ort for reducing the use of polluting inputs) and
"classical" agricultural goods. Contrary to the previous part, we explicitely model
the heterogeneity of the farmers (linked to di¤erent technical abilities), which must
be taken into account by the regulator, who is moreover in a position of informa-
tional asymmetry with the agents it regulates. In the presence of two principals, the
di¢ culty of dealing with the informational asymmetry is reinforced by the compe-
tition exerted by the other principal. The question of interest is thus to assess the
consequences of the competition between the two principals on the allocations levels.
Common Agency will be presented in Chapter 5.
60 The Common Agency adds a very important feature with respect to the traditional principal-
agent relationship: the competition between the two principals in their contractual o¤er. Therefore,
when o¤ering her contract to the agent, the principal cannot only consider the agents strategic
behavior in revealing his information to her, she must also take into consideration the way the other
principals contract will a¤ect the agents information revelation to her.
Chapter 6 strives to model the regulation of the two types of goods produced by
agriculture: an environmental good and a "classical" agricultural commodity. More
generally, there is a tension between the stringent environmental objectives that the
EU entities (most often the Commission) wish to promote and the opposition of the
MS willing to unleash the production capacities of their agricultural sector. Hence,
Chapter 6 addresses the issue of regulation in the EU context, i.e. with a competition
between the supranational regulator (the EU Commission) and the national regulator
(a Member State). More precisely, the regulation which is considered gives the leader-
ship for imposing its environmental regulation to the EU. This regulation framework
ts well into the setting up of the Common Agricultural Policys successive reforms,
in which environment has been gaining pre-eminence over time.
While Chapter 5 sets out the general framework of Common Agency applied
to agriculture, Chapter 6 focuses on the competition between regulators at the EU
and national levels, in the case where the former is in a Stackelberg leader position.
Biofuels are not the central subject of this part, however, they are responsible for the
high tension between production and environmental objectives.
Chapter 5
Common Agency in agriculture
Introduction
This chapter aims at introducing the instruments of Common Agency in an agricul-
tural framework. It paves the way for the next chapter, dealing with the separation
of regulatory powers within the EU, for which the tools of Common Agency are ex-
tensively used. Common Agency adds a very important feature to the traditional
principal-agent relationship: the competition between two principals in their contrac-
tual o¤ers. Therefore, when o¤ering her contract to the agent, one principal cannot
only consider the agents strategic behavior in revealing his information to her, she
must also take into consideration the way the other principals contract will a¤ect the
agents information revelation to her.61
The term "Common Agency" was coined by Bernheim and Whinston (1986).62
Two seminals papers due to Stole (1991) and Martimort (1992) investigate Common
Agency under adverse selection. While ignoring each others work at the time of the
writing of their respective articles, they reached similar conclusions in the case of in-
trinsic Common Agency, i.e. when the agent can only accept both contractual o¤ers
from the principals or elect his outside opportunity. In the other family of Com-
mon Agency models, the agent can choose to contract with one or both principals or
61 The female pronouns will refer to the principals, while the male pronouns will designate the agent.
62 While their article deals with Common Agency under moral hazard, this chapter will be restricted to
Common Agency under adverse selection.
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neither of them if his outside opportunity is more appealing. These situations are re-
ferred to as delegated Common Agency, since the existence of the Common Agency
is delegated by the choice of the agent, who prefers to contract with both principals
rather than to choose the exclusive dealing outcome. This type of Common Agency
framework is developed in Martimort and Stole (2003). While the rst resolution of
Common Agency problems63 was built upon a very complex adaptation of the Reve-
lation Principle (with an extension of the interval of types in order to avoid protable
deviations by the principals) as well as modied versions of the Taxation Principle
(with an extension of the quantities that can be chosen by the agent), Martimort and
Stole (2002) developed a new algorithm: "The Delegation Principle", which simplies
Common Agency problems. The contractual externalities between the two principals
can either be indirect (they only interact through the agents utility function, the
cross-derivative of which is non-zero), or direct (the principal compete on the same
output market, on which they sell goods that have been produced by the common
agent), as in Martimort and Stole (2004). While these articles considered agents
with continuously distributed e¢ ciency parameters, Martimort and Stole (2002) de-
veloped a discrete model. More recently, Calzolari (2007) developed a model of a
multinational rm in a Common Agency framework.
The following settings will be presented in this chapter. First, the perfect in-
formation framework will be dealt with, then we will develop the case of asymmetric
information, with only one principal interested in both goods. Thereafter, we will
63 As in Martimort (1992).
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discuss the likely adaptation of the Revelation Principle to the Common Agency set-
ting and show that it fails in this situation. Finally, the generic framework of intrinsic
Common Agency, with two principals competing through nonlinear price schedules
will be solved.
5.1 The problem under perfect information
Consider an agricultural supply, characterized by a cost function: C(q1; q2; ), where
q1 and q2 are the two goods under scrutiny and  is the e¢ ciency parameter of
the agricultural supply.  is dened on support [; ]; with density function f and
cumulative distribution function F; and d=d(F ()=f())  0: The cost function of
the agricultural supply has the following characteristics:64
 Ci > 0; Cii > 0
 C > 0; Ci > 0
 Ci  0
 C convex in q1; q2:
In a rst approach, we consider that each principal derives a gross surplus Bi(qi);
i 2 [1; 2] from the production of a quantity qi of agricultural raw material. The func-
tion Bi is assumed increasing and concave. Thus, the principals only interact with
64 The notation Ci stands for @C=@qi:
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one another through the cost function of the agricultural supply. There is no direct
externality between the two principals: this situation is an instance of indirect ex-
ternalities between the two principals. When one principal o¤ers a contract to the
common agent, she has to take into account the interaction of the other principals
contract on her own contractual o¤er. For instance, principals buy their agricul-
tural raw material from the same agricultural supply, but the transformed goods are
thereafter sold on unrelated markets.
Assuming that each principal perfectly knows the agents characteristic, the
problem of principal Pi is drastically simplied:
max
q1(:);t1(:)
B1(q1())  t1() (5.34)
s:t: t1() + t2()  C(q1(); q2(); )  0
As P1 perfectly knows the farmers characteristic ; she can maintain him at a
zero prot level:
t1() + t2()  C(q1(); q2(); ) = 0 (5.35)
Using (5.35), we may rewrite principal P1s program:
max
q1(:)
B1(q1()) + t2()  C(q1(); q2(); ) (5.36)
Maximization with respect to q1 yields the rst-best quantities: B01(q
F
1 ()) =
C1(q
F
1 (); q
F
2 (); ); 8: The perfect information framework leaves no rent to the
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farmer and achieves the rst-best outcome. However, the sharing of the rent between
the two principals is left unspecied.
5.2 The framework with 2 principals merged.
In this framework, we assume that the two principals are merged into one single
entity, principal Pm; whose problem is to design a contract fq1(:); q1(:); tm(:)g: The
Revelation Principle can still apply, as the problem boils down to the relationship
between one agent and one principal.
5.2.1 Information revelation by the agent
The farmer solves the following maximization program:
U() = maxb tm(b)  C(q1(b); q2(b); ) (5.37)
Applying the envelope theorem to (5.37) yields the incitation constraint for the
farmer:
:
U() =  C(q1(); q2(); ) (5.38)
As for the second-order conditions, we have the following result:
Lemma 1
The second-order condition of the farmers program is satised if q1() and
q2() are non-increasing.
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Proof: Program (5.37)s rst-order condition may be written as:
@U
@b = :tm(b)  C1(q1(b); q2(b); ) :q1(b)  C2(q1(b); q2(b); ) :q2(b) (5.39)
The second-order condition is given by:
@2U
@b2 = ::tm(b)  C11(q1(b); q2(b); )

:
q1(b)2   C1(q1(b); q2(b); )::q1(b) (5.40)
 C22(q1(b); q2(b); ) :q2(b)2   C2(q1(b); q2(b); )::q2(b)
 2C12(q1(b); q2(b); ) :q2(b) :q1(b)
Di¤erentiating equation (5.39) with respect to , taken in b =  yields:
0 =
::
tm()  C11(q1(); q2(); ) ( :q1())2   C1(q1(); q2(); )
::
q1() (5.41)
 C22(q1(); q2(); ) ( :q2())2   C2(q1(); q2(); )
::
q2()
 2C12(q1(); q2(); ) :q2()
:
q1()  C1(q1(); q2(); )
:
q1()
 C2(q1(); q2(); ) :q2()
As for the second-order condition, we must have @2U=@b2b=  0: Plugging
(5.41) into (5.40) taken in b =  gives the following inequality:
C1(q1(); q2(); )
:
q1() + C2(q1(); q2(); )
:
q2()  0 (5.42)
C1 and C2 being positive, the concavity of the agents program is ensured if
q1() and q2() are non-increasing.
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Therefore, the program solved by Principal Pm takes the following form:65
max
tm(:); q1(:); q2(:)
Z 

fB1(q1()) +B2(q2())  tm()g f()d (5.43)
s:t:
:
U() =  C(q1(); q2(); )[()]
Using (5.37), we substitute for tm(:) in Principal Pms problem. Hence:
max
q1(:); q2(:); U(:)
Z 

fB1(q1()) +B2(q2())  C(q1(); q2(); ) (5.44)
 U()gf()d
s:t:
:
U() =  C(q1(); q2(); ) [()]
By an integration by parts, we get:
Z 

()
:
U()d = ()U()   ()U()  Z 

:
()U()d:
We therefore have the following program:
max
q1(:); q2(:); U(); U()
Z 

Hm()d + ()U()  ()U() (5.45)
The HamiltonianHm of this program can be written as: Hm(q1; q2; ) =B1(q1())+
B2(q2()) C(q1(); q2(); ) U()gf()+()C(q1(); q2(); )  :()U(): The La-
grangian Lm is dened by: Lm =
Z 

Hm()d + ()U()  ()U():
The rst-order condition with respect to U(:) gives:
65 We will assume that the quantities are not increasing and check ex-post that the property is e¤ectively
satised. () is the Lagrange multiplier attached of the incentive constraint.
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@Hm
@U
=  f()  :()  0 ; (U()  0) (5.46)
Derivation with respect to qi; i = f1; 2g yields:
@Hm
@qi
= fB0i(qi())  Ci(qi(); qj(); )gf() + ()Ci(qi(); qj(); ) = 0 (5.47)
The rst-order conditions of the Lagrangian Lm with respect to U() and U()
are the following:
@Lm
@U()
= ()  0 ; U()  0 (5.48)
@Lm
@U()
=  ()  0 ; U()  0 (5.49)
As U() > 0; we get from equation (5.49) that () = 0
Moreover, we have ()  () =
Z 

:
(x)dx =  
Z 

f(x)dx from (5.46).
Hence, () =  F ()
Replacing into (5.47), we derive the following optimal solution for qi; i = f1; 2g:
B0i(qi())  Ci(qi(); qj(); ) 
F ()
f()
Ci(qi(); qj(); ) = 0 (5.50)
The second-order conditions are checked by di¤erentiating (5.50) with respect
to  (omitting the arguments):
:
qi

B00i   Cii  
F
f
Cii

  :qj

Cij +
F
f
Cij

  F
f
Ci   Ci

1 +
d
d
F
f

= 0 (5.51)
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In the case of symmetric costs and benets, we obtain a symmetric production
of both goods, i.e. qi() = qj() = q(): Considering the properties of the cost and
distribution functions, we get:
:
q =
F
f
Ci + Ci
h
1 + d
d
F
f
i
B00i   Cij   Cii   Ff [Cii + Cij]
 0 (5.52)
The quantity schedules being non-increasing, the second-order conditions are
veried (owing to Lemma 1).
5.3 The problem of information revelation with two
principals
The previous framework was not really complexied by the presence of two principals,
since the two principals acted like one single merged principal. Thus, the Revelation
Principle could continue to apply. When both regulators o¤er their own incentive
schemes, the information revelation by the agent is more complicated, as he has to
report his type twice, i.e. he announces a type bi to each principal Pi: It remains
unclear whether an equivalent of the Revelation Principle exists in the case of two
principals. We rst present the Revelation Principle in the case of one principal,
and then explain why a straightforward extension to the case of two principals is
impossible.
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5.3.1 The Revelation Principle
As exposed in La¤ont and Martimort (2002), a direct revelation mechanism is a
correspondence g(:) from toA:66 g() = (q(); t()), 8 2 : The principal commits
to o¤ering a transfer t(e) in exchange of a production q(e) from the agent if the agent
announces that the value of his parameter is e: A direct revelation mechanism is
truthful if the agent nds worthwhile to announce his true type ; 8; i.e. if the
direct revelation mechanism satises the following incentive constraint:
t()  C(q(); )  t(e)  C(q(e); ); for all;e 2 2: (5.53)
However, a more general mechanism can be obtained when the communication
between the principal and the agent is more complex than a simple announce of his
type to the principal. LetM be the space of messages o¤ered to the agent by a more
general mechanism, which may be very complex. Conditionally to a given message
m received from the agent, the principal asks for a production level eq(m) and pays a
transfer et(m) to the agent.
Facing such a mechanism, the -type agent chooses an optimal message m()
which is implicitely dened by:
et(m())  C(eq(m()); )  et(em)  C(eq(em); ) (5.54)
66 A is the space of allocations.
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The mechanism (M; eg(:)) induces an allocation rule a() = (eq(m());et(m()))
from the types  to the allocations A. With these denitions, we may now formulate
the Revelation Principle in the case of one agent.
Any allocation rule a() obtained with a mechanism (M; eg(:)) can also be im-
plemented with a truthful direct revelation mechanism. Expressed graphically, the
Revelation Principle takes the following form:

m(:) ! M eg(:) !A   g(:)=egm(:) ! A
The proof is straightforward (following La¤ont and Martimort, 2002): by com-
posing eg(:) and m(:); a direct revelation mechanism mapping  into A can be con-
structed, i.e. g(:)  eg m(:): The truthfullness of this direct revelation mechanism
is proved using (5.54). As it is true for all em; we take the case where em = m(0) :
et(m())  C(eq(m()); )  et(m(0))  C(eq(m(0)); ) (5.55)
And, using the denition of g(:), we get:
t()  C(q(); )  t(0)  C(q(0); ); 8 (; 0) in 2 (5.56)
Hence, the direct revelation mechanism is truthful.
5.3.2 Can the Revelation Principle apply to Common Agency?
We now strive to determine the form that the Revelation Principle would take in the
Common Agency framework and explain why it cannot work in such a context.
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Let us considerM1 andM2 the message spaces of the agent, who reports his
type to both principals. Let m1() 2 M1 and m2() 2 M2 be the two optimal
messages. The agent will receive the allocations eg1(m1()) = (q1(m1()); t1(m1()))
and eg2(m2()) = (q2(m2()); t2(m2())):
An equivalent version of the Revelation Principle in the case of the presence of
two principals would be:
  !
m1(:) ! M1 eg1(:) !A1
m2(:) ! M2 eg2(:) !A2    !
g1(:)=eg1m1(:) ! A1
g2(:)=eg2m2(:) ! A2
A direct revelation mechanism would then be a couple of correspondences fg1(); g2()g
from 2 to A1 A2: fg1(); g2()g = f(q1(); t1()); (q2(); t2())g:
Such a direct revelation mechansim fg1(:); g2(:)g would be truthful if it were
incentive-compatible for the agent to announce his true type (for all type) to both
principals, i.e. if the direct revelation mechanism would satisfy the following incentive
constraints, for all (b1;b2; ) 2 3:
t1() + t2()  C(q1(); q2(); )  t1(b1) + t2(b2)  C(q1(b1); q2(b2); ) (5.57)
However, it looks di¢ cult to be able to reach such a result. Indeed, it seems
unlikely that the optimal behavior for the agent be to report his type truthfully to
both principals. As noted in Salanié (2005), the Revelation Principle cannot apply
in this case. Assume that a general game in mechanisms implements an equilib-
rium (q1(); q2(); t1(); t2()): For any agent of type ; t1(b1) C(q1(b1); q2(); ) and
t2(b2)  C(q1(); q2(b2); ) must reach their maximum for b1 = b2 = : However, C12
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being nonzero, it does not follow that t1(b1) + t2(b2)   C(q1(b1); q2(b2); ) is maxi-
mal in b1 = b2 = : Hence, the agent can do better than reveal his true type to both
principals.
When one principal modies the contract she o¤ers to the agent, she not only
modies the choice of the activity level for her, she also modies the level of the
activity for her rival principal, as the marginal cost of one activity hinges upon the
level of the other activity: there is an indirect externality between the two principals
in their contractual o¤ers (since C12 6= 0):
5.4 Solving the problem when principals compete
with nonlinear schedules.
The resolution of the problem takes the following path: in order to solve principal P2s
program, we consider that the latter o¤ers a contract to the agent, taking account
of the fact that the agent optimally responds to a nonlinear schedule T1(q1) o¤ered
by principal P1. Following Martimort and Stole (2002) and Salanié (2005), a new
cost function which takes account of the agents optimal behavior facing the contract
o¤ered by P1 is introduced: This "residual" cost function vis-à-vis P2 may be written
as:67
67 We symmetrically dene bC1(:) as:
bC1(q1; ;T2) = min
q2
C(q1; q2; )  T2(q2)
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bC2(q2; ;T1) = min
q1
C(q1; q2; )  T (q1) (5.58)
This function determines the cost borne by the  type farmer when he produces
a quantity q2 for principal P2, knowing that he has optimized the quantityQ1(q2; ;T1)
he chooses in the nonlinear schedule o¤ered by P1 and that he has received the
payment corresponding to this quantity. We have:68
Q1(q2; ;T1) = argmin
q1
C(q1; q2; )  T1(q1) (5.59)
Facing the nonlinear schedules o¤ered by the two principals, the agent faces
the following problem. Its maximum is equivalently determined by the three maxi-
mization programs below:
U() = max
q1;q2
T1(q1) + T2(q2)  C(q1; q2; ) (5.60)
= max
q2
T2(q2)  bC2(q2; ;T1)
= max
q1
T1(q1)  bC1(q1; ;T2)
The solutions q1() and q2() of program (5.60) also verify: q1() = Q1(q2(); ;T1)
and q2() = Q2(q1(); ;T2):
By application of the envelope theorem, the incitation constraint of the agent
which must be taken into account by both principals can equivalently be written in
68 Likewise,
Q2(q1; ;T2) = argmin
q2
C(q1; q2; )  T2(q2)
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the three following ways, in relation with the three maximization programs presented
above:
:
U() =  C(q1(); q2(); ) =   bC2 (q2(); ;T1) =   bC1 (q1(); ;T2) (5.61)
Principal P2 solves the following maximization program, which accounts for the
agents participation and incitation constraints.
max
T2(:);q2(:)
EfB2(q2())  T2(q2())g
s:t:
 :
U() =   bC2 (q2(); ;T1)
U()  0
As
:
U() =   bC2 (q2(); ;T1) =  C(q1(); q2(); ) < 0; the rent function is
strictly decreasing in : It su¢ ces that the participation constraint be binding in
 to ensure that all types wish to participate. Moreover, as T2(q2()) = U() +
bC2(q2(); ;T1); P2s program can be rewritten as:
max
q2(:);U(:)
Z 

n
B2(q2())  bC2(q2(); ;T1)  U()o f()d
s:t:
 :
U() =   bC2 (q2(); ;T1)
U() = 0
(5.62)
By an integration by parts, we may replace U() by the expression of its deriv-
ative in ;
:
U():
Z 

U()f () d =  
Z 

:
U()F () d =
Z 

bC2 (q2(); ;T1)F () d
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It then remains for principal P2 to solve the following maximization program:
max
q2(:)
Z 


B2(q())  bC2(q2(); ;T1)  F ()
f()
bC2 (q2(); ;T1) f () d (5.63)
The rst-order condition in q gives:
B22(q

2())  bC22(q2(); ;T1)  F ()f() bC22(q2(); ;T1) = 0 (5.64)
A symmetric reasoning for regulator P1 leads to:
B11(q

1())  bC11(q1(); ;T2)  F ()f() bC11(q1(); ;T2) = 0 (5.65)
As F () = 0; the solutions for the most e¢ cient agent correspond to the rst-
best levels. It remains to replace the "residual" cost function bC11 (and its derivatives)
by the "real" cost function C. This is done following Salanié (2005).
Applying the envelope theorem to program (??), the derivatives of these two
functions with respect to parameter  are linked by the following equation:
bC2 (q2; ;T1) = C(Q1(q2; ;T1); q2; ) (5.66)
Upon derivation with respect to q, we get:
bC22(q2; ;T1) = C1(Q1(q2; ;T1); q2; )@Q1@q2 + C2(Q1(q2; ;T1); q2; ) (5.67)
Replacing the "residual" cost functions with the real cost function in the two
expressions above gives us:
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B01(q

1()) C1(q1(); q2(); ) 
F ()
f()
(
C1(q

1(); q

2(); ) + C2(q

1(); q

2(); )
@Q2
@q1

(q1();q

2())
)
= 0
(5.68)
B02(q

2()) C2(q1(); q2(); ) 
F ()
f()
(
C1(q

1(); q

2(); )
@Q1
@q2

(q1();q

2())
+ C2(q

1(); q

2(); )
)
= 0
(5.69)
Even if the rst-order conditions are still not completely expanded, we may stop
on these expressions to understand the supplementary distortion brought about by
the competition between the two principals. Observe condition (5.68): as in the clas-
sical one principal-one agent framework, the distortion due to information revelation
appears: F ()
f()
C1(q

1(); q

2(); ): However, a supplementary terms arises, reecting
the competition between the two principals: F ()
f()
C2(q

1(); q

2(); )
@Q2
@q1

(q1();q

2())
:
Hence, the competition between the two principals leads to greater distortions with
respect to the merged framework in the case of complements

as @Q2
@q1

(q1();q

2())
> 0

,
while the case of substitutes results in a smaller distortion

as @Q2
@q1

(q1();q

2())
< 0

.
This intuitive result can be explained quite simply, following Martimort (1992). Prin-
cipal P1 o¤ers a nonlinear schedule which reduces the level q1, in order to decrease
the agents rent. In the case of substitutes, the agent chooses higher levels for q2;
therefore leading to high activity levels at the symmetric equilibrium. On the con-
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trary, the agent chooses low levels for q2 in the case of complements,69 thus leading
to low activity levels at the symmetric equilibrium.
Finally, @Q1=@q2 and @Q2=@q1 are replaced. The same path as Salanié (2005)
is followed: applying the implicit functions theorem to program (5.58)s rst-order
condition, we obtain:
T 001
@Q1
@q2
= C11
@Q1
@q2
+ C12
And, upon rearranging terms:
@Q1
@q2
=
C12
T 001   C11
Then, in order to replace T 001 in the previous expression, we suppose that an
equilibrium of the contract game (q1(); q

2()) has been reached, and di¤erentiating
the agents rst-order condition with respect to :
T 001 (q

1())
:
q1

() = C11(q

1(); q

2(); )
:
q1

()+C12(q

1(); q

2(); )
:
q2

()+C1(q

1(); q

2(); )
which gives:
T 001 (q

1())  C11(q1(); q2(); ) =
C12(q

1(); q

2(); )
:
q

2() + C1(q

1(); q

2(); )
:
q1()
69 The two goods produced by the farmer are not necessarily substitutes. We may consider the case of raw
materials for the second-generation of biofuels which are complements in the agents cost function: this is
the case for crops which have elements used to be transformed into biofuels (the leaves), while the grain
are used for food purposes. Moreover, the two goods under scrutiny may also be thought of as two types of
energy crops, one for the rst generation of biofuels, the other one for the second generation. Indeed, when
the rst plants for the second generation are on stream, the plants producing the rst generation will still
be active. Hence, these two generations of biofuels will undoubtedly be overlapping.
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and nally:
@Q1
@q2

(q1();q

2())
=
C12(q

1(); q

2(); )
:
q1

()
C12(q1(); q

2(); )
:
q2

() + C1(q1(); q

2(); )
The expression of @Q2=@q1 is obtained in a symmetric way:
@Q2
@q1

(q1();q

2())
=
C12(q

1(); q

2(); )
:
q2

()
C12(q1(); q

2(); )
:
q1

() + C2(q1(); q

2(); )
Hence, the rst-order solutions can nally be written as:
B02(q

2())  C2(q1(); q2(); )
  F ()
f()

C1(q

1(); q

2(); )C12(q

1(); q

2(); )
:
q1

()
C12(q1(); q

2(); )
:
q2

() + C1(q1(); q

2(); )
+ C2(q

1(); q

2(); )

= 0
B01(q

1())  C1(q1(); q2(); )
  F ()
f()

C1(q

1(); q

2(); ) +
C2(q

1(); q

2(); )C12(q

1(); q

2(); )
:
q2

()
C12(q1(); q

2(); )
:
q1

() + C2(q1(); q

2(); )

= 0
The system of di¤erential equations that we nally attain is di¢ cult to solve
analytically. However, assuming that the agents cost function takes the following
form: C(q1; q2; ) = (q1+q2)+ 12(q
2
1+q
2
2)+q1q2, that principalssurpluses are linear
: B1(q1) = b1q1 and B2(q2) = b2q2 and that the cumulative distribution function is
the uniform function on  = [0; 1], the problem becomes tractable:

qnash1 () = (b
1   b2)  2[1  2]
qnash2 () = (b
2   b1)  2[1  2]
Proof.
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q1
b1 b2
q1
nash b1 b2 2 1 2
0 1
q1 b
1 b2 1
q1
merged b1 b2 2 1
q1
merged
q1
q1
nash
Fig. 5.5. Quantity schedules for q1 in di¤erent settings,  small and > 0:
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Taking  ' 0,70 the di¤erential system can be conveniently simplied:
b1   ( + q1() + q2())   f1 +  :q2()g = 0 (5.70)
b2   ( + q2() + q1())   f1 +  :q1()g = 0 (5.71)
Di¤erentiating equation (5.71) with respect to ;we get:
 1  :q2()   :q1()  1   :q1()   ::q1() = 0 (5.72)
Hence,
:
q2() can be expressed in the following way:
:
q2() =  2  2 :q1()   ::q1() (5.73)
Rewriting (5.71), q2() takes the subsequent expression:
q2() = b
2      q1())   f1 +  :q1()g (5.74)
And, replacing q2() and
:
q2() in the equation (5.70):
b1   ( + q1() + q2())   f1 +  :q2()g = 0 (5.75)
b1  2  q1() [b2   q1())   f1 +  :q1()g]  [ 2  2 :q1()   ::q1()] = 0
(5.76)
70 the approximation of 
:
q1
()

:
q2()+1
leads to 
:
q1
()

:
q2()+1

=0
' 
h :
q2(
:
q1+1)  :q1 :q2
(
:
q2+1)2
i
=0
'  :q2
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Conclusion
Neglecting the terms in 2, we nally obtain:
qnash1 () =
 
b1   b2  2[1  2] (5.77)
And, after replacing q1() in equation (5.71)
qnash2 () = (b
2   b1)  2[1  2] (5.78)
Conclusion
This chapter serves as a preamble to the developments led in the next chapter, in
which the competition between two levels of regulation is dealt with. Even if the
principals do not compete directly with one another (say, on the same market), the
sharing of a common agent (here, farmers) leads to indirect contractual externalities
between them, involving smaller (resp. higher) distortions in the case of substitutes
(resp. complements) goods with respect to the benchmark scenario with merged prin-
cipals. Hence, if we take the example of the production of substitutes by farmers
(environment good and a "traditional" agricultural good), we end up with produc-
tion levels that are higher in the case of a competition between two regulators with
respect to the case in which these regulators would have cooperated.
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Chapter 6
The dual regulation of the
European agricultural sector
Biofuels and environmental policies directed to agriculture share a common char-
acteristic in the European Union (EU): the separation of regulatory powers between
the EU and the Member State (MS) levels. Concerning agri-environmental policies,
the examples are numerous, such as, e.g. cross-compliance and agri-environmental
measures in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the Directives concerning water
(the most famous being the nitrates Directive), etc. As regards biofuel policies, the
development of the rst-generation shows this duality, with on the one hand the EU
setting prominent objectives related to the environment (be it on climate change is-
sues or on the certication of energy crops), while on the other hand the MS endowed
with a large agricultural sector wishing to develop biofuels produced domestically
and tending to put forwards income-related issues for their farmers.71 The second-
generation of biofuels, albeit not produced on an industrial level yet, is bound to
raise similar regulatory issues. More generally, there is a tension between the strin-
71 Moreover, biofuel policies might be considered as a rst example of a re-nationalisation of the Common
Agricultural Policy: the support schemes are decided at the level of the Member States (MS), and each
MS is free to subsidize its own agriculture through biofuel production to the level deemed desirable. Re-
nationalisation is a possible outcome for the future (post-2013)CAP, in which the burden of nancing the
agricultural sector would be transfered from the EU to the MS level. However, even if such an extreme
scenario materializes for the future of the European Agricultural Policy, it seems that a common feature
ought to outlive the dismantling of the CAP: environmental standards decided at the EU level. Hence,
the regulation of the European agriculture would still be split up between a EU regulator, interested in
the enforcement of stringent environmental standards and the MS regulator, which wants its agriculture to
produce as much as possible.
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gent environmental objectives that the EU entities (most often the Commission) wish
to promote and the opposition of the MS willing to unleash the production capacities
of their agricultural sector.
The environmental cross-compliance which appeared in the Agenda 2000 and
was further reinforced under the Mid-Term Review (MTR) reform72 shows that the
Commission has gained the ability to link environmental and agricultural issues. This
is due to growing concerns among the EU population of environmental problems
related to agriculture. Besides, as the legitimacy of the CAP payments has faded
away over time, putting forward environmental provisions in the CAP reforms is a
means to justify the still important share of the CAP in the EUs budget (more than
40%, Bureau, 2007). Moreover, external pressures linked to the WTO negotiations
have also helped the Commission to press for change.
Although the process that leads to CAP reforms is utterly complex, with numer-
ous European and National structures involved in the process,73 we strive to model
the way the negotiations unfold by isolating two main actors: the EU Commission
and an agricultural MS who opposes new environmental constraints imposed on the
agricultural activities.74 The European Commission is therefore considered as the
environmental regulator,75 whereas the agricultural MS make up the "production"
72 Proposal in 2002 by the European Commission, agreement in 2003.
73 The Commission of course, is a key actor along with the Council of Ministers which is the executive body.
However, there are numerous committees which are consulted in the reform process, e.g. the Committee of the
regions, the Committee of permanent representatives, the special Committee on agriculture, the management
Committee, etc. (Greer, 2005). With the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty (forecasted before the European
elections of 2009), the European Parliament will gain a power of co-decision in the next CAP reforms.
74 Ireland, Greece and France are some examples of MS reluctant to new environmental provisions (Greer,
2005)
75 Note that the interests of the MS wishing to enforce stringent environmental standards have their objec-
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regulator. While the EU Commission presses the MS to respect high environmental
standards, the agricultural MS wishes to produce as many agricultural commodities
as possible, in order to endow its agricultural sector with high incomes. Both entities
regulate the agricultural sector of the agri-MS, which is therefore asked to produce
two kinds of goods: an environmental good (in the form of an environmental e¤ort,
e.g. a decrease in the use of polluting inputs) and a "classical" production good.
The aim of this chapter is to study the implications from the separation of reg-
ulatory powers. More precisely, the focus will be set on the timing of the regulation.
The order in the regulatory decisions are by no means a theoretical abstraction which
would arbitrarily designate the identity of the Stackelberg leader. The sequentiality
stems from the expression of a political power (taken in a broad sense) to impose its
own agenda to the other regulatory entity and to the regulated sector, i.e. the agri-
cultural supply. The methodological framework chosen to modelize these regulation
aspects is the Common Agency theory (presented in its general setting in Chapter
5 ), with a special focus on the Stackelberg form of the game. As explained in the
previous chapter, Common Agency games involve 2 (or more) principals competing
through contractual o¤ers made to a common agent, for whom they share a common
probability function concerning his technical ability :
The evolution towards sti¤er environmental commitments in the CAP reforms
can be viewed as a change in the structure of the game being played between the
tives aligned with the environmental regulator.
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European Commission and the MS in dening the European agricultural policy. Our
purpose is to modelize two di¤erent negotiation settings:
 The past CAP reforms did not give the prevalence to environmental problems.
Hence, the setting of the game can be considered as a simultaneous move, Nash
game, as no clear leadership emerges.
 In the most recent CAP reforms, the setting of the game being played is
profoundly altered: the European Commission favoring strict environmental
standards can now be considered as a Stackelberg leader, who imposes its
environmental policy (for all the reasons previously cited). The MS can only
adopt what has been decided with respect to the environment.
The aim of this chapter is not primarily to study the implications of regulatory
separation per se with respect to a merged regulation setting. The chapter is rather
aimed at addressing the implications of being rst (i.e. being the Stackelberg leader)
when co-regulating a sector for which the e¢ ciency is unknown.
This chapter builds upon the theory of Common Agency initiated by Stole
(1991) and Martimort (1992). More precisely, our purpose is to study the implica-
tions of separated regulatory powers when one agency is in charge of the environment
and the other is interested in the production activity of the entity they regulate. The
rst paper on the dual regulation of an activity under asymmetric information is due
to Baron (1985). In his seminal paper, Baron studies the regulation of an electricity
generating plant which is controlled by a public utilities commission and an environ-
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mental regulator (the Environmental Protection Agency). The plant is a monopolist
which has some private information about the e¤ectiveness of its abatement alterna-
tives, and the environmental regulator acts as a Stackelberg leader. The problem is
that the agents who bear the abatement costs and those who get the benets of an
emission abatement policy belong to two di¤erent jurisdictions. Hence, the interests
of the two regulators (which represent di¤erent jurisdictions) are in conict. In the
noncooperative equilibrium, the EPA sets a very stringent standard and a very high
emission fee. The EPA and the rm prefer the noncooperative framework, while the
Public Utilities Commission prefers the cooperative outcome. In Martimort (1996),
a rather similar analysis is conducted: there are two regulators which are called upon
to contribute to the nancing of a large project (e.g., the construction of a nuclear
power plant). However, the regulators only have a prior information about the cost
of the project. The author compares di¤erent regulation structures: cooperation, sep-
aration under Nash or Stackelberg setting. The regulators o¤er too small transfers
in the Nash separated regulation case with respect to the cooperative outcome. The
distortions are even larger in the Stackelberg framework. A more complex analysis is
conducted in Martimort (1999): the regulators o¤er payments in return of the pro-
duction of a given good in quantity q: The setting is therefore more complex than the
decision of building or not a given project. Although the scope of the article is much
larger than the Stackelberg Common Agency setting (it notably deals with renegoti-
ation), it nonetheless reaches a powerful result with respect to the sharing of the cost
burden between the two principals: the follower bears the larger part of the produc-
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tion costs of the agent. Last, Martimort (2006) o¤ers a methodology for dealing with
the variations of the followers prot in the Stackelberg Common Agency framework.
This study goes a step further with respect to this literature since it presents a Stack-
elberg framework of a Common Agency setting where the agent produces a di¤erent
good for each principal.
In this chapter, we rst sum up the main results concerning the di¤erences be-
tween separation and integration of the regulatory powers. Then, we present the
Stackelberg perfect information framework, where both agencies perfectly know the
agricultural sectors technical parameter: The asymmetric information framework fol-
lows. Finally, we compare the welfare levels in the di¤erent frameworks under scrutiny.
6.1 Regulation separation vs integration
An interesting policy question is to discuss the various regulatory structures and
to determine which one is optimal for the di¤erent economic agents involved. We
compare two frameworks for regulation. First, we study the optimal production of
an environmental and an agricultural good under cooperation, then we study how
the competition between the two regulators leads to di¤erent conclusions. The two
frameworks are built under the assumption of asymmetric information between the
agricultural sector and its regulators.
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6.1.1 Modelling choices
The agricultural sectors of the MS wishing to promote the production aspects in
agriculture are asked to produce two types of goods. The rst good, referred to as
the environmental good e; is controlled by an environmental regulator in charge of
promoting the production of an environmental good (environmental e¤ort in the form
of polluting input reduction). The second good q is an agricultural crop. The two
goods are produced by the agricultural sector of the MS (i.e. a MS supporting actively
the income of its agricultural sector), each farm being characterized by a cost function
C(e; q; ); increasing and convex in both goods produced;  being a parameter that
reects the technical ability of the farmer, and his private information. The two goods
are substitutes in the farm sectors cost function : Ceq > 0:We also have C > 0 (the
total cost increases in ), Ce > 0 (the marginal cost for producing the environmental
good e increases in ) and Cq > 0 (the marginal cost for producing the energy crop
q also increases in ): Moreover, we assume that C = 0 for simplicity. Be(:) and
Bq(:) are the regulatorssurpluses. They are function of e and q respectively and are
supposed increasing and concave.
In most of the analysis conducted in the following, we assume that both regu-
lators share a common prior belief over the technical parameter ; embodied in the
distribution and density functions f() and F () respectively, with support [; ]. Be-
sides, we assume that the distribution function satises the following monotonicity
condition: 0() > 0; where () = F ()=f():
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The regulatory framework under scrutiny will be modelled through the use of
the Common Agency theory, which deals with the contractual relationships between
two principals and one agent. More precisely, the Common Agency framework we
are referring to is the intrinsic Common Agency framework, in which the agent is
compelled to contract with both principals or to elect his outside opportunity.76 (see
Stole, 1991 and Martimort, 1992).
Let then Pe be the environmental regulator (the European Commission willing
to impose the production of a level e of an environmental good) and Pq the production
regulator, which is an agri-MS willing to promote income issues for its agricultural
sector above all. Regulator Pe (in charge of the environment) o¤ers a nonlinear price
schedule S(e) to the agent, while principal Pq o¤ers a schedule T (q): S(e) can be
regarded as a subsidy to produce the environmental good, while T (q) is the "pro-
ductive" payment to agriculture. Facing these two nonlinear schedules, the farmer
(the agent) must pick on his two preferred quantities (e(); q()) that maximize his
program.
6.1.2 Regulators integration
In this part we study the framework in which both regulatory powers are in the hands
of a single, merged regulator.
76 In the other family of Common Agency models, the agent can choose to contract with one or both
principals or neither of them if his outside opportunity is more appealing. These situations are referred to
as delegated Common Agency, since the existence of the Common Agency is delegated by the choice of the
agent, who prefers to contract with both principals rather than to choose the exclusive dealing outcome.
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The two regulators cooperate in the setting up of nonlinear payment schedules
S(e) and T (q): Under cooperation, regulators Pe and Pq share the same maximization
program, which can be considered as the program solved by a merged regulator Pm
in charge of both the environment and the agricultural production aspects.
The -type farmers maximization program is the following:77
U() = max
e;q
S(e) + T (q)  C(e; q; ) (6.79)
Applying the envelope theorem to (6.79), we get:
:
U() =  C(e(); q(); ) < 0 (6.80)
where e() and q() are the optimal quantities chosen by the -type farmer.
Thus, principal Pm solves the following program:
max
S(:);T (:);e(:);q(:)
EfBe(e()) +Bq(q())  S(e())  T (q())g
s:t:
 :
U() =  C(e(); q(); )
U() = 0
Using (6.79), we can replace S(e()) + T (q()) in Pms maximand. The princi-
pals program can now be written as:
max
e(:);q(:);U(:)
Z 

fBe(e()) +Bq(q())  C(e(); q(); )  U()gf()d
s:t:
 :
U() =  C(e(); q(); )
U() = 0
77 The second-order necessary conditions are identical to the ones derived in Chapter 5, Lemma 1.
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Following an integration by parts, we can replace U() in the programs maxi-
mand by the expression of its derivative and use (6.80) to obtain:
max
e(:);q(:)
Z 

fBe(e())+Bq(q()) C(e(); q(); ) ()C(e(); q(); )gf()d (6.81)
It then only remains to solve this program pointwise with respect to each choice
variables. The following rst-order conditions are derived:

Bee(e
()) = Ce(e(); q(); ) + ()Ce(e(); q(); )
Bqq (q
()) = Cq(e(); q(); ) + ()Cq(e(); q(); )
(6.82)
Assume that the agents cost function takes the following form: C(e; q; ) = (e+q)+
1
2
(e2 + q2) + eq, that principalssurpluses are linear : Be(e) = bee and Bq(q) = bqq
and that the cumulative distribution function is the uniform function on  = [0; 1].
Moreover, considering  small and neglegting the terms in 2; the quantity schedules
are given in the next proposition:
Proposition 5 In the case of merged regulatory powers, the quantities of the two
goods are:
emerged() = be   bq   2(1  )
qmerged() = bq   be   2(1  )
The cooperative outcome leads to a solution identical to the traditional principal-
agent relationship. The regulatory powers being merged, there is of course no contrac-
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tual externality between the two principals. However, this framework looks hardly
implementable when deciding to launch the production of second-generation biofuels
both for agricultural-income and environmental positive externalities reasons. Even if
the regulators belong to the same constituency, it seems very likely that there would
be at least a competition between the ministries in charge of the agriculture and the
environment.
6.1.3 Regulators separation
As already pointed out in the introduction, the setting of a regulatory separation
can correspond to the past agricultural reforms in the EU, when two regulators were
facing o¤: the European Commission and the agri-MS. The more agriculture-oriented
MS were pushing to maintain the economic instruments of the CAP (price supports,
quotas, high tari¤ rates, export subsidies, etc.) to keep a high level of production,
while the Commission was in favor of market liberalization and for transfers from the
rst (production) to the second (rural development) pillar.
In the CAP reforms that have been undertaken, each group has striven to push
its own agenda. The process of negotiation can therefore be modelled as a Nash
contract competition between two regulators: the "environmental" principal Pe and
the "productive" principal Pq:78 The negotiation ends up as a Nash equilibrium of
their contracting o¤ers, which take into account the information asymmetry between
each principal and the agent, i.e. the MSs agricultural sector. The presence of 2
78 A similar setting has already been presented in Chapter 5. Therefore, the derivation of the results has
been placed in the appendix to this Chapter.
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competing principals makes the model more technical. The resolution of the problem
takes the following path: in order to solve principal Pqs program, we consider that
the latter o¤ers a contract to the agent, taking account of the fact that the agent
optimally responds to a nonlinear schedule S(e) o¤ered by principal Pe, in charge of
the environment.
The framework is exactly identical to the one developed in Chapter 5 (5.4),
albeit the notations. Hence, we skip the details (placed in appendix B.) and state the
following lemma:
Lemma 6 When the regulatory powers are separated, the optimal quantities of the
two goods e() and q() are dened8<: b
e   ( + e() + q())  ()
n
1 + 
:
q

()

:
e

()+1
o
= 0
bq   ( + q() + e())  ()
n

:
e

()

:
q

()+1
+ 1
o
= 0
In the Nash framework, similar computations give the following quantity sched-
ules: 
enash() = be   bq   2[1  2]
qnash() = bq   be   2[1  2] (6.83)
The quantities of the two goods are greater than under merged regulation:
enash()  emerged() and qnash()  qmerged(), with a strict equality for  = .
Proof: see appendix C.
In the case of a small substituability between the environmental and the pro-
ductive goods (i.e.   0), we observe that the regulatory separation ends up with
a more important production of both goods (which are substitutes) in equilibrium
with respect to the merged regulatory setting. This comparative statics result has al-
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ready been explained in Stole (1991) and Martimort (1992): Principal Pe will o¤er
a nonlinear schedule which reduces the level of activity e, in order to decrease the
agents rent. In the case of substitutes, the agent chooses higher levels of activity for
q; therefore leading to high activity levels at the symmetric equilibrium.
6.2 The Stackelberg Common Agency framework
In a political economy point of view, the Stackelberg framework corresponds to the
imposition of an environmental regulation prior to any productive schedule. This
new regulatory setting marks a departure with respect to the simultaneous move
regulation in which no regulator was able to impose her own agenda to the other.
This new framework marks the pre-eminence of the environmental aspects in the
agricultural reforms. It can be viewed as a shift from a Nash to a Stackelberg setting,
in which the European Commission plays rst (it is represented as the Stackeberg
leader), imposing a stringent environmental schedule.
As observed by Greer (2005): "The European Commission is often said to be in
favourable position to set agendas, partly because of its formal monopoly on policy
initiation and partly because it can draw selectively from national agendas. [...]
Undoubtedly there have been occasions when the Agriculture Directorate has shaped
the agenda, for example Commissioner Fischlers epousal of broad rural development
in the mid-1990s and his role in the MTR."
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The study is conducted under perfect and asymmetric information. In the latter
case, both regulators must build an incentive scheme taking account of the fact that
the agricultural sector acts strategically in revealing his type to the principals.
6.2.1 The perfect information case
The regulatory framework where both regulators are perfectly informed about the
farm sectors productivity is rst presented. Let then fs(); e()g2 and ft(); q()g2
be the two incentive schemes o¤ered by regulators Pe and Pq respectively. The timing
of the game is the following:
 First, the environmental regulator (principal Pe) announces the contracts
fs(); e()g2. Said di¤erently, the farmer of technical ability  will accept to
produce an environmental good in quantity e(); and will receive a payment
s() (an environmental subsidy) from the EU regulator to reward him for his
environmental production.
 Then, the MS (principal Pq), chooses her own payment scheme ft(); q()g2;
taking into account what has been decided environment-wise at the EU level.
In exchange of a production subsidy t(), the farmer commits to produce the
"productive" good in quantity q():
 Last, each agent  announces his type  to each regulator. He produces
(e(); q()) and receives the total payment s() + t():
Principal Pqs program (the follower) can be written as:
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max
fq(:);t(:)g
Bq(q())  t() (6.84)
s:t: s() + t()  C(e(); q(); )  0
Knowing the farmers parameter  and the contracts fs(); e()g2 o¤ered by
the Stackelberg leader; regulator Pq can maintain the farmer at a zero prot level, for
all : The farmers participation constraint is therefore binding and we can replace t
in Pqs program:
max
q(:)
Bq(q()) + s()  C(e(); q(); ) (6.85)
For all ; the rst-order condition in q can therefore be written as:
Bqq (q
()) = Cq(e(); q(); ) (6.86)
Principal Pq therefore induces an e¢ cient production for all :We solve for Pes
program in order to know how the two regulators share the burden of the farmers
costs. The environmental regulatory agency Pe plays rst. She must take into account
Pqs optimal solution, and the agents participation constraint as well as Pqs no-veto
constraint: principal Pq must be guaranteed a non-negative social welfare when she is
called upon to play after principal Pe: The program may thus be written as follows:
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max
fe(:);s(:)g
Be(e())  s() (6.87)
s:t:
8<: B
q
q (q
())  Cq(e(); q(); ) = 0
Bq(q())  t()  0
s() + t()  C(e(); q(); )  0
Writing the Lagrangian of Pes program (where  is the Lagrange multiplier
attached to the rst constraint):
max
e(:);q(:)
Be(e())+Bq(q()) C(e(); q(); )+fBqq (q()) Cq(e(); q(); )g (6.88)
The rst-order condition is:
Bee(e
()) = Ce(e(); q(); ) 8 (6.89)
For each -type farmer, Pe manages to impose the Pigouvian level:
Bqq (q
())  Cq(e(); q(); ) + fBqqq(q())  Cqq(e(); q(); )g = 0 (6.90)
As we must haveBqq (q
()) Cq(e(); q(); ) = 0 andBqqq(q()) Cqq(e(); q(); ) 6=
0; it leads to  = 0:
In the perfect information framework, each regulator therefore manages to im-
pose her rst-best quantities. However, contrary to the Nash perfect information
outcome where the respective shares of the agents cost borne by each principal is
left unspecied (see Martimort, 1992), the Stackelberg outcome selects an equilib-
rium, namely the one in which the leader succeeds in leaving her follower pay a large
chunk of their common cost burden. As Pe can control Pqs subsequent behavior since
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she plays rst, she will maintain her follower and the farmer at a zero social welfare
level. The game played in Nash was awed with a multiplicity of equilibria. This is
no longer the case in a Stackelberg framework, in which the most favorable outcome
for the leader is selected. This result seems intuitively appealing. These results are
summed up in the proposition below:
Proposition 7 In the perfect information, Stackelberg framework, both goods (the
environmental good and the agricultural raw material) are produced at their rst-best
levels. The agent and the MS earn no rent, while the environmental regulator manages
to keep all the social welfare for her.
Corollary 8 In the case where the marginal valuations of both principals are equal,
the payments can be conveniently expressed:
t() = bq() = b

b  
1 + 

and
s() =
(b  )
1 + 
Proof: see appendix D.
We therefore have t() > s() for all : principal Pq contributes more to the
reimbursement of the agents costs, by the mere fact that she plays second, after
principal Pe, who has some leeway to maintain her follower at a zero social welfare
level. The environmental regulator will impose her desired level of environmental good
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production (at the Pigouvian level) and manage to contribute in the least important
way to the production of the couple {environmental good, agricultural good}. In the
next section, we solve the same regulatory problem, but in the case where farmers
have a private information on their production costs.
6.2.2 The imperfect information framework
This section deals with the regulatory framework where both regulators are imper-
fectly informed about the farm sectors productivity, knowing only a prior distribution
of the agents type. Let then S(e) and T (q) be the two nonlinear payment sched-
ules o¤ered by regulators Pe and Pq respectively. Contrary to the previous perfect
information framework, where incentive schemes were used, we prefer to use nonlin-
ear schedules in the asymmetric information case. The timing of the game is the
following:
 First, the environmental regulator (principal Pe) announces her nonlinear
schedule S(e). Said di¤erently, this means that a farmer who chooses
to produce the environmental good in quantity e will receive a payment
S(e) (environmental subsidy) from the EU regulator to reward him for his
environmental production.
 The MS (principal Pq) then chooses her own nonlinear payment schedule T (q);
taking into account what the EU Commission has decided with respect to the
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environment. In exchange of producing crops in quantity q, the farmer will
receive T (q) in payment from the MS.
 Last, the agent picks on his preferred quantities e and q in each regulators
nonlinear payment schedules, thus receiving a total payment S(e) + T (q):
We rst consider principal Pqs problem (the follower):79 As in the Nash frame-
work, the following rst-order condition is obtained:
Bqq (q
())  bCqq (q(); ;S)  () bCqq(q(); ;S) = 0 (6.91)
Principal Pe (who is the Stackelberg leader) has to take into account in her
own program principal Pqs behavior, her follower. This control by principal Pe of
principal Pqs social welfare function is realized through Pqs ex ante social welfare
function, for a given  type agent, which entails the information cost in addition to
the production cost.
V q(;S) = max
q
Bq(q)  bCq(q; ;S)  () bCq (q; ;S) (6.92)
= Bq(q())  bCq(q(); ;S)  () bCq (q(); ;S)
= Bq(q())  bCq(q(); ;S) + () :U()
Just in the same way as a principal has to consider the evolution of the agents
informational rent in a classical principal-agent problem, principal Pe has to take into
79 Note that the problem will be solved for the simple specications presented above as regards the farmers
cost function, the regulatorssurplus functions and the typesdistribution function.
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account in her ownmaximization program the evolution of principal Pqs ex ante social
welfare, in addition to the agents incentive and participation constraints. Moreover,
principal Pe will have to ensure that principal Pq will obtain a non-negative ex ante
social welfare: V q(;S)  0; so as to be sure that she wishes to o¤er a contract to
the whole set of farmers.
The evolution of the ex ante social welfare of principal Pq is obtained by applying
the envelope theorem to program (6.92):80
dV q(;S)
d
=  (1 +
:
()) bCq (q(); ;S)  () bCq(q(); ;S) (6.95)
We rst assume that dV
q(;S)
d
< 0; although there may be occurrences where this
expression is nill. We give su¢ cient conditions for this inequality to be veried in
appendix F.
Principal Pqs ex ante social welfare therefore evolves in a monotonic way. The
non-negativity constraint implies that V q() = 0 and that V q() > 0 for all  < :
This result is in sharp contrast with the outcome of the Stackelberg game under
perfect information. In the framework under scrutiny, principal Pq; although playing
after principal Pe, manages to withhold a non-zero social welfare.
80 Note that, although we have assumed that C = 0; this does not imply that bCq = 0: Indeed, we have:
bCq (q; ;S) = C(E(q; ;S); q; ) (6.93)
Hence,
bCq(q; ;S) = Ce(E(q; ;S); q; )@E@ (q; ;S) + C = Ce(E(q; ;S); q; )@E@ (q; ;S) (6.94)
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By integration, the level of the ex ante social welfare V q(;S) is derived:
V q(;S)  V q(;S) =
Z 

:
V
q
(x;S)dx
The constraint V q(;S)  0 being binding in ; we get:
V q(;S) =
Z 

n
(1 +
:
(x)) bCqx(q(x); x;S) + bCqxx(q(x); x;S)o dx
Pe maximizes her expected welfare, under the agents participation and incita-
tion constraints and under principal Pqs welfare evolution and no-veto constraints
(V q(;S)  0):
max
S(:);e(:)
EfBe(e())  S(e())g (6.96)
s:t:
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
:
U() =   bCe(e(); ;T )
U() = 0
:
V
q
(;S) =  (1 +
:
()) bCq (q(); ;S)  () bCq(q(); ;S)
V q(;S)  0
U() = S(e()) + T (q())  C(e(); q(); )
V q(;S) = Bq(q())  bCq(q(); ;S) + () :U()
The program above is conveniently transformed in order to make principal Pqs
ex ante social welfare and the farmers informational rent (his prot) appear. By
denition of principal Pqs ex ante social welfare, we have:
V q(;S) = Bq(q())  bCq(q(); ;S) + () :U()
And, replacing bCq(q(); ;S) using its denition:
V q(;S) = Bq(q())  C(e(); q(); ) + S(e()) + ()
:
U()
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As the expression of the evolution of the informational rent can alternatively be
written as:
:
U() =   bCe(e(); ;T ) following equation (6.109), :U() can be replaced
in the expression above. Hence:
S(e()) =  Bq(q()) + C(e(); q(); ) + () bCe(e(); ;T ) + V q(;S)
Replacing S(e()) by the expression above, Pes program can be rewritten as
follows:
max
e(:);V q(:)
Z 

fBe(e()) +Bq(q())  C(e(); q(); ) (6.97)
 () bCe(e(); ;T )  V q(;S)gf()d
s:t:
( :
V
q
(;S) =  (1 +
:
()) bCq (q(); ;S)  () bCq(q(); ;S):
U() =   bCe(e(); ;T )
With the specication chosen for the cost function, bCq(q(); ;S) can be expressed
rather straightforwardly:
bCq(q(); ;S) = Ce(E(q(); ;S); q; )@E@ (q(); ;S) + C (6.98)
= Ce(E(q(); ;S); q; )
@E
@
(q(); ;S)
=
:
e()
since Ce = 1:
Upon integrating by parts, the expression
Z 

V q(;S)f () d is replaced in prin-
cipal Pes maximand. Hence:
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Z 

V q(;S)f () d =
Z 

n
(1 +
:
()) bCq (q(); ;S) + () bCq(q(); ;S)oF ()d
=
Z 

n
(1 +
:
()) bCe(e(); ;T ) + () :e()oF ()d
The transition from the second to the third equality is made using
:
U() =
 C(e(); q(); ) =   bCq (q(); ;S) =   bCe(e(); ;T ) (see appendix B) and bCq(q(); ;S) =
:
e(). Principal Pes program can nally be rewritten as:
max
e(:);
:
e()
Z 

n
Be(e()) +Bq(q())  C(e(); q(); )  () bCe(e(); ;T )f2 + :()g   ()2 :e()o
f () d
At this stage, a simplifying assumption is made: the distribution function is the
uniform distribution on  = [0; 1]: The program can thus be rewritten as:
max
e(:);
:
e()
Z 

n
Be(e()) +Bq(q())  C(e(); q(); )  3 bCe(e(); ;T )  2 :e()o d
Upon integrating
Z 

f2 :e()gd by parts, we get:
max
e(:)
Z 

n
Be(e()) +Bq(q())  C(e(); q(); )  3 bCe(e(); ;T ) + 2e()o
d   2e()
The rst-order condition with respect to e gives the following expression:
Bee(e
())  Ce(e(); q(); )  3 bCee(e(); ;T ) + 2 = 0 (6.99)
213
6.2 The Stackelberg Common Agency framework
Replacing the "residual" cost function bCe by the "real" cost function C; Pes
rst-order condition at the game equilibrium can be written as:
Bee(e
())  Ce(e(); q(); )
  3
(
Ce(e
(); q(); ) +
@Q
@e

(e();q())
Cq(e
(); q(); )
)
+ 2 = 0
For principal Pq; the rst-order condition at the game equilibrium is the follow-
ing (from the previous section in Nash equilibrium):
Bqq (q
()) Cq(e(); q(); ) 
(
Ce(e
(); q(); )
@E
@q

(e();q())
+ Cq(e
(); q(); )
)
= 0
(6.100)
With the simple specications for the farmers cost function, the principals
surpluses and the distribution function, the rst-order conditions of the regulators
programs may be written as:
be   ( + e() + q())  3

1 +

:
q

()

:
e

() + 1

+ 2 = 0 (6.101)
bq   ( + q() + e())  


:
e

()

:
q

() + 1
+ 1

= 0 (6.102)
Observe that the solutions for the most e¢ cient agent are the rst-best levels.
It then remains to solve this di¤erential system.
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Lemma 9 The di¤erential system (approximated for  small) gives the following
quantity schedules in the Stackelberg framework under asymmetric information:
estack() = be   bq   2[1  4]
qstack() = (bq   be)  2[1  2] (6.103)
Proof: see appendix E.
Proposition 10 The quantities of the environmental good is greater in the Stackel-
berg framework: estack()  enash(), with a strict inequality for  > : The agricul-
tural raw material (good q) has the same production level as in the Nash case, for all
: The leading principal manages to extract a larger part of the social welfare. The
follower extracts a non-zero social welfare (which is a better outcome for her with
respect to the perfect information framework). The di¤erent quantity schedules are
represented on gure (6.8).
Welfare comparisons show that the Stackelberg leader achieves a higher level of
welfare than if she were playing a Nash game (and assuming that the social welfares
are evenly distributed between the two regulators. We shall discuss shortly the multi-
ple equilibria problem regarding the Nash outcome). The table below illustrates our
point for the subsequent parameters:  = 0:01 and be = bq = 15:
Pe Pq Farmer
Nash 97.19 97.19 13.40
Stackelberg 167.52 26.86 13.43
The transfers and the production costs in the two frameworks under considera-
tion are given below:
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e
be bq
enash be bq 2 1 2
0 1
e be bq 1
estack be bq 2 1 4 em erged be bq 2 1
e
estack
enash
em erged
Fig. 6.6. Quantity schedules for the environmental good e under perfect information
and in the Nash and Stackelberg frameworks.
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Production cost U() te() + tq()
Nash 208.02 13.4 221.42
Stackelberg 208.60 13.43 222.03
The table below compares the welfare levels of the 3 entities in all the frameworks
discussed hitherto. As noted above, the sharing of the social welfare in the Nash
settings has been arbitrarily set to 1=2; 1=2; although these Nash equilibria leave the
sharing of the social welfares between the two principals unspecied.
Pe Pq Farmer
Perfect Information, Nash 200.18 200.18 0
Perfect Information, Stackelberg 400.36 0 0
Asymmetric information, Cooperation 97.19 97.19 12.88
Asymmetric information, Nash 97.19 97.19 13.40
Asymmetric information, Stackelberg 167.52 26.86 13.43
First of all, we may note that the Stackelberg setting (be it under perfect or
asymmetric information) has the advantage of selecting one equilibrium, while the
Nash outcomes were awed with a multiplicity of equilibria: in the Stackelberg frame-
work, the sharing of the social welfare is unambiguously determined.
Secondly, under asymmetric information, the shifting from a simultaneous con-
tract o¤er to a setting in which the environmental schedule is rst imposed gives (as
intuitively expected) a more favorable outcome to the Stackelberg leader, who man-
ages to withhold a more important share of the total social welfare.81 From a political
economy point of view, this means that the pre-eminence of the environmental as-
pects of the CAP reforms (imposed to the MS who bend towards the interests of
81 This result was of course all the more true under perfect information.
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their agricultural sector) tend to give the European Commission the bigger part of
the commonly shared aggregate social welfare.
Finally, comparing the Stackelberg perfect and asymmetric information settings,
one can observe that the follower manages to obtain a non-zero social welfare (albeit
relatively small) under asymmetric information, whereas she got zero under perfect in-
formation. This result may look a bit intriguing at rst sight, but it is easily explained:
the leading principal, when designing her contractual o¤er, has to take into account
the evolution of the farmersprot (for the contract to be incentive-compatible): un-
der asymmetric information, the farmer therefore manages to withhold an information
rent from both principals. As the following principals social welfare depends upon
the farmers prot, the leading principal indirectly leaves some social welfare to her
follower when focusing on designing an incentive-compatible schedule for her agent.
We could say that the follower free rides on the information rent of the farmer.
To sum up, the MS benets from the informational asymmetry that exist be-
tween the two regulators and the farmer. For the MS, the cost of supporting her
farmers is diminished thanks to informational asymmetry. The EU, although being
the Stackelberg leader, will have to help the MS pay a part of the support she awards
to her farmers.
Conclusion
This chapter has striven to study the consequences of the shifting from a Nash to a
Stackelberg setting in the contractual o¤ers made from two regulatory entities (agri-
218
References to Chapter 6
cultural and environmental principals) to farmers. As expected, the environmental
regulator gains from playing rst. However, the asymmetric information between the
regulators and the agricultural sector tends to mitigate the loss of social welfare for
the follower, who manages to end up with a non-zero benet. This framework can
apply to various environmental policies for which the regulatory powers are shared
between the two levels of regulation. The setting of stringent environmental stan-
dards in the latest reforms of the CAP may be linked to the shift in the setting of the
game being played between the two regulators, the EU gaining a leadership position.
As the emergence of biofuel policies tend to show, the economic support directed
to agriculture will more and more be borne by MS. Hence, the future of agricultural
policies will most likely be characterized by re-nationalization. However, this re-
nationalization would be only partial, dealing primarily with the economic support
to the production of agricultural commodities. The environmental regulation of the
agricultural production will still be required, and it seems that the environmental
issues are better taken care of at the EU level. Therefore, the question of the compe-
tition in the regulation of agriculture between these two entities is bound to emerge
in future EU negotiations.
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The agents program second-order conditions (Proof A)
We derive the second-order conditions of the agents maximization problem. In order
to address this question, we need to study the signs of the agents Hessian matrix,
H(e; q): Its expression is the following:
H(e; q) =

See   Cee  Ceq
 Cqe Tqq   Cqq

(6.104)
This matrix must be negative semi-denite. The agents maximization problem
is therefore concave if the following conditions are satised:
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8<: (See   Cee)(Tqq   Cqq)  (Ceq)
2 > 0
See   Cee < 0
Tqq   Cqq < 0
(6.105)
Regulator separation. First-order conditions (Proof B)
Following82 Martimort and Stole (2002) and Salanié (2005), a new cost function which
takes account of the agents optimal behavior facing the contract o¤ered by Pe is
introduced: This "residual" cost function vis-à-vis Pq may be written as:83
bCq(q; ;S) = min
e
C(e; q; )  S(e) (6.106)
This function determines the cost borne by the  type farmer when he produces
a quantity q for principal Pq, knowing that he has optimized the quantity E(q; ;S) he
chooses in the nonlinear schedule o¤ered by Pe and that he has received the payment
corresponding to this quantity. We have:84
E(q; ;S) = argmin
e
C(e; q; )  S(e) (6.107)
82 Note that appendix B is rigorously identical to the developments conducted in Chapter 5. This proof
can therefore be skipped by the reader if he has already read section (5.4).
83 We symmetrically dene bCe(:) as:
bCe(e; ;T ) = min
q
C(e; q; )  T (q)
84 Likewise,
Q(e; ;T ) = argmin
q
C(e; q; )  T (q)
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Facing the nonlinear schedules o¤ered by the two principals, the agents prob-
lem is the following program. Its maximum is equivalently determined by the three
maximization programs below:85
U() = max
e;q
S(e) + T (q)  C(e; q; ) (6.108)
= max
q
T (q)  bCq(q; ;S)
= max
e
S(e)  bCe(e; ;T )
The solutions e() and q() of program (6.108) also verify: e() = E(q(); ;S)
and q() = Q(e(); ;T ):
By application of the envelope theorem, the incitation constraint of the agent
which must be taken into account by both principals can equivalently be written in
the three following ways, in relation with the three maximization programs presented
above:
:
U() =  C(e(); q(); ) =   bCq (q(); ;S) =   bCe(e(); ;T ) (6.109)
Principal Pq solves the following maximization program, which accounts for the
agents participation and incitation constraints.
85 The second-order conditions of the agents program are discussed in the appendix.
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max
T (:);q(:)
EfBq(q())  T (q())g
s:t:
 :
U() =   bCq (q(); ;S)
U()  0
As
:
U() =   bCq (q(); ;S) =  C(e(); q(); ) < 0; the rent function is strictly
decreasing in : It su¢ ces that the participation constraint be binding in  to ensure
that all types wish to participate. Moreover, as T (q()) = U() + bCq(q(); ;S); Pqs
program can be rewritten as:
max
q(:);U(:)
Z 

n
Bq(q())  bCq(q(); ;S)  U()o f()d
s:t:
 :
U() =   bCq (q(); ;S)
U() = 0
(6.110)
By an integration by parts, we may replace U() by the expression of its deriv-
ative in ;
:
U():
Z 

U()f () d =  
Z 

:
U()F () d =
Z 

bCq (q(); ;S)F () d
It then remains for principal Pq to solve the following maximization program:
max
q(:)
Z 

n
Bq(q())  bCq(q(); ;S)  () bCq (q(); ;S)o f () d (6.111)
The rst-order condition in q gives:
Bqq (q
())  bCqq (q(); ;S)  () bCqq(q(); ;S) = 0 (6.112)
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A symmetric reasoning for regulator Pe leads to:
Bee(e
())  bCee(e(); ;T )  () bCee(e(); ;T ) = 0 (6.113)
As () = 0; the solutions for the most e¢ cient agent correspond to the rst-
best levels. It remains to replace the "residual" cost function bCee (and its derivatives)
by the "real" cost function C. This is done following Salanié (2005).
Applying the envelope theorem to program (6.106), the derivatives of these two
functions with respect to parameter  are linked by the following equation.
bCq (q; ;S) = C(E(q; ;S); q; ) (6.114)
Upon derivation with respect to q, we get:
bCqq(q; ;S) = Ce(E(q; ;S); q; )@E@q + Cq(E(q; ;S); q; ) (6.115)
Replacing the "residual" cost functions with the real cost function in the two
expressions above gives us:
Bqq (q
()) Cq(e(); q(); ) ()
(
Ce(e
(); q(); )
@E
@q

(e();q())
+ Cq(e
(); q(); )
)
= 0
(6.116)
Bee(e
()) Ce(e(); q(); ) ()
(
Ce(e
(); q(); ) + Cq(e(); q(); )
@Q
@e

(e();q())
)
= 0
(6.117)
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Finally, @E=@q and @Q=@e must be replaced. The same path as Salanié (2005)
is followed: applying the implicit functions theorem to program (6.106)s rst-order
condition, we obtain:
See
@E
@q
= Cee
@E
@q
+ Ceq
And, upon rearranging terms:
@E
@q
=
Ceq
See   Cee
Then, in order to replace See in the previous expression, we suppose that an
equilibrium of the contract game (e(); q()) has been reached, and di¤erentiating
the agents rst-order condition with respect to :
See(e
())
:
e

() = Cee(e
(); q(); )
:
e

()+Ceq(e
(); q(); )
:
q

()+Ce(e
(); q(); )
which gives:
See(e
())  Cee(e(); q(); ) = Ceq(e
(); q(); )
:
q

() + Ce(e
(); q(); )
:
e()
and nally:
@E
@q

(e();q())
=
Ceq(e
(); q(); )
:
e

()
Ceq(e(); q(); )
:
q

() + Ce(e(); q(); )
The expression of @Q
@e
is obtained in a symmetric way:
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@Q
@e

(e();q())
=
Ceq(e
(); q(); )
:
q

()
Ceq(e(); q(); )
:
e

() + Cq(e(); q(); )
With the specied functions presented above, we get:
8<: b
e   ( + e() + q())  ()
n
1 + 
:
q

()

:
e

()+1
o
= 0
bq   ( + q() + e())  ()
n

:
e

()

:
q

()+1
+ 1
o
= 0
(6.118)
Nash under asymmetric information: approximation of
quantity schedules (Proof C)
Taking  ' 0, the di¤erential system can be conveniently simplied:
be   ( + e() + q())   f1 +  :q()g = 0 (6.119)
bq   ( + q() + e())   f1 +  :e()g = 0 (6.120)
Di¤erentiating equation (6.120) with respect to ;we get:
 1  :q()   :e()  1   :e()   ::e() = 0 (6.121)
Hence,
:
q() can be expressed in the following way:
:
q() =  2  2 :e()   ::e() (6.122)
Rewriting (6.120), q() takes the subsequent expression:
q() = bq      e())   f1 +  :e()g (6.123)
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And, replacing q() and
:
q() in the equation (6.119):
be   ( + e() + q())   f1 +  :q()g = 0 (6.124)
be 2 e() [bq  e())  f1 +  :e()g] [ 2 2 :e()  ::e()] = 0 (6.125)
Neglecting the terms in 2, we nally obtain:
enash() = be   bq   2[1  2] (6.126)
And, after replacing e() in equation (6.120)
qnash() = (bq   be)  2[1  2] (6.127)
Which gives the result.
Stackelberg perfect information framework (Proof D)
The rst-order conditions can conveniently be stated using the simple specications
we have already used in the Nash framework.
For all ; the two goods are produced at their rst-best levels:

be =  + eF () + qF ()
bq =  + qF () + eF ()
(6.128)
The resolution of this system is straightforward and leads to:
(
e() = b
e bq (1 )
1 2
q() = b
q be (1 )
1 2
(6.129)
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We derive the transfers from both principals to the agent, using the fact that
both the agent and principal Pq are maintained at their reservation utility levels, i.e.
zero.
Pqs utility level set at zero allows to derive the transfers ft()g2 :
t() = bqq() = bq

bq   be   (1  )
1  2

And the agents zero utility level enables us to derive Pes payments fs()g2.
s() + t()  C(e(); q(); ) = 0
s() = C(e(); q(); )  t()
s() = 

be   bq   (1  )
1  2

+

bq   be   (1  )
1  2

+
1
2
(
be   bq   (1  )
1  2
2
+

bq   be   (1  )
1  2
2)
+

be   bq   (1  )
1  2

bq   be   (1  )
1  2

 bq

bq   be   (1  )
1  2

Taking the simplest case where the principalsmarginal surpluses are chosen
equal: be = bq = b; with b > ; 8 ; we therefore have the symmetric production
levels:
e() = q() =
b  
1 + 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And the principalstransfers to the agent take the following expressions:
t() = bq() = b

b  
1 + 

and
s() =
(b  )
1 + 
Stackelberg under asymmetric information: approximation of
quantity schedules (Proof E)
Taking  ' 0, the di¤erential system can be conveniently simplied:
be   ( + e() + q())  3 f1 +  :q()g+ 2 = 0 (6.130)
bq   ( + q() + e())   f1 +  :e()g = 0 (6.131)
Di¤erentiating equation (6.131) with respect to ;we get:
 1  :q()   :e()  1   :e()   ::e() = 0 (6.132)
Hence,
:
q() can be expressed in the following way:
:
q() =  2  2 :e()   ::e() (6.133)
Rewriting (6.131), q() takes the subsequent expression:
230
Appendix
q() = bq      e())   f1 +  :e()g (6.134)
And, replacing q() and
:
q() in the equation (6.130):
be   ( + e() + q())  3 f1 +  :q()g+ 2 = 0 (6.135)
be 2 e() [bq  e())  f1 +  :e()g] 3[ 2 2 :e()  ::e()] = 0 (6.136)
Neglecting the terms in 2, we nally obtain:
estack() = be   bq   2[1  4] (6.137)
And, after replacing e() in equation (6.131)
qstack() = (bq   be)  2[1  2] (6.138)
Which gives the result.
Su¢ cient condition to have a strictly decreasing prot function
for the follower [
:
V
q
(;S) < 0] (Proof F)
We look for a su¢ cient condition to have
dV q(;S)
d
=  (1 +
:
()) bCq (q(); ;S)  () bCq(q(); ;S) < 0 (6.139)
We must have :  2(e() + q())   :e() < 0:
replacing
:
e() using (6.131), we get:
231
Appendix
 2(e() + q())  b
q   2   q()  e()

< 0 (6.140)
 2e()  2q()  bq + 2 + q() + e() < 0
bq > 2 + (1  2)q()  e()
It therefore su¢ ces to choose bq large enough.
Discussion on the denition of the prot chosen for the
principal
In this section we discuss the two alternative denitions of a principals prot in her
relationship with a  type agent:
 Let () be the prot achieved ex post with an agent of type ; when the
contract between the principal and the agent is realized.
We have
() = B(e())  t() (6.141)
= B(e())  C(e(); )  U()
= B(e())  C(e(); ) 
Z 

Cx(e (x) ; x)dx
 In contrast, let V () be the net economic prot that the principal considers
ex ante before to o¤er a contract to a  type agent:This seems to be the
more economically appealing prot since it takes into account the productive
e¢ ciciency of the relationship with agent  on the one hand and the cost of
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the informational rents given away to more e¢ cient agents on the other hand.
V () is dened by:
V () = B(e())  C(e(); )  F ()
f()
C(e(); ) (6.142)
Of course, these two alternative denitions of prots have equal expectations:
E() = EV () (6.143)
This claim is proven straightforwardly:
E() =
Z 

()f()d =
Z 

fB(e())  C(e(); )  U()gf()d
=
Z 

fB(e())  C(e(); ) 
 Z 

Cx(e (x) ; x)dx
!
gf()d
=
Z 


B(e())  C(e(); )  F ()
f()
C(e(); )

f()d
= EV ()
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While rst-generation biofuels are obtained from storage organs, second-generation biofuels are pro-
duced froms lignocellulose, which is the main building block of vegetal cell walls. There are two tech-
nologies to transform lignocellulose into second-generation biofuels: thermochemical or biochemical
conversion. It seems noteworthy to give some basic explanations about the technical di¤erences be-
tween the two ways of conversion, since the economic situation resulting from the adoption of either
tecchnology will be quite di¤erent. The thermochemical conversion The thermochemical con-
version consists in breaking up molecules by the action of temperature in various physico-chemical
conditions. This method of transformation aims at converting the cellulosic biomass into two ele-
mentary gases, carbon monoxide (CO) and hydrogen (H2). This gaseous mix, referred to as syngas,
is then puried and used to synthetize liquid fuels, notably through Fischer-Tropsch synthesis. The
quality of the lignocellulosic raw material is crucial for the thermochemical conversion: the variability
of the mineral and water contents constitutes the major hurdle for this type biomass conversion. A
wide array of fuels can be obtained through Fischer-Tropsch synthesis: they are identical to fossil hy-
drocarbures. The biochemical conversion The biochemical conversion technology (also referred
to as biological conversion) aims at producing one type of biofuel principally: ethanol. This trans-
formation rests on biochemical processes (conversions thanks to microorganisms and enzymes) ; it
also involves physico-chemical processes. The biochemical conversion consists in breaking down the
lignocellulosic biomass into elementary organic molecules, most notably into simple sugar molecules,
which can be thereafter converted into ethanol by fermentation. Just as in the thermochemical con-
version, the composition of the lignocellulosic raw material represents one of the major constraints of
its conversion through the biochemical conversion. However, all kinds of biomass share the presence
of 3 majors macromolecular compounds: cellulose, hemicellulose and lignins. Cellulose is a linear
polymer made up of glucose, a 6-carbons sugar which can be transformed into ethanol by numer-
ous microorganisms. Hemicelluloses are sugar heteropolymers whose monomers are made up most
often of 5 carbon atoms, sometimes 6. Hemicelluloses therefore represent a potentially signicant
source of fermentiscible sugars. However, even if many bacterian and fungus microorganisms can
metabolize those sugars, their fermentation into ethanol is a much rarer path. Lignins are complex
heteropolymers whose monomers derive from 3 alcools with phenolic cycle. Some microorganisms
are able to catabolize these sugars naturally, but with a very low yield which prevents to imagine
any industrial development.
Box 10: The two possible technologies for the second generation of biofuels. This is adapted from
an article by Gosse, G. et al., entitled "La seconde génération de biocarburants", published in the
Biofuel Survey under the supervision of Tréguer, D., Déméter 2008, 352 pp.
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General Conclusion
This dissertation has striven to analyze the main economic problems linked to
biofuel policies. More precisely, this thesis has attempted to enlighten the strong links
that exist between biofuel and agricultural policies. First and foremost, the central role
of the State in the development of biofuel policies has been stressed in the rst part of
this thesis. Indeed, biofuel development rests on a strong commitment from the State,
which translates into the enforcement of incentives (subsidies and mandatory blending
mainly) aimed at ensuring the production of a desired quantity of biofuels. Owing to
the sizeable budgetary cost of biofuel subsidies, the support directed to biofuels slowly
evolves towards mandatory blending policies, which transfers the burden of biofuel
support from taxpayers to consumers. The objectives put forward by the states
to justify the development of biofuels are numerous (e.g. security of supply, GHG
emission reduction, rural development, etc.). However, the main objective of biofuel
policies boils down to agricultural income concerns, as the simple welfare analyses led
in Chapter 1 have shown. The tight link between biofuel policies and the support
to farmers income is further demonstrated in the case of France in Chapter 2: the
justications of biofuel policies as energy policies appear particularly weak. Besides,
the analysis conducted for France shows that biofuel producers have beneted from
very high subsidies, far more than what was necessary to break even.
The second part of the dissertation has investigated the close links between
biofuel policies and the present CAP (Chapters 3 & 4). The next reforms of the
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CAP will need to integrate the new central position held by biofuels. Thus, Chapter
3 has studied the possible substitutions between traditional decoupled payments and
the new support for biofuel policies. The main result reached in our analysis is that
it might be welfare-improving to move from an agricultural policy which transfers
decoupled payments to the farmers towards a policy in which the decoupled payments
would have been reduced, partially substituted for by the support to biofuel (either
subsidies or mandatory blending schemes). This result rests on the hypothesis that
the distortions in the economy are su¢ ciently high. We have no clear indication
yet that the next reform of the Common Agricultural Policy will follow that trail.
Nevertheless, it seems obvious that biofuel policy o¤ers a new economic support to
the agricultural sector, which therefore benets from a dual support.
Besides, biofuel production is likely to put an increased pressure on the envi-
ronment, since it triggers price hikes. The environmental regulation concerning the
agricultural production ought to take this new framework into account. The model
developed in Chapter 4 shows the problems facing the regulators for enforcing envi-
ronmental policies in agriculture. While the latest reforms of the CAP had evolved
towards the setting of stringent environmental standards, biofuel policies raise issues
regarding the enforcement of these standards: if the scenario of a decrease in the
level of decoupled payments materializes, the penalties in the framework of cross-
compliance (a fraction of the Single Farm Payment) will lose their role as credible
deterrents. Hence, we show that a xed penalty would be more e¢ cient than a frac-
tion of the decoupled payment in this new biofuel setting.
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While the second part of this dissertation modelled the agricultural sector as a
representative farmer, the third part explicitely takes into account the heterogeneity of
the agricultural sector. Chapter 5 has exposed a framework well-suited to consider the
duality of agricultural production, under asymmetric information: Common Agency
theory. Finally, Chapter 6 has striven to model the competition between two levels of
regulation: the EU and the Member State (MS) levels, in the case where one regulator
is a Stackelberg leader. In the setting where the EU is the Stackelberg leader, we
show that the introduction of an informational asymmetry between the farmer and his
regulator ends up to a situation in which the follower manages to withhold a benet,
while the perfect information setting leaves him with a zero benet. Hence, even if
the Stackelberg leader (in our model, the EU) manages to extract the bigger part of
the social benet, the follower nevertheless ends up with a non-zero benet thanks to
informational asymmetry. The MS benets from the informational asymmetry that
exist between the two regulators and the farmer. For the MS, the cost of supporting
her farmers is diminished thanks to informational asymmetry. Should future reforms
of the Common Agricultural Policy evolve towards re-nationalization after 2013, it
seems highly possible that the EU Commission will keep the environmental regulation
in its grasp. Hence, the question of the consequences of regulation separation between
the EU and the MS (the EU regulator being the leader) might well become a lively
issue in the future.
Finally, it seems worth stressing that biofuel policies are nothing more than
policies bearing a close link with agricultural policies. Touting biofuels as the universal
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solution to the GHG emissions in the transport sector has been overused by their
promotors, who are experimenting today a powerful backlash as evidence grows that
biofuels record concerning GHG emissions are not so good (even negative when taking
account of the land use changes, cf Searchinger et al. and Fargione et al., 2008) and
their responsibility in the recent price hike in agricultural markets might be sizeable
(according to a recent unpublished report from the World Bank). Hence, handing
out large amount of subsidies for biofuel production (or, equivalently, setting up
mandates) seems a misguided policy. It is high time that these policies be ground to
a halt. A moratorium on biofuels would help take the time for a thorough reection
on the implications of biofuel production (such a reection should have been carried
out before launching large biofuel programs).
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Lobjectif de cette thèse est détudier les politiques de promotion des biocarbu-
rants sous langle de léconomie publique. Plus précisément, son but est déclairer les
liens très étroits qui existent entre les politiques de biocarburants et les réformes de la
Politique Agricole Commune (PAC), passées, présentes et à venir. Au début simple
mesure liée à la réforme de la PAC de 1992 (la mise en place dune jachère obliga-
toire avait permis la production de cultures énergétiques sur cette terre interdite aux
productions alimentaires), les biocarburants se sont récemment a¢ rmés comme une
composante essentielle de lagriculture européenne. En e¤et, bien que les politiques
de biocarburants ne soient pas formellement un élément de la PAC, les répercussions
quelles engendrent sur les marchés agricoles créent de fait un lien très étroit avec la
PAC. Létude des liens des politiques de biocarburants avec les di¤érentes réformes
de la PAC constitue le l conducteur de cette thèse.
Il convient avant tout de rappeler ce que sont les biocarburants : il sagit de
substituts aux carburants dorigine fossile obtenus à partir dune matière première
dorigine végétale. Léthanol (obtenu à partir de plantes sucrières comme la canne ou
la betterave à sucre ou de lamidon de céréales : blé, maïs, orge...) remplace lessence
et le biodiesel (obtenu par estérication dune huile végétale de colza, soja, palme,
tournesol ou coton avec un alcool, le méthanol principalement) remplace le diesel.
Les politiques de biocarburants sont mises en place à linitiative des Etats, qui as-
surent la production de biocarburants par le biais de subventions (ou, de manière
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équivalente, de déscalisation partielle des droits daccise sappliquant aux biocar-
burants) ou de mécanismes dincorporation obligatoire. Sans ces mesures de soutien
décidées par les Etats, la production de biocarburants ne serait pas viable.86 Ces
politiques sont souvent justiées par les avantages économiques qui leur seraient as-
sociées : lutte contre les émissions de gaz à e¤et de serre dans les transports,87 emploi
rural, sécurité énergétique, etc. Toutefois, leur intérêt très fort comme instruments de
soutien des revenus agricoles (via la hausse des prix des matières premières agricoles)
nest généralement pas mis en avant. LUnion Européenne (UE) na ainsi jamais ex-
plicitement retenu cet objectif pour justier sa politique de biocarburants. Pourtant,
force est de constater que les politiques de biocarburants ne sont compréhensibles
quà travers le prisme des politiques agricoles.
Cette thèse sarticule autour de trois parties, qui visent chacune à éclairer sous
un angle di¤érent les liens entre les politiques de biocarburants et les évolutions de
la PAC.
Dans une première partie, les politiques de biocarburants mises en place par les
di¤érents Etats Membres de lUE seront détaillées. De plus, les raisons de lémergence
des politiques de biocarburants dans lUE sera expliquée (Chapitre 2). En outre,
la production de biocarburants sera comparée aux "anciennes" politiques agricoles,
antérieures à la réforme du début des années 90.
86 Ainsi, même au Brésil, la production de biocarburants na été rentable que quelques mois au cours de
lannée 2005. Le reste du temps, les déscalisations mises en place par lEtat fédéral et les Etats producteurs
savèrent nécessaires (ESMAP, 2007).
87 Deux articles publiés en Février 2008 dans la revue Science : Searchinger et al. et Fargione et al.
remettent sérieusement en cause les bilans positifs attribués aux biocarburants en matière démission de gaz
à e¤et de serre.
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Dans une seconde partie, les conséquences de la production actuelle de biocar-
burants sur les prix des matières premières agricoles seront prises en compte an de
rééchir aux évolutions possible de la PAC actuelle, à la fois en termes de soutiens
aux agriculteurs (Chapitre 3 ) que du respect des politiques de conditionnalité (et
notamment déco-conditionnalité, Chapitre 4 ).
Enn, la dernière partie propose un nouveau cadre théorique de régulation pour
lagriculture européenne, dans lequel deux niveaux de régulation (lUE et les dif-
férents Etats Membres) contrôlent chacun un bien produit par un agriculteur. LUE88
sintéresse au bien environnemental (e.g. le¤ort de réduction démissions polluantes),
les Etats Membres possédant un secteur agricole important sont pour leur part in-
téressés par la production de commodités agricoles an daugmenter le revenu de leurs
agriculteurs. Ce cadre théorique vise à formaliser le dilemme auquel est confrontée
lagriculture, qui produit des commodités agricoles en quantités importantes (du fait
des prix élevés) et doit également respecter les dispositions environnementales qui ont
été intégrées dans la PAC. Ainsi, la théorie de lAgence Commune sera mobilisée pour
cette partie. Contrairement à la partie II dans laquelle nous étudions le comportement
dun agriculteur représentatif, nous prenons explicitement en compte lhétérogénéité
du secteur agricole, ainsi que lasymétrie dinformation existant entre les agriculteurs
et leurs régulateurs. Cette partie vise également à anticiper la PAC de laprès-2013, et
une possible re-nationalisation dune grande partie des aides attribuées aux agricul-
88 Les Etats Membres ne possédant pas un secteur agricole important et/ou attachant une grande impor-
tance au respect de lenvironnement sont considérés comme ayant des objectifs parfaitement alignés sur ceux
de la Commission Europénne.
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teurs. Dans ce cas de gure extrême, la régulation environnementale continuerait
dêtre décidée au niveau de lUE, alors que les Etats-Membres choisiraient le mon-
tant du soutien quils désirent accorder à leurs agriculteurs. Létude des interactions
entre ces deux niveaux de régulation fera lobjet du Chapitre 6, le Chapitre 5 étant
pour sa part destiné à présenter le cadre théorique de lAgence Commune.
Partie I
Le Chapitre 1 présente les deux principaux instruments utilisés pour promouvoir
la production des biocarburants : la déscalisation partielle des droits daccise et
lincorporation obligatoire.
 La déscalisation partielle des droits daccises est équivalente à une subvention
octroyée aux biocarburants et est donc supportée par les contribuables.
 Lincorporation obligatoire consiste à remplacer une partie des carburants
dorigine fossile par des biocarburants. Le surcoût (les biocarburants coûtant
plus cher que les carburants pétroliers auxquels ils se substituent) est payé par
les consommateurs.
Par ailleurs, ce premier chapitre détaille le cadre hétérogène du développement
des biocarburants au sein de lUE. LUE a xé des objectifs (non contraignants) de
5,75% dincorporation de biocarburants dans les carburants utilisés pour les trans-
ports terrestres en 2010, mais laisse les Etats Membres (EM) libres de décider des
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objectifs entre types de biocarburants (parts respectives de biodiesel et déthanol)
ainsi que des instruments économiques à mettre en place pour permettre la produc-
tion e¤ective de biocarburants.
Enn, le Chapitre 1 vise à souligner des points communs entre les politiques de
biocarburants et les "anciennes" politiques agricoles qui étaient en place jusquà la n
des années 80. Ces politiques consistaient à garantir un prix élevé aux producteurs.
Elles ont depuis été réformées en profondeur, évoluant vers des politiques de paiements
découplés. La production de biocarburants représente une demande supplémentaire
adressée au secteur agricole, qui provoque une augmentation des prix. Les e¤ets en
termes de bien-être pour les di¤érents agents de léconomie sont comparés à ceux des
"anciennes" politiques agricoles.
Le Chapitre 2 rappelle que la production de biocarburants a débuté à la faveur
dune disposition contenue dans la réforme de la PAC de 1992, qui prévoyait linstauration
dune jachère obligatoire an de réguler lo¤re agricole (en situation de surproduc-
tion). La production de cultures énergétiques était autorisée sur ces terres gelées
pour la production alimentaire. Les cultures énergétiques constituaient une solution
ad-hoc intéressante pour accompagner cette réforme importante de la PAC. Le colza
ester avait été préféré aux autres cultures énergétiques car, en raison de son faible ren-
dement, il permettait de couvrir la surface maximale de jachère pour une enveloppe
budgétaire donnée. Cette réforme de 1992 marquait la première étape dune mutation
de la PAC dun système de soutien aux prix à un soutien aux revenus. Ce chapitre vise
à étudier le cadre de la production de biocarburants existant avant les programmes
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de développement mis en place en 2004-2005. A laide dun modèle déquilibre partiel
développé par lINRA, nous étudions la répartition des surplus entre les divers acteurs
de la lière biocarburants. Ainsi, il apparaît que le gain des agriculteurs est modeste
par rapport au gain de lindustrie de transformation des biocarburants. En outre, ce
chapitre met en avant le caractère insu¢ sant de lexternalité CO2 pour justier les
soutiens économiques conséquents dont bénécient les lières de biocarburants. Enn,
laccent est mis sur les problèmes méthodologiques dans le calcul des bilans énergé-
tiques des biocarburants, notamment en ce qui concerne lutilisation des co-produits.
Pour conclure, nous montrons que les politiques de biocarburants sont nées grâce
à une disposition contenue dans la réforme de la PAC de 1992, et sont avant tout
un mode de soutien à lagriculture, et non de nouvelles lières énergétiques aptes à
rivaliser avec la lière pétrolière.
Partie II
Les politiques actuelles en faveur des biocarburants ne peuvent sexpliquer sans pren-
dre en compte les interactions entre celles-ci et les politiques agricoles, bien quil
ny ait pas formellement de lien entre la PAC et les politiques de biocarburants.
Lapparition dune nouvelle demande pour les productions agricoles a pour con-
séquence une augmentation sensible du prix des commodités agricoles. Ce chapitre
présente plusieurs études qui évaluent limpact des programmes de biocarburants sur
les prix des matières premières agricoles. La plupart des programmes de développe-
ment des biocarburants ont été initiés sous la pression des lobbies agricoles qui consid-
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èrent les biocarburants comme un nouveau débouché capable dendiguer la baisse des
revenus agricoles. Lémergence des politiques de soutien aux biocarburants pose le
problème dun soutien au secteur agricole (au sens large) qui est double : dune part,
lEtat verse des paiements découplés aux agriculteurs (Droit à Paiement Unique, mis
en place en janvier 2006 en France), dautre part, lEtat soutient les industries de bio-
carburants, dont les coûts de production excèdent la valorisation des biocarburants.
En raison du poids important de la PAC dans le budget de lUE et de la coexistence
de la PAC et des politiques en faveur des biocarburants, se pose la question de la
possibilité dune substitution partielle des aides PAC par les subventions aux biocar-
burants, et donc dun transfert du nancement des politiques agricoles de lUE vers
les Etats membres. Aux Etats-Unis, le programme éthanol qui a permis une hausse
sensible du prix du maïs a dores et déjà opéré cette substitution: même sils nont
pas été supprimés dun point de vue légal, les paiements contra-cycliques nont pas
été déclenchés lors des dernières récoltes. Pour un objectif de revenu agricole xé,
lEtat pourrait ainsi opérer une substitution partielle entre soutien au revenu agricole
et soutien aux industries de transformation de biocarburants.
Pour répondre à cette question, nous avons développé une analyse de la compéti-
tion entre usages alimentaires et énergétiques des productions agricoles. Résumons-en
les principales caractéristiques. Il sagit dun modèle faisant intervenir les di¤érentes
parties prenantes du dossier : lEtat, le secteur agricole, les industries de transfor-
mation des biocarburants et les industries agro-alimentaires. LEtat sest engagé à
développer le secteur des biocarburants, tout en maintenant un revenu garanti au
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secteur agricole. La hausse des revenus agricoles permise par laugmentation du prix
des commodités permet à lEtat de diminuer le paiement découplé agricole, tout en as-
surant un revenu seuil aux agriculteurs. Dans une première approche, lEtat possède
toute linformation nécessaire à lajustement de la subvention minimale nécessaire
aux industries des biocarburants pour que la production puisse se faire.
Par ailleurs, pour tenir compte de la contrainte budgétaire de lEtat, un facteur
(1+) est a¤ecté aux subventions accordées par lEtat,  étant le coût dopportunité
des fonds publics, qui résulte des distorsions dans léconomie liées aux impôts levés
pour pouvoir distribuer ces subventions.
Le principal résultat de ce chapitre est que lEtat a intérêt à mettre en place
une production de biocarburants, en dehors de tout intérêt environnemental, car une
redistribution de revenu va sopérer entre le secteur agro-alimentaire (dont les prots
vont séroder) et les agriculteurs (qui voient le produit de leurs ventes augmenter).
Pour assurer un niveau de revenu donné aux agriculteurs, lEtat va pouvoir diminuer
son enveloppe globale de subventions (au secteur de la transformation de biocarbu-
rants et aux agriculteurs directement sous forme de paiements découplés), et il y aura
donc globalement une baisse des distorsions dans léconomie. Ceci est principale-
ment dû au fait que le secteur agro-alimentaire (et les consommateurs de produits
alimentaires) va payer le surcoût de la matière première agricole : les contribuables
gagneraient à ce changement de politique, les consommateurs et lagro-industrie y
perdraient. Bien entendu, ce résultat repose entièrement sur lexistence de telles dis-
torsions dans léconomie à un niveau su¢ samment important, i.e. il faut que le coût
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dopportunité des fonds publics soit plus grand quune valeur seuil pour que la quan-
tité de biocarburants à produire soit strictement positive.
Ensuite, les politiques de biocarburants posent un problème pour la pérennité
des dispositifs environnementaux contenus dans la PAC. Remarquons tout dabord
quil y a une contradiction dans les termes entre le respect dun objectif ambitieux
de production de biocarburants, qui pousse (via le signal prix) à lobtention de ren-
dements élevés et donc à une intensication de la production agricole et ladoption
de pratiques agricoles respectueuses de lenvironnement.
Le Chapitre 4 présente dabord des dispositions environnementales liées à la
PAC et met en avant le problème de la mise en application et du respect des standards
environnementaux.
Avec la transition progressive dun soutien par les prix à un soutien au revenu,
la PAC avait opéré un renforcement concomitant des politiques de protection de
lenvironnement dans la production agricole. Ainsi, les aides découplées versées
aux agriculteurs sont progressivement devenues conditionnelles, et notamment éco-
conditionnelles (respect dun certain nombre de directives européennes de protection
de lenvironnement). Lobjectif des paiements découplés est double : dune part,
garantir un revenu minimum aux agriculteurs, dautre part, sassurer que la produc-
tion agricole sinscrit dans un cadre de bonne pratiques agronomiques et environ-
nementales. Le versement dun paiement découplé étant subordonné au respect de
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ces bonnes pratiques, le régulateur peut iniger une pénalité dun montant inférieur
ou égal au paiement découplé, et ne peut aller au-delà.89
Si les aides aux biocarburants se substituent partiellement aux aides agricoles
découplées, la conditionnalité perdra une partie de sa justication, de sa crédibilité et
de son e¢ cacité. Quels garde-fous pourraient alors être mis en place pour empêcher
la production intensive de cultures à vocation énergétique, favorisée par lattrait de
cours élevés des matières agricoles ? Les aides découplées résiduelles ne seront plus
le moyen unique de garantir un revenu aux agriculteurs (le soutien aux lières de
biocarburants aura partiellement pris le relais). Continueront-elles à remplir leur
rôle de garant de bonnes pratiques environnementales, alors même quelles seront
diminuées et donc (en supposant que leur non versement est la pénalité maximale
inigeable en cas de non-respect) perdront une partie de leur e¤et incitatif? Le
paiement découplé (toujours conditionné à de bonnes pratiques environnementales)
serait-il encore linstrument adapté, sachant que lincitation au non-respect de ces
pratiques (évasion) grandira avec le niveau du cours des commodités agricoles en
même temps que la pénalité maximale diminuera? Pour conserver un même niveau
dobjectif environnemental, il faudrait prévoir un renforcement des instruments, soit
en augmentant la fréquence des contrôles (ce qui augmentera bien entendu le coût
total du contrôle) et/ou en augmentant la pénalité inigée en cas de fraude, en lui
permettant de prendre une valeur supérieure au paiement découplé non versé. Si la
fréquence des contrôles naugmente pas, il faudra alors accepter dabaisser le niveau de
89 Dans la pratique, la pénalité ne représente quune faible part du paiement découplé.
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lobjectif environnemental. Dans ce chapitre, nous montrons quen cas de substitution
partielle des paiements découplés par le soutien aux biocarburants, il convient de
changer le type de pénalité inigée aux agriculteur en cas de non-respect des standards
environnementaux : la pénalité maximale nest plus le paiement découplé, mais un
paiement xe exogène.
Partie III
Cette dernière partie propose un nouveau cadre théorique de régulation pour lagriculture
européenne, dans lequel deux niveaux de régulation (lUE et les di¤érents Etats Mem-
bres) contrôlent chacun un bien produit par un agriculteur. LUE sintéresse au bien
environnemental (e.g. le¤ort de réduction démissions polluantes), les Etats Membres
possédant un secteur agricole important sont pour leur part intéressés par la produc-
tion de commodités agricoles an daugmenter le revenu de leurs agriculteurs. Ce
cadre théorique vise à formaliser le dilemme auquel est confrontée lagriculture, qui
produit des commodités agricoles en quantités importantes (du fait des prix élevés)
et doit également respecter les dispositions environnementales qui ont été intégrées
dans la PAC. Ainsi, la théorie de lAgence Commune sera mobilisée pour cette partie.
La Théorie des Contrats a récemment été enrichie dun nouveau cadre pour
étudier les comportements de compétition entre deux principaux : il sagit de la lit-
térature "Multiprincipal-Agent" (ou de lAgence Commune) qui a été initiée par les
articles de Stole (1991) et Martimort (1992). Elle fait aujourdhui encore lobjet
dabondants développements par ces deux auteurs (Martimort et Stole, 2003 et Mar-
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timort, 2006). Un jeu dagence commune met en relation un agent possédant une
information privée (son type), face à n principaux (en général, n = 2). Deux princi-
paux proposent de manière simultanée et non-coopérative des menus de contrats. Ces
contrats sont principalement des tarications non linéaires, qui sont signés pour une
seule période. Lorsque les deux activités sont des substituts dans la fonction dutilité
de lagent (cas de lagriculteur qui produit une culture alimentaire et une culture
énergétique), le comportement non coopératif des Principaux réduit les distortions.
Enn, le dernier chapitre sintéresse à la régulation du secteur agricole par deux
entités : un régulateur européen, contrôlant la production dun bien environnemental
par lagriculteur et le régulateur national (lEtat membre), intéressé pour sa part par
la production dun bien agricole "classique" et désirant augmenter les revenus de son
secteur agricole. Lobjectif de ce chapitre nest pas de comparer une situation (hy-
pothétique) dans laquelle les deux régulateurs seraient fusionnés par rapport à une
situation de compétition en Nash entre les régulateurs. Le but poursuivi consiste à
comparer deux situations de compétition entre les régulateurs : une compétition en
Nash avec une compétition en Stackelberg, dans laquelle le régulateur environnemen-
tal est le leader. Les cas dinformation parfaite et dasymétrie dinformation sont
traités.
Ce cadre théorique est appliqué à la prise en compte de lenvironnement dans
les réformes de la PAC. Nous considérons que les réformes successives de la PAC ont
abouti à un changement dans le déroulement du jeu entre le régulateur environnemen-
tal (lUE, dont les objectifs sont alignés avec les pays ayant un secteur agricole peu
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important et/ou très préoccupés par la protection de lenvironnement) et le régulateur
national (lEtat membre disposant dun grand secteur agrciole) : lUE, à la faveur no-
tamment de la montée des préoccupations environnementales, a su simposer comme
un leader de Stackelberg dans les négociations visant à réformer les dispositions en-
vironnementales de la PAC. La compétition entre les deux régulateurs a donc évolué
dun jeu en Nash, à un jeu en Stackelberg.
Ayant acquis cette position de leader, lUE pourra continuer à jouer son rôle de
régulateur dans la situation extrême (mais possible) dune renationalisation de la PAC
de laprès-2013 : les subventions à la production seraient alors à la charge des Etats,
mais il serait nécessaire de maintenir une régulation supra-nationale pour garantir le
respect des dispositions environnementales héritées des réformes de la PAC. Ainsi, ce
cadre théorique peut non seulement expliquer les évolutions observées au cours des
réformes passées de la PAC, mais également être utilisé pour les réformes futures de
la PAC, dans lesquelles la séparation entre les deux régulateurs seraient marquées de
manière très nette (renationalisation des soutiens à la production).
Les principaux résultats du chapitre sont les suivants :
 La comparaison entre le cas dune concurrence en Nash et en Stackelberg
montre que le niveau de production du bien environnemental est supérieur dans
le cas "Stackelberg" par rapport au cas "Nash", les biens agricoles "classiques"
étant pour leur part produits à des niveaux identiques dans les deux cas. Le
changement de la structure du jeu entre les deux régulateurs aboutit ainsi à
une meilleure prise en compte de lenvironnement.
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Synthèse
 La comparaison des cas "Stackelberg" en information parfaite et en information
asymétrique fait apparaître un intérêt pour lEtat membre (le suiveur) de
lexistence dune asymétrie dinformation entre lagriculteur et ses régulateurs :
le bien-être de lEtat membre est en e¤et supérieur dans le cas dune asymétrie
dinformation, ce dernier bénéciant de la rente informationnelle que le leader
de Stackelberg (le régulateur Européen) doit consentir à lagriculteur. Le fait
de ne pas être leader dans la mise en place de la politique nest donc pas si
pénalisant pour lEtat membre.
Conclusion
Cette thèse a cherché à mettre en avant les nombreux liens qui existent entre les
politiques de promotion des biocarburants et les évolutions de la PAC. Les nom-
breux mérites qui ont été attribués aux biocarburants au moment des lancements
des programmes depuis 2003-2004 sont aujourdhui remis en cause. En particulier,
lexternalité environnementale positive en matière démission de gaz à e¤et de serre
pourrait en fait se révéler être une externalité négative. La réexion sur le bien-fondé
des biocarburants (qui navait pas été menée au moment des décisions de vastes
programmes de biocarburants) est enn lancée. Un moratoire sur de nombreux pro-
grammes biocarburants semble inéluctable (et souhaitable).
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Summary:
Biofuels are being extensively developed around the world thanks to the support of states, which is
a necessary condition for their production. Thus, the focus of this dissertation is to study the regulation
of biofuel policies. More precisely, this work intends to enlighten the strong links between biofuel and
agricultural policies. Policies directed to biofuel production have changed dramatically over the past three
years, evolving from the status of a secondary policy within agricultural policies to the position of a
central policy at the crossroads of agricultural, environmental and energy policies. The work exposed in
this dissertation is divided in three parts. First, the reasons that have led to the sudden development
of biofuels are presented. Then, in a second part, the interactions of biofuel policies with the present
agricultural policies are dealt with. The aim of this second part is to assess the extent to which these
policies ought to be amended in order to account for the growing importance of energy crops in the
total agricultural production. Finally, the third part focuses on the new regulatory framework imposed by
the dual production of the agricultural sector (an environmental good and an agricultural commodity):
a Common Agency setting is chosen to address this issue. Hence, the common thread of all the ideas
developed in this dissertation is the mutual interactions that exist between biofuel and agricultural policies.
Biofuel policies have emerged thanks to the reform of the CAP in 1992, are now an important player of
the present CAP and will undoubtedly be a central issue in the future reforms of agricultural policies.
Keywords : Biofuels, Common Agricultural Policy, Welfare Economics, Contracts Theory.
Résumé:
Les biocarburants connaissent un développement rapide dans de nombreux pays grâce au soutien ap-
porté par les Etats, qui est une condition nécessaire de leur production. Ainsi, cette thèse vise à étudier
la régulation des politiques de soutien aux biocarburants. Plus précisément, ce travail a pour objectif
déclairer les liens étroits tissés entre les politiques de biocarburants et les politiques agricoles. Les poli-
tiques de biocarburants ont évolué de manière radicale au cours des 3 dernières années, passant du statut
de politique subordonnée à la politique agricole à une position centrale, à la croisée des politiques agri-
coles, environnementales et énergétiques. Le travail présenté dans cette thèse sarticule en trois parties.
Premièrement, nous présentons les raisons qui ont présidé au développement rapide des biocarburants. En-
suite, dans une seconde partie, les interactions des politiques de biocarburants avec les politiques agricoles
actuelles sont examinées. Cette seconde partie vise à évaluer les nécessaires modications à apporter aux
politiques actuelles an de tenir compte de limportance croissante des cultures énergétiques dans la pro-
duction agricole totale. Enn, une troisième partie sattache à étudier un nouveau cadre théorique pour
la régulation du secteur agricole, dont la production est duale (il produit à la fois un bien agricole "clas-
sique" et un bien environnemental) : la théorie de lAgence Commune est utilisée pour cette modélisation.
Ainsi, le l conducteur des idées développées dans cette thèse est létude des interactions entre politiques
de biocarburants et politiques agricoles. Les biocarburants sont apparus à la faveur dune réforme de la
PAC en 1992, sont maintenant des acteurs centraux de la PAC actuelle et représenteront sans conteste un
aspect incontournable des futures réformes des politiques agricoles.
Mots-Clés : Biocarburants, Politique Agricole Commune, Economie Publique, Théorie des Contrats.
